Shri-harsha (IAST: à Ârëhará¹£a) was a 12th century CE Indian philosopher and poet. à Ârëhará¹£a works discuss various themes in Indian Philosophy, such as pramana. He has been often interpreted as promoting Advaita VedÃÂnta in his Sweets of Refutation (Khaá¹Âá¸Âanakhaá¹Âá¸ÂanakhÃÂdya), however, this interpretation remains controversial among modern scholars. à Ârëhará¹£a's thought was influential for both NyÃÂya-Vaià Âeá¹£ika thinkers and also for the Advaita VedÃÂnta tradition.
à Ârëhará¹£a was born to a Kanyakubja Brahmin à Ârëhira and Mamalladevë. His father, à Ârëhira, was a poet in the court of the Gahadavala king Vijayachandra. His father was also a guide of common people towards god with vedas, Bhagavad Gita's thoughts etc. His father asked Harsha at the time of his death to study well and become a pandit. He told him to use his shiksha (education) towards making life of common people divinity oriented and better. Also, he told à Ârëhará¹£a to take thoughts of Bhagavad Gita to every one.
à Ârëhará¹£a had a classic Indian education at a gurukula, studying and living under guru's guidance. He mastered all scriptures and all schools of thoughts prevailing at that time. He famously wrote the Sweets of Refutation (Khaá¹Âá¸Âanakhaá¹Âá¸ÂanakhÃÂdya), which critiques the epistemology of the Nyaya school and the rational inquiry in general.
à Ârëhará¹£a spent his later life in ascetic serenity on the banks of River Ganga. He composed several works. These include Naiá¹£adhacarita, Khaá¹Âá¸Âanakhaá¹Âá¸ÂakhÃÂdya, Vijayaprasasti, Chindaprasasti, Gaudorvisakulaprasasti, Sahasankacarita, Arnavavarnana and Amarakhandana.
à Ârëhará¹£a's most well known philosophical text is the Khaá¹Âá¸Âanakhaá¹Âá¸ÂakhÃÂdya ("Sugar-candy Pieces of Refutations" or just Sweets of Refutation).
à Ârëhará¹£a thinks that any philosophical argument or view is subject to refutation-arguments (khaá¹Âá¸Âana-yukti) and thus all philosophical arguments are defeasible and are not sufficient evidence to believe in any philosophical view.
The work focuses on skeptical critiques of rational philosophical proofs, especially the epistemological system of the NyÃÂya-Vaià Âeá¹£ika philosophical school. His main critique is the inadequacy of the Nyaya definitions of the six philosophical categories they defend: substance (dravya), quality (guá¹Âa), action (karma), universal (sÃÂmÃÂnya), ultimate differentiator (vià Âeá¹£a), and the relation of inherence (samavÃÂya). à Ârëhará¹£a also critiques the Nyaya definition of knowledge, and argues that there may no single satisfactory definition.
à Ârëhará¹£a thinks that his critiques also provide evidence for the non-duality of consciousness, the view that only consciousness truly exists. Indeed, while à Ârëhará¹£a critiques almost all philosophical categories and views, including causality and the external world (apart from consciousness), he affirms the reality of consciousness.
According to à Ârëhará¹£a, all consciousness events are self-aware or self-revealing. Thus, consciousness knows itself, and this reflexive self-knowing is the only thing we need to know that consciousness is real. This view was commonly defended by the YogÃÂcÃÂra school of Buddhism, which defended the theory of self-reflexive awareness (svasamvedana).
à Ârëhará¹£a also seeks to show through his many critiques of rational Nyaya thought that using rationality to attempt to understand ultimate reality is a futile act. Thus, he thinks that rational argumentation cannot prove the dualistic system of Nyaya nor can it prove non-dualism either. Instead, he says that the method of knowing non-duality is a subtle awareness of non-duality which arises from contemplation based on hearing the words and great sentences (mahavakyas) of the Upaniá¹£ads.
One reading of the main idea of this text is that it seeks to show the instability of reason, and how any rational argument can be undermined by further reasoning. Thus, reasoning is always inconclusive. Because of this, à Ârëhará¹£a argues that Nyaya logicians should stop doing philosophy and have faith in the liberating power of the Upaniá¹£ads. à Ârëhará¹£a is thus radically different from the Advaita philosopher Saá¹Âkara, who held that reason can help us better understand ultimate truth. For à Ârëhará¹£a, reason is useless, only faith and the Upaniá¹£ads will lead us to the truth of non-duality.
à Ârëhará¹£a composed the kÃÂvya poem Naishadha Charita (IAST: Naiá¹£adhacarita) in 1174, during the reign of the Vijayachandra's son Jayachandra. According to RÃÂjaà Âekhara's Prabandhakoà Âa, upon the wide acceptance of Naishadha Charita, à Ârëhará¹£a was dignified with the title Narabharati.
The Naishadha Charita contains erotic themes, but according to the 15th-century Jain scholar Nayachandra Suri, à Ârëhará¹£a was actually a celibate, who had "conquered his sense organs" (jitendriya).
The Naishadha Charita was brought into Gujarat by Harihara during the reign of Vëradhavala to which Chandu Pandita in his Dipika, composed in 1296, refers to as a new poem and also to the commentary of VidyÃÂdhara. Naishadha Charita was composed earlier than Khaá¹Âá¸Âanakhaá¹Âá¸ÂakhÃÂdya in which text Sriharsha alludes to the works of Kalidasa.