In Buddhist philosophy, svasaá¹Âvedana (also svasaá¹Âvitti) is a term which refers to the reflexive nature of consciousness, or the awareness of being aware. It was initially a theory of cognition held by the MahÃÂsaá¹Âghika and SautrÃÂntika schools while the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda-VaibhÃÂá¹£ika school argued against it.
The idea was famously defended by the Indian philosopher DignÃÂga, and is an important doctrinal term in Indian MahÃÂyÃÂna thought and Tibetan Buddhism. It is also often translated as self-cognition or self-apperception, and by Malcolm Smith as "one's own vidyÃÂ."
According to Zhihua Yao, the theory was first presented by the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghika school. Their view was preserved in the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda compendium of Abhidharma called the MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a and states:<blockquote>It is the nature (svabhÃÂva) of awareness (jñÃÂna) and so forth to apprehend, thus awareness can apprehend itself as well as others. This is like a lamp that can illuminate itself and others owing to its nature of luminosity.</blockquote> Jan Westerhoff notes that the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghikas accepted the doctrine of the natural luminosity of the mind and connects this with svasaá¹Âvedana, "such natural luminosity making it possible that consciousness does not just apprehend other things, but can also apprehend itself."
SarvÃÂstivÃÂda sources which discuss self-cognition mainly do so in order to refute the idea that a mind moment can know itself in that moment. These include the JñÃÂnaprasthÃÂna and MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a. However that does not mean the Sarvastivadins reject all theories of self cognition, they developed their own theory which argued that mind moments know themselves only reflexively in regards to the previous mind moments. As Zhihua Yao states, "in other words, the mind knows itself through a reflection of the past mind". The SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins use their metaphysical theory of the real existence of the past, present and future to allow for a present mind to take a past mind as itself.
SautrÃÂntika authors also discussed the theory. It was extensively covered by Harivarman, the author of the Tattvasiddhi-à ÂÃÂstra, and shows that he was in a dialogue with both Sarvastivada and MahÃÂsaá¹Âghika views. Harivarman's view argues against the MahÃÂsamghika's simultaneous model of self-cognition and instead argues that self-cognition is only seen in the course of successive moments of cognition. That is, it involves multiple mental processes which Harivarman considers as happening in the "present continuum" and is not a case of a single mind moment knowing itself but is a case of the mind grasping the "image" (ÃÂkÃÂra) of itself as it is fading away. This is also part of his account of how memory works.
The Buddhist philosopher DignÃÂga also defended a theory of svasaá¹Âvedana drawing on SautrÃÂntika and YogÃÂcÃÂra influences. For DignÃÂga, svasaá¹Âvedana is a kind of perception (pratyaká¹£a) which is an "internal awareness of mental consciousness" and his theory of perception also entails that it is non-conceptual (unlike the other source of valid cognition, anumÃÂna - inference). He asserts that svasaá¹Âvedana is a valid means to knowledge, just as sense-perception is. DignÃÂga gives three reasons for why cognition can grasp an object and itself.
Dharmakërti, DignÃÂga's most influential follower also defended svasaá¹Âvedana. He claimed that cognition and its object are the same because they are perceived together at the same time. If one could not perceive cognition, one could not perceive its content either. He argues that cognition cannot be cognized by another cognition because that would lead to infinite regress: the second cognition would require a third cognition to cognize it and so on.
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita summarizes DignÃÂga's and Dharmakërti's arguments for svasaá¹Âvedana in his Tattvasaá¹Âgraha. He also discusses two additional features of svasaá¹Âvedana.
Westerhoff also points out that à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's Tattvasaá¹Âgraha "argues that if an act of consciousness of some object x was not reflexively self-aware, it could also not be conscious of x."
According to Yao, the doctrine of self-cognition evolved out of a soteriological context in early materials. He points out that for the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghika, soteriological and epistemological senses of the doctrine were closely linked, and when SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins rejected the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghika, they also discussed self-cognition in the soteriological context of omniscience. Moreover, the SautrÃÂntikas referred to yogic practice when discussing their view that the mental consciousness is self-aware, and within early YogÃÂcÃÂra as well, the understanding of self-cognition was broad and included the sense of self-realization. However, after DignÃÂga, the doctrine developed in the context of an epistemic inquiry in which the soteriological and epistemological senses were clearly distinguished.
While Yao believes that it is important to maintain a technical distinction between the soteriological concept of "self-realization" (pratyÃÂtmasaá¹Âvedya) and the more epistemological "self-cognition" (svasaá¹Âvedana), he points out that in Chinese sources zi zheng èªè can be used to translate both terms, and that "[t]his ambiguity reflects a more complicated relationship, rather than a clear-cut distinction between the two concepts." Yao also observes that YogÃÂcÃÂra-Madhyamikas such as à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita and his disciple Kamalaà Âëla attempted a return to more soteriological concerns in their presentation of self-cognition, understanding it less as an epistemic process and more as "the very nature of consciousness." As Kamalaà Âëla states in his commentary on à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's Tattvasaá¹Âgraha: <blockquote>When Cognition is said to be 'self-cognisant', it is not meant that it is the apprehender or cogniser of itself; what is meant is that it shines,âÂÂbecomes manifested,âÂÂby itself,âÂÂby its very nature,âÂÂjust like the Light diffused in the atmosphere.</blockquote> Yao explains, "by rejecting the articulated epistemological formulations, they [i.e., à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita and Kamalaà Âëla] have returned to a MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghika position, according to which self-cognition is more simple, fundamental and soteriologically oriented." The YogÃÂcÃÂra-Madhyamaka synthesis was in keeping with the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda position on self-cognition. On the other hand, SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda thinkers such as Dharmakërti, PrajñÃÂkaragupta and JñÃÂnaà Ârëmitra exemplified a SautrÃÂntika-YogÃÂcÃÂra synthesis which aligned with the SautrÃÂntika tendency to articulate self-cognition within a more epistemological framework.
Svasaá¹Âvedana is at the root of a major doctrinal disagreement in Indian Mahayana Buddhism. While defended by the YogÃÂcÃÂra thinkers such as Dharmakërti and the eclectic à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita, it was attacked by Prasaá¹ gika Madhyamika thinkers such as Candrakërti and à ÂÃÂntideva. Since in Madhyamaka thought all dharmas are empty of inherent essence (svabhÃÂva), they argued that consciousness could not be an inherently reflexive ultimate reality since that would mean it was self validating and therefore not characterized by emptiness.
In Tibetan Buddhism there are various competing views regarding svasaá¹Âvedana (Tibetan: ranggi rig pa).
In the Nyingma school's Dzogchen tradition, svasaá¹Âvedana is often called 'the very nature of mind' (sems kyi chos nyid) and metaphorically referred to as 'luminosity' (gsal ba) or 'clear light' ('od gsal). A common Tibetan metaphor for this reflexivity is that of a lamp in a dark room which in the act of illuminating objects in the room also illuminates itself. Dzogchen meditative practices aim to bring the mind to direct realization of this luminous nature. In Dzogchen (as well as some MahÃÂmudra traditions) svasaá¹Âvedana is seen as the primordial substratum or ground (gdod ma'i gzhi) of mind.
Following Je Tsongkhapa's (1357âÂÂ1419) interpretation of the Prasaá¹ gika Madhyamaka view, the Gelug school completely denies both the conventional and the ultimate existence of reflexive awareness. This is one of Tsongkhapa's "eight difficult points" that distinguish the Prasaá¹ gika view from others. The Nyingma philosopher Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846âÂÂ1912) defended the conventional existence of reflexive awareness as per the Madhyamaka two truths doctrine. According to Mipham, the Prasaá¹ gika critique of reflexive awareness only applied to its ultimate inherent reality and not its conventional status.
Mipham gives a number of absurd consequences that would follow if the conventional existence of svasaá¹Âvedana were rejected. First, rejecting svasaá¹Âvedana would mean absurdly that one's own consciousness would be hidden to itself. Since one's own consciousness would not be known directly, one would have to rely on inference to know the state of one's own mind in any given moment. This argument draws on a threefold distinction made by DignÃÂga and Dharmakërti between: [1] evident objects which can be known by direct perception, [2] hidden objects which must be known by inference, and [3] very hidden objects (such as the precise details of karma and rebirth) which can only be known by the authority of the Buddha. Moreover, it follows from this that there would be no difference between the manner in which one knows one's own mind and the way in which one knows the mind of another person. As Williams explains, "just as one has to infer the existence of other minds, so one would have to infer the existence of one's own mind. Absurdly, one would know one's own mind in just the same way as one knows of the minds of other sentient beings." This would mean one would not be able to prove for oneself that one has a mind of oneâÂÂs own. Finally, if one's mind were hidden to itself, one could have no knowledge of cognitive referents either, and this would amount to a kind of annihilation of the "transactional conventions of awareness."
According to Zhihua Yao, Chinese developments in the doctrine of self-cognition can be divided into three phases: the old YogÃÂcÃÂra in China (which blended YogÃÂcÃÂra with Buddha-nature teachings), the new YogÃÂcÃÂra of Xuanzang and Kuiji, and contemporary YogÃÂcÃÂra studies beginning at the start of the twentieth-century. Yao observes that the old and new YogÃÂcÃÂra in China correspond respectively to views in India. According to the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda, consciousness is without different parts or divisions. Thus, self-cognition is reflexive and not involved with subjective and objective aspects of consciousness. The NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda position, according to which subject and object are illusory, is represented in the East Asian à ÂÃÂstra, the Awakening of Faith. On the other hand, the new YogÃÂcÃÂrins Xuanzang and Kuiji defended the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda view of DharmapÃÂla. According to their view, the various parts or divisions of consciousness (bhÃÂga) are real.
According to the Huayan patriarch Fazang, self-cognition is the original karmic appearance (yexiang) which causes the delusive world of samsÃÂra with all its suffering. In this, Fazang differed from certain YogÃÂcÃÂra views, such as that of DignÃÂga, according to which self-cognition is an effect of consciousness' subjective aspect perceiving its objective aspect. Fazang's view corresponds rather to that of the Awakening of Faith for which karmic appearance, being a state in which the mind is aware only of itself, is the cause of both the subjective aspect of consciousness as well as the illusory objective world. As Zhihua Yao explains, according to this view, karmic appearance, or self-cognition, "is not contributed by an external agency because the arising or awareness is inherent to the mind or reality itself."
The Korean commentator on the Awakening of Faith, Taehyeon (c. 750), argued that in addition to the five kinds of manas (mentation) enumerated in the text, there should be added another: svajÃÂtilaká¹£aá¹Âa, or "genuine appearance," which he borrows from the Laá¹ kÃÂvatÃÂra Sà «tra. For Taehyeon, genuine appearance is to be regarded as the first manas, as it is unconditioned and not dependent on any other manas. Since it possesses the nature of illumination, genuine appearance is thus the basis of the other five types of mentation (namely, karmic consciousness, or appearance; transformative consciousness; representative consciousness; intellectual consciousness; and continuous consciousness). Regarding self-cognition, Taehyeon states that it refers to both genuine and karmic appearance, corresponding to his first and second manas respectively.
According to the Huayan patriarch and Chan master Guifeng Zongmi, the essence of the true mind is awareness or knowing (çÂÂ¥; zhi). Zongmi takes the true nature to be a "spiritual Knowing that never darkens," describing mind as "aware in and of itself," or "spontaneously Knowing" (èªçÂÂ¥; zizhi). For Zongmi, knowing or awareness is thus a "direct manifestation of the very essence itself" (t'ang-t'i piao-hsien). Zongmi explains that the true mind has two types of functioning: one original and intrinsic, the other conditioned and responsive. According to Jenny Hung, ZongmiâÂÂs intrinsic functioning of the true mind refers to "reflexive awareness in and of itself," while the responsive function is "reflexive awareness with content." Zongmi gives the analogy of a bright mirror to illustrate their relationship: where the responsive function is likened to the appearance in response to conditions of various reflected images, the intrinsic function is likened to the mirror's constant brightness itself. He says, "The reflections appear [when the mirror] is face to face with objective supports. They appear in a thousand varieties, but the brightness is an intrinsically constant brightness. The brightness is just one flavor."
In Chan sources one can also find the term èª砧, zizhao, or self-illumination. For example, the Hongzhi Chanshi Guanglu of Chan master Hongzhi Zhengjue, who famously promoted the practice of silent illumination, contains the phrase æ¬å Âèª砧 (ben guang zi zhao), "the inherent light illuminates itself." Zizhao appears in earlier Chan works as well, such as the Xin Ming (Mind Inscription), attributed to Niutou Farong (594âÂÂ657):
<blockquote>Bodhi exists originally<br />It has no need of being preserved<br />Afflictions have no intrinsic existence<br />They do not need to be eradicated<br />Numinous knowing is self-illuminated [èª砧, zizhao]<br />The myriad dharmas return to Thusness<br />There is no return, no receiving<br />Cut off contemplation, forget preservation</blockquote>
See also the well-known Xinxin Ming (Faith-Mind Inscription), attributed to the third Chan Patriarch Sengcan though likely a product of the Oxhead School, which flourished during the Tang dynasty:
<blockquote>Nothing remains<br />Nothing is harboured in memory<br />Void, clear, self-illumining [èª砧, zizhao]<br />The heart-strength does not struggle<br />It is not the place of calculated thinking<br />Difficult for understanding and sentiment to fathom<br />In the Dharma realm of true Suchness<br />There is no other, no self</blockquote>
The Japanese Sà Âtà  Zen master Menzan Zuihà  (1683âÂÂ1769) comments in his Jijuyà «-Zanmai that this means that "the light of the Self shines brightly," saying that it is "similar to the light of a jewel illuminating the jewel itself." As such, there is no need to engage in mental struggle.