Dharmakërti (fl. ) was an influential Indian Buddhist philosopher who worked at NÃÂlandÃÂ. He was one of the key scholars of epistemology (pramÃÂá¹Âa) in Buddhist philosophy, and is associated with the YogÃÂcÃÂra and SautrÃÂntika schools. He was also one of the primary theorists of Buddhist atomism. His works influenced the scholars of MëmÃÂá¹ÂsÃÂ, Nyaya and Shaivism schools of Hindu philosophy as well as scholars of Jainism.
Dharmakërti's PramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂrttika, his largest and most important work, was very influential in India and Tibet as a central text on pramana ('valid knowledge instruments'), and was widely commented on by various Indian and Tibetan scholars. His texts remain part of studies in the monasteries of Tibetan Buddhism.
Little is known for certain about the life of Dharmakërti. As per John Taber, the only reliable information that we have about his life was that he was a teacher at Nalanda. The Chinese monk, Yijing, who was a resident at Nalanda between the years of 675 and 685 CE, refers to Dharmakërti as a âÂÂrecentâ teacher. Yijing also mentioned that a Chinese traveller called Wuxing, was studying Dharmakërti's teachings at the Telhara monastery which is just a short distance away from Nalanda which indicates that Dharmakërti had attained fame as a logician in Magadha around 650âÂÂ660 CE.
Tibetan hagiographies suggest that Dharmakërti (Tibetan: à ½Âà ½¼à ½¦à ¼Âà ½Âà ¾±à ½²à ¼Âà ½Âà ¾²à ½Âà ½¦à ¼Âà ½Âà ¼Â; Wylie: chos kyi grags pa) was born into a Brahmin family of South India and was the nephew of the MëmÃÂá¹Âsàscholar KumÃÂrila Bhaá¹Âá¹Âa. When he was young, KumÃÂrila spoke abusively towards Dharmakërti as he was taking his Brahminical garments. This led Dharmakërti to take the robes of the Buddhist order instead, resolving to "vanquish all the heretics." As a student of Buddhism, he first studied under Isvarasena, and later moved to Nalanda where he interacted with the 6th century Buddhist scholar Dharmapala.
However, the accuracy of the Tibetan hagiographies is uncertain, and scholars place him in the 7th century instead. This is because of inconsistencies in different Tibetan and Chinese texts, and because it is around the middle of 7th century, and thereafter, that Indian texts begin discussing his ideas, such as the citation of Dharmakërti verses in the works of Adi Shankara. Dharmakërti is believed by most scholars to have lived between 600 and 660 CE, but a few place him earlier.
Dharmakërti is credited with building upon the work of DignÃÂga, the pioneer of Buddhist logic, and Dharmakërti has ever since been seen as influential in the Buddhist tradition. His theories became normative in Tibet and are studied to this day as a part of the basic monastic curriculum.
The Tibetan tradition considers that Dharmakërti was ordained as a Buddhist monk at NÃÂlandàby DharmapÃÂla. In his writings, we find the statement that no one will understand the value of his work and that his efforts would soon be forgotten.
The Buddhist works such as the Yogacarabhumi-sastra and the MahÃÂyÃÂnasà «trÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂra, composed before the 6th century, on hetuvidyà(logic, dialectics) are unsystematic, whose approach and structure are heresiological, proselytical and apologetic. They aimed were to defeat non-Buddhist opponents (Hinduism, Jainism, ÃÂjëvikism, Charvaka (materialists), and others), defend the ideas of Buddhism, develop a line of arguments that monks could use to convert those who doubted Buddhism and to strengthen the faith of Buddhists who began to develop doubts. Around the middle of the 6th century, possibly to address the polemics of non-Buddhist traditions with their pramana foundations, the Buddhist scholar DignÃÂga shifted the emphasis from dialectics to more systematic epistemology and logic, retaining the heresiological and apologetic focus. Dharmakërti followed in DignÃÂga's footsteps, and is credited with systematic philosophical doctrines on Buddhist epistemology, which Vincent Eltschinger states, has "a full-fledged positive/direct apologetic commitment". Dharmakërti lived during the collapse of the Gupta Empire, a time of great insecurity for Buddhist institutions. The role of Buddhist logic was seen as an intellectual defense against Hindu philosophical arguments formulated by epistemically sophisticated traditions like the Nyaya school. However, Dharmakërti and his followers also held that the study of reasoning and its application was an important tool for soteriological ends.
Dharmakërti's philosophy is based on the need to establish a theory of logical validity and certainty grounded in causality. Following DignÃÂga's PramÃÂá¹Âasamuccaya, Dharmakërti also holds that there are only two instruments of knowledge or 'valid cognition' (pramÃÂá¹Âa): "perception" (pratyaksa) and "inference" (anumÃÂá¹Âa). Perception is a non-conceptual knowing of particulars that is bound by causality, while inference is reasonable, linguistic, and conceptual. In the PramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂrttika Dharmakërti defines a pramana as a "reliable cognition". What it means for cognition to be reliable has been interpreted in different ways. Following commentators like Dharmottara, who define it as meaning that cognition can lead to the obtaining of one's desired object, some modern scholars such as Jose I. Cabezon have interpreted Dharmakërti as defending a form of Pragmatism. Tillemans sees him as holding to a weak form of correspondence theory, which holds that to "confirm causal efficacy" (arthakriyÃÂsthiti) is to have a justification that an object of cognition has the causal powers we expected. That justification comes through a certain kind of non-conceptual perception (pratyaká¹£a) which is said to be an "intrinsical source of knowledge" (svataḥ prÃÂmÃÂá¹Âya) which is ultimately reliable. Dharmakërti sees a cognition as being valid if it has a causal connection with the object of cognition through an intrinsically valid, un-conceptual perception of the object which does not err regarding its functionality. As Dharmakërti says: "A pramÃÂá¹Âa is a reliable cognition. [As for] reliability, it consists in [this cognition's] compliance with [the object's capacity to] perform a function" (PramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂrttika 2.1ac).
Dharmakërti also holds that there were certain extraordinary epistemic warrants, such as the words of the Buddha, who was said to be an authoritative/reliable person (pramÃÂá¹Âapuruá¹£a) as well as the 'inconceivable' perception of a yogi (yogipratyaká¹£a). On the role of scriptural authority, Dharmakërti has a moderate and nuanced position. For Dharmakërti, scripture (Buddhist or otherwise) is not a genuine and independent means of valid cognition. He held that one should not use scripture to guide one on matters that can be decided by factual and rational means and that one is not to be faulted for rejecting unreasonable parts of the scriptures of one's school. However, scripture is to be relied upon when dealing with "radically inaccessible things", such as the laws of karma and soteriology. However, according to Dharmakërti scripture is a fallible source of knowledge and has no claim to certainty.
Dharmakërti made significant contributions to Buddhist epistemology by refining the theory of inference, which addresses a central problem left unresolved by his predecessor, DignÃÂga. Dharmakërti's approach ensures that the evidence (e.g. smoke) must always be present when the predicate (e.g. fire) is present, thereby providing a stronger foundation for inferential reasoning.
According to Buddhologist Tom Tillemans, Dharmakërti's ideas constitute a nominalist philosophy which disagrees with the Madhyamaka philosophy, by asserting that some entities are real. Dharmakërti states that the real is only the momentarily existing particulars (svalaká¹£aá¹Âa), and any universal (sÃÂmÃÂnyalaká¹£aá¹Âa) is unreal and fiction. He criticized the Nyaya theory of universals by arguing that since they have no causal efficacy, there is no rational reason to posit them. What is real must have powers (à Âakti), fitness (yogyatÃÂ), or causal properties which is what individuates a real particular as an object of perception. Dharmakërti writes "whatever has causal powers (arthakriyÃÂsamartha), that exists (paramÃÂrthasat)." This theory of causal properties has been interpreted as a form of trope theory. Svalaká¹£aá¹Âa are said to be part-less, undivided, and property-less, and yet they impart a causal force which give rise to perceptual cognitions, which are direct reflections of the particulars.
Dharmakërti's ultimately real (paramÃÂrthasat) particulars are contrasted with conventionally real entities (saá¹Âvá¹Âtisat) as part of his presentation of the Buddhist Two truths doctrine. The conventionally real for him are based on linguistic categories, intellectual constructs, and erroneous superimpositions on the flow of reality, such as the idea that universals exist. According to Dharmakërti, cognitive distortion of the direct perception of particulars occurs during the process of recognition (pratyabhijñÃÂna) and perceptual judgment (nià Âcaya) which arises due to latent tendencies (vÃÂsanÃÂ) in the mind left over from past impressions of similar perceptions. These latent dispositions come together into constructed representations of the previously experienced object at the moment of perception, and hence it is an imposed error on the real, a pseudo-perception (pratyaká¹£ÃÂbhÃÂsa) which conceals (saá¹Âvá¹Âti) reality while at the same time being practically useful for navigating it. Ignorance (avidyÃÂ) for Dharmakërti is conceptuality, pseudo-perception and superimposition overlaid on the naturally radiant (prabhÃÂsvara) nature of pure perception. By correcting these defilements of perception through mental cultivation as well as using inference to gain "insight born of (rational) reflection" (cintÃÂmayë prajñÃÂ) a Buddhist yogi is able to better see the true nature of reality until his perception is fully perfected.
Dharmakërti, again following DignÃÂga, also holds that that things as they are in themselves are "ineffable" (avyapadeà Âya). Language is never about the things in themselves, only about conceptual fiction, hence they are nominalists. Due to this theory, the main issue for Dharmakërti becomes how to explain that it is possible for our arbitrary and conventional linguistic schemas to refer to perceptual particulars that are ineffable and non-conceptual. To explain this gap between conceptual schema and perceptual content, Dharmakërti takes up DignÃÂga's theory of "exclusion" (apoha). DignÃÂga's view is that "a word talks about entities only as they are qualified by the negation of other things." Dharmakërti's unique take on this nominalist theory, which underlies his entire system, is to reinterpret it in terms of causal efficacyâÂÂarthakriyà(which can also be translated as 'telic function', 'functionality', and 'fulfillment of purpose').
Dharmakërti developed his philosophical system to defend Buddhist doctrines, so it is no surprise that he developed many of the arguments for rebirth, the Four Noble Truths, the authority of the Buddha, karma, anatta, and compassion as well as attacking Brahminical views such as the authority of the Vedas.
Dharmakërti also defended the Buddhist theory of momentariness (ká¹£aá¹Âikatva), which held that dharmas spontaneously perish the moment they arise. Dharmakërti came up with an argument for the theory which stated that since anything that exists has a causal power, the fact that its causal power is in effect proves it is always changing. For Dharmakërti, nothing could be a cause while remaining the same, and any permanent thing would be causally inert.
Dharmakërti defends DignÃÂga's theory of consciousness being non-conceptually reflexive (svasamvitti or svasaá¹Âvedana). This is the idea that an act of intentional consciousness is also aware of itself as aware. Consciousness is said to illuminate itself like a lamp that illuminates objects in a room as well as itself. Dharmakërti also defends the YogÃÂcÃÂra theory of "awareness-only" (vijñaptimÃÂtratÃÂ), which holds that 'external objects' of perception do not exist. According to Dharmakërti, an object of cognition is not external or separate from the act of cognition itself. This is because the object is "necessarily experienced simultaneously with the cognition [itself]" (PramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂrttika 3.387). The view that there is a duality (dvaya) between an object (grÃÂhya) and a subjective cognition (grÃÂhaka) arises out of ignorance.
Dharmakërti's Substantiation of Other Mindstreams (Saá¹ÂtÃÂnÃÂntarasiddhi) is a treatise on the nature of the mindstream and Buddhist response to the problem of other minds Dharmakërti held the mindstream to be a beginning-less yet also described the mindstream as a temporal sequence, and that as there are no true beginnings, there are no true endings, hence, the "beginningless time" motif that is frequently used to describe the concept of mindstream.
There is disagreement among Indian and Tibetan doxographers as to how to categorise Dharmakërti's thoughts. The Gelug school asserts that he expressed YogÃÂcÃÂra views, most non-Gelug Tibetan commentators assert that he expressed SautrÃÂntika views and, according to one Tibetan source, several of renowned later Indian Madhyamikas asserted that he expressed Madhyamaka views.
Among modern scholars, some like Tillemans argue that Dharmakërti represented the YogÃÂcÃÂra school, while Amar Singh argues that he was a SautrÃÂntika. For Christine Mullikin Keyt, Dharmakërti represents a "synthesis of two schools of Indian Buddhism, the Sautrantika and the Yogacara." Likewise, Dan Arnold argues that Dharmakërti's alternating philosophical perspectives of SautrÃÂntika and YogÃÂcÃÂra views are ultimately compatible and are applied at different levels of his 'sliding scale of analysis.'
There is also a tendency to see DignÃÂga and Dharmakërti as founding a new type of Buddhist school or tradition, which is known in Tibetan as "those who follow reasoning" () and sometimes is known in modern literature as pramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂda.
Dharmakërti is credited with the following major works:
There are various commentaries by later thinkers on Dharmakërti, the earliest commentators being the Indian scholars Devendrabuddhi (ca. 675 CE.) and Sakyabuddhi (ca. 700 C.E.). Other Indian commentators include Kará¹Âakagomin, PrajñÃÂkaragupta, Manorathanandin, Ravigupta and à Âaá¹ karanandana.
He was extremely influential in Tibet, where Phya pa Chos kyi Seng ge (1182-1251) wrote the first summary of his works, called "Clearing of Mental Obscuration with Respect to the Seven Treatises on Valid Cognition" (tshad ma sde bdun yid gi mun sel). Sakya Pandita wrote the "Treasure on the Science of Valid Cognition" (tshad ma rigs gter) and interpreted Dharmakërti as an anti-realist against Phya pa's realism. These two main interpretations of Dharmakërti became the foundation for most debates in Tibetan epistemology.