SarvÃÂstivÃÂda-VaibhÃÂá¹£ika () or simply VaibhÃÂá¹£ika () was an ancient Buddhist tradition of Abhidharma (scholastic Buddhist philosophy), which was very influential in North India, especially Kashmir. In various texts, they referred to their tradition as YuktavÃÂda (the doctrine of logic), and another name for them was HetuvÃÂda (the doctrine of causes). The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika school was an influential subgroup of the larger SarvÃÂstivÃÂda school. They were distinguished from other SarvÃÂstivÃÂda sub-schools like the SautrÃÂntika and the "Western Masters" of Gandhara and Bactria by their orthodox adherence to the doctrines found in the MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a, from which their name is derived (VaibhÃÂá¹£a is a vá¹Âddhi derivative of vibhÃÂá¹£a, meaning "related to the vibhÃÂá¹£a"). VaibhÃÂá¹£ika thought significantly influenced the Buddhist philosophy of all major MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhist schools of thought and also influenced the later forms of TheravÃÂda Abhidhamma (though to a much lesser extent).
The SarvÃÂstivÃÂda tradition arose in the Mauryan Empire during the second century BCE, and was possibly founded by KÃÂtyÃÂnëputra (c. 150 BCE). During the Kushan era, the "Great Commentary" (MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a) on Abhidharma was compiled, marking the beginning of VaibhÃÂá¹£ika as a proper school of thought. This tradition was well-supported by Kanishka, and later spread throughout North India and Central Asia. It maintained its own canon of scriptures in Sanskrit, which included a seven-part Abhidharma Piá¹Âaka collection. VaibhÃÂá¹£ika remained the most influential Buddhist school in Northwest India from the first century CE until the seventh century.
Despite numerous variations and doctrinal disagreements within the tradition, most SarvÃÂstivÃÂda-VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas were united in their acceptance of the doctrine of "sarvÃÂstitva" (all exists), which says that all phenomena in the three times (past, present and future) can be said to exist. Another defining VaibhÃÂá¹£ika doctrine was that of simultaneous causation (sahabhà «-hetu), hence their alternative name of "HetuvÃÂda".
The main source of this tradition is the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda Abhidharma Piá¹Âaka.
The texts of the SarvÃÂstivÃÂdin Abhidharma Piá¹Âaka are:
Together, these comprise the Six Treatises (Chinese: å Â足è«Â; Sanskrit: à ¤·à ¤¡à ¥Âà ¤ªà ¤¾à ¤¦à ¤¶à ¤¾à ¤¸à ¥Âà ¤¤à ¥Âà ¤°, á¹¢aá¸Â-pÃÂda-à ÂÃÂstra). The seventh text is the JñÃÂnaprasthÃÂna ('Foundation of Knowledge'), also known as Aá¹£á¹Âaskandha or Aá¹£á¹Âagrantha, said to be composed by KÃÂtyÃÂyanëputra.
Yaà Âomitra is said to have likened this text to the body of the above six treatises, referring to them as its legs (pÃÂdas).
The JñÃÂnaprasthÃÂna became the basis for SarvastivÃÂda exegetical works called vibhÃÂá¹£a, which were composed in a time of intense sectarian debate among the SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins in Kashmir. These compendia not only contain sà «tra references and reasoned arguments but also contain new doctrinal categories and positions. The most influential of these was the Abhidharma MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a à ÂÃÂstra ("Great Commentary"), a massive work which became the central text of the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika tradition who became the Kashmiri SarvÃÂstivÃÂda orthodoxy under the patronage of the Kushan Empire.
There are also two other extant vibhÃÂá¹£a compendia, though there is evidence for the existence of many more of these works which are now lost. The VibhÃÂá¹£a à ÂÃÂstra of Sitapani and the Abhidharma VibhÃÂá¹£a à ÂÃÂstra translated by Buddhavarman c. 437 and 439 CE are the other extant VibhÃÂá¹£a works. Though some scholars claim the MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a dates to the reign of Kanishka during the first century CE, this dating is uncertain. However, we at least know it was translated into Chinese by the late 3rd or early 4th century.
In addition to the canonical SarvÃÂstivÃÂdan Abhidharma, a variety of expository texts or treatises were written to serve as overviews and introductions to the Abhidharma. The best known belonging to the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda tradition are:
The most mature and refined form of VaibhÃÂá¹£ika philosophy can be seen in the work of master Saá¹Âghabhadra (c. 5thcentury), "undoubtedly one of the most brilliant Abhidharma masters in India". His two main works, the *NyÃÂyÃÂnusÃÂra (Shun zhengli lun é Âæ£çÂÂè«Â) and the *Abhidharmasamayapradëpikà(Apidamo xian zong lun é¿æ¯ÂéÂÂ磨顯å®Âè«Â), are very important sources for late VaibhÃÂá¹£ika thought. His work was referenced and cited by various important figures, such as Xuanzang and Sthiramati.
All Buddhist schools of Abhidharma divided up the world into "dharmas" (phenomena, factors, or "psycho-physical events"), which are the fundamental building blocks of all phenomenal experience. Unlike the sà «tras, the Abhidharma analyses experience into these momentary psycho-physical processes. Dharmas refers to the discrete and impermanent instances of consciousness along with their intentional objects that rapidly arise and pass away in sequential streams. They are analogous to atoms, but are psycho-physical. Hence, according to Noa Ronkin, "all experiential events are understood as arising from the interaction of dharmas."
From the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika perspective, "Abhi-dharma" refers to analysing and understanding the nature of dharmas and the wisdom (prajñÃÂ) that arises from this. This systematic understanding of the Buddha's teaching was seen by VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas as the highest expression of the Buddha's wisdom which was necessary to practice the Buddhist path. It is seen as representing the true intention of the Buddha on the level of absolute truth (paramÃÂrtha-satya). According to the MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a, "Abhidharma is [precisely] the analysis of the intrinsic characteristics and common characteristics of dharmas."
For VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, dharmas are the "fundamental constituents of existence" which are discrete and real entities (dravya). K. L. Dhammajoti states:<blockquote>A dharma is defined as that which holds its intrinsic characteristic (svalaká¹£aá¹ÂadhÃÂraá¹ÂÃÂd dharmaḥ). The intrinsic characteristic of the dharma called rà «pa, for example, is the susceptibility of being molested (rà «pyate), obstructability and visibility; that of another dharma called vedanàis sensation, etc. And for a dharma to be a dharma, its intrinsic characteristic must be sustainable throughout time: A rà «pa remains a rà «pa irrespective of its various modalities. It can never be transformed into another different dharma (such as vedanÃÂ). Thus, a uniquely characterizable entity is a uniquely real (in the absolute sense) entity, having a unique intrinsic nature (svabhÃÂva): âÂÂTo be existent as an absolute entity is to be existent as an intrinsic characteristic (paramÃÂrthena sat svalaká¹£aá¹Âena sad ityarthaá¹Â).âÂÂ</blockquote>This idea is seen in the JñÃÂnaprasthÃÂna which states: "Dharmas are determined with respect to nature and characteristic... Dharmas are determined, without being co-mingled. They abide in their intrinsic natures, and do not relinquish their intrinsic natures (T. 26, 923c)."
According to VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, the svabhÃÂvas of dharmas are those things that exist substantially (dravyasat) as opposed to those things which are made up of aggregations of dharmas and thus only have a nominal existence (prajñaptisat). This distinction is also termed the doctrine of the two truths, which holds that there is a conventional truth (saá¹Âvá¹Âti) that refers to things which can be further analysed, divided or broken up into smaller constituents and an ultimate truth (paramÃÂrtha) referring to that which resists any further analysis.
Thus, a dharma's intrinsic characteristic (svalaká¹£aá¹Âa) and the very ontological existence of a dharma (i.e. svabhÃÂva, "intrinsic nature", or dravya, "substance") is one and the same. For the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika school, this "own nature" (svabhÃÂva) was said to be the characteristic of a dharma that persists through the three times (past, present and future).
VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma also describes dharmas as having "common characteristics" (sÃÂmÃÂnya-laká¹£aá¹Âa), which applies to numerous dharmas (for example, impermanence applies to all material dharmas and all feelings, etc.). Only the mental consciousness can cognise common characteristics.
However, the intrinsic characteristics of a dharma have a certain kind of relativity due to the relationship between various dharmas. For example, all rà «pa (form) dharmas have the common characteristic of resistance, but this is also an intrinsic characteristic with respect to other dharmas like vedanà(feeling).
Also, various sources state that the intrinsic nature of a dharma is "weak" and that they are interdependent with other dharmas. The MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a states that "conditioned dharmas are weak in their intrinsic nature, they can accomplish their activities only through mutual dependence" and that "they have no sovereignty (aisvarya). They are dependent on others." Thus, an intrinsic nature (svabhÃÂva) arises due to dependently originated processes or relationships between various dharmas and therefore, a svabhÃÂva is not something which is completely ontologically independent.
Abhidharma thought can be seen as an attempt at providing a complete account of every type of experience. Therefore, an important part of VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma comprises the classification, definition and explanation of the different types of dharma as well as the analysis of conventional phenomena and how they arise from the aggregation of dharmas. Thus there is the element of dividing up things into their constituents as well as the element of synthesis, i.e. how dharmas combine to make up conventional things.
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas made use of classic early Buddhist doctrinal categories such as the five skandhas, the sense bases (ÃÂyatanas) and the "eighteen dhÃÂtus". Beginning with the Pañcavastuka of Vasumitra, the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas also adopted a five group classification of dharmas which outlined a total of 75 types of phenomena.
The five main classifications of dharmas are:
Dharmas are also classified and divided into further taxonomical categories providing further aids to understanding the Buddhist view and path. Some of the major ways that the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas classified dharmas include the following:
Matter is that which is "subject to deterioration or disintegration." As Vasubandhu says, it is what "is repeatedly molested/broken" by contact. The main way of defining matter for VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas is that it has two main distinctive natures: resistance (sa-pratighÃÂtatva), which is âÂÂthe hindrance to the arising of another thing in its own location,â and visibility (sa-nidarà Âanatva), which allows one to locate matter since "it can be differently indicated as being here or being there" (Saá¹Âghabhadra).
The primary material dharmas are the four Great Elements (mahÃÂbhà «ta, "Great Reals") â earth (pá¹Âthivë), water (ap), fire (tejas), air (vÃÂyu). All other dharmas are "derived matter" (upÃÂdÃÂya-rà «pa/bhautika) which arise on the basis of the Great Realities. According to Dhammajoti: "The four Great Elements exist inseparably from one another, being co-existent causes (sahabhà «-hetu) one to another. Nevertheless, rà «pa-dharmas are manifested and experienced in diverse forms because of the difference in intensity or substance of one or more of the four Elements."
VaibhÃÂá¹£ika also had a theory of atoms. However, these atoms (paramÃÂá¹Âu) were not seen as eternally immutable or permanent and instead are seen as momentary. For VaibhÃÂá¹£ika, an atom is the smallest unit of matter, which cannot be cut, broken up and has no parts. They come together (without touching each other) to form aggregations or "molecules". They held that this is "known through mental analysis".
In VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma, the mind is a real entity, which is referred to by three mostly synonymous terms: ÃÂitta, manas (thinking) and vijñÃÂna (cognition), which are sometimes seen as different functional aspects of the mind. As defined by Dhammajoti, ÃÂitta "is the general discernment or apprehension with respect to each individual object. This discernment is the mere grasping of the object itself, without apprehending any of its particularities." Saá¹Âghabhadra defines it as what "grasps the characteristic of an object in a general manner."
ÃÂitta never arises by itself, it is always accompanied by certain mental factors or events (ÃÂaittas or ÃÂaitasikas), which are real and distinct dharmas that make a unique contribution to the mental process. Therefore, a moment of thought always has a specific nature and content. ÃÂittas and ÃÂaittas always arise together simultaneously in mutually dependent relationships.
The doctrine which said that these two always arise and operate together is called "conjunction" (saá¹Âprayoga). What conjunction meant was a disputed topic among the early masters. Later, it came to be accepted that for ÃÂitta and ÃÂaittas to be conjoined, the following had to be true: both must be supported by the same basis (ÃÂà Âraya i.e. sense organ), they must have the same object (ÃÂlambana), mode of activity (ÃÂkÃÂra), same time (kÃÂla), and the same substance (dravya). This doctrine was repudiated by the SautrÃÂntika, who held that dharmas only arise successively, one after the other.
As seen in their list of dharmas, the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas classified ÃÂaittas into various sub-categories based on various qualities. For example, the first classification, the universal dharmas (mahÃÂbhà «mika), are so called because they exist in all types of ÃÂitta. Then there are also universal good dharmas (kuà Âala mahÃÂbhà «mikÃÂ) and universal defilements (kleà Âa).
One of the major controversies in Abhidharma Buddhism dealt with the question of the original nature of ÃÂitta. Some, like the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghika, held the view that it retains an originally pure nature. VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas like Saá¹Âghabhadra rejected this view, holding that the nature of ÃÂitta can also be defiled.
Unlike other Abhidharma schools, the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas added another ultimate classification termed ÃÂitta-viprayukta-saá¹ÂskÃÂra, âÂÂconditionings (forces) disjoined from thought.â These "are real entities which are neither mental nor material in nature, which yet can operate on both domains" and can be seen as laws of nature. Dhammajoti notes however that the Abhidharma works of other schools like the *à ÂÃÂriputrÃÂbhidharma also contain this category, just not as one of the main ultimate classifications. He also notes that there was never full agreement on how many dharmas are found in this category and that the SautrÃÂntikas did not accept their reality. Thus it was a much debated topic in northern Abhidharma traditions.
Perhaps the most important of these conditionings are acquisition (prÃÂpti) and non-acquisition (aprÃÂpti). Acquisition:<blockquote>Is a force that links a dharma to a particular serial continuity (santati/santÃÂna), i.e., the individual. Non-acquisition is another real entity whose function and nature are just opposed to those of acquisition: It acts to ensure that a given dharma is delinked from the individual serial continuity... It was at a relatively later stage that acquisition came to be defined generally as the dharma that effects the relation of any dharma to a living being (santÃÂna).</blockquote>These conditionings are particularly important because, due to their theory of tri-temporal existence, acquisition is central to the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika understanding of defilement and purification. Since a defilement is a real dharma that exists always (sarvadàasti); it cannot be destroyed, however it can be de-linked from an individual by disrupting the acquisition-series. This also helps to explain how one can obtain a pure dharma such as nirvÃÂá¹Âa, since it is only through acquisition that one experiences nirvÃÂá¹Âa.
Another doctrinally important set of conditionings are "the four characteristics of the conditioned (saá¹Âská¹Âta-laká¹£aá¹Âa)". Dharmas are said to have the production-characteristic (jÃÂti-laká¹£aá¹Âa) which allows them to arise, the duration-characteristic (sthiti-laká¹£aá¹Âa) which is what enables it to temporarily remain and the decay-characteristic (jarÃÂâÂÂlaká¹£aá¹Âa) which is the force which impairs its activity so that it can no longer continue projecting another distinct effect. A dharma also has the impermanence or disappearance characteristic (anityatÃÂ/vyayalaká¹£aá¹Âa) which is what causes it to enter into the past.
Unconditioned dharmas are those which exist without being dependently co-arisen (pratëtya-samutpanna), they are also not temporal or spatial. They transcend arising and ceasing, and are real existents that possess a unique efficacy (though not a temporal causal efficacy like other dharmas).
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika school taught three types of unconditioned dharmas: space (ÃÂkÃÂà Âa), cessation through deliberation (pratisaá¹ÂkhyÃÂ-nirodha), and cessation independent of deliberation (apratisaá¹ÂkhyÃÂ-nirodha).
In the MVà Â, some disagreement among SarvÃÂstivÃÂda masters regarding these dharmas can be seen. Some like "the Bhadanta" (DharmatrÃÂta) denied the reality of space. Meanwhile, DÃÂrá¹£á¹ÂÃÂntikas denied the ontological reality of all three.
According to Dhammajoti, cessation through deliberation refers to "the cessation of defilements acquired through the process of discriminative or deliberative effort." There are just as many of these cessations as there are with-outflow dharmas. Cessation independent of deliberation meanwhile "are those acquired simply on account of the deficiency in the required assemblage of conditions for the particular dharmaâÂÂs. They are so called because they are independent of any deliberative effort." There are as many of these cessations are there are conditioned dharmas.
Cessation through deliberation is also the technical term for the Buddhist goal of nirvÃÂá¹Âa, which is also defined as "a disjunction (visaá¹Âyoga) from with-outflow dharmaâÂÂs acquired through the process of discrimination/deliberation (pratisaá¹ÂkhyÃÂna) which is a specific outflow-free prajñÃÂ." NirvÃÂá¹Âa is the absolute absence of karma and the defilements, the escape from the skandhas and all saá¹ÂsÃÂric existence which attained by an arhat.
In SarvÃÂstivÃÂda, nirvÃÂá¹Âa is a "distinct positive entity" (dravyÃÂntara). It is "an ontologically real force that is acquired by the practitioner when a given defilement is completely abandoned." This force ensures that the defilement's acquisition will never arise again. Master Skandhila's definition indicates how this real entity has a positive presence, which is said to be "like a dike holding back the water or a screen blocking the wind."
VaibhÃÂá¹£ika holds that the real existence of nirvÃÂá¹Âa is supported both by direct perception and by scripture which depict the Buddha stating that "There is definitely the unborn." SautrÃÂntikas disagree with this interpretation of scripture, holding that the unborn simply refers to the discontinuity of birth (janmÃÂpravá¹Âtti), and thus it is a mere concept referring to the absence of suffering due to the abandoning of the defilements and thus it is only relatively real (prajñaptisat). However, Saá¹Âghabhadra argues that "It is only when the unborn is conceded to be a distinct real entity that it is meaningful to say 'There is.' Besides, if there were no such entity, the Buddha should have simply said 'There is the discontinuity of the born.'"
According to VaibhÃÂá¹£ika, nirvÃÂá¹Âa must be an ultimately real existent because no real supporting phenomena can be found which could serve as the basis on which to designate nirvÃÂá¹Âa as a relative existent (as the aggregates serve to designate the self as relative, for example). Also, if nirvÃÂá¹Âa is not a real force, then beings could not give rise to delight in nirvÃÂá¹Âa and disgust towards saá¹ÂsÃÂra, for nirvÃÂá¹Âa would be inferior in terms of existence. It would also mean that the Buddha had been deluding everyone by speaking of non-existents in the same way that he spoke of the existents.
Furthermore, if nirvÃÂá¹Âa was unreal, it could not be one of the four noble truths, since a non-existent cannot be said to be true or false. An ÃÂrya is said to directly see the four truths, including the third truth of duḥkhanirodha (the end of suffering, i.e. nirvÃÂá¹Âa) and wisdom cannot arise with regard to a non-existent object.
The name SarvÃÂstivÃÂda literally means "all exists" (sarvÃÂm asti), referring to their doctrine that all dharmas, past present and future, exist. This doctrine of tri-temporal existence has been described as an eternalist theory of time.
What does it mean for a dharma to exist? For the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda Abhidharmikas, the main reasons that something is real or existent is causal efficacy and the fact that it abides in its own nature (svabhÃÂva). The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika philosopher Saá¹Âghabhadra defines an existent as follows: "The characteristic of a real existent is that it serves as an object-domain for generating cognition (buddhi)." Each cognition is intentional and it has a distinctive character which is caused by the intrinsic characteristic (svalaká¹£aá¹Âa) of the object of cognition. If there is no object of cognition (viá¹£aya), there is no cognition.
Furthermore, according to Saá¹Âghabhadra, only if there are true existent forms can there be a difference between correct and incorrect cognitions regarding material things.
Saá¹Âghabhadra further adds that they are of two types of existents:<blockquote>What exists truly (dravyatoâÂÂsti) and what exists conceptually (prajñaptitoâÂÂsti), the two being designated on the basis of conventional truth and absolute truth. If, with regard to a thing, a cognition (buddhi) is produced without depending on anything else, this thing exists truly â e.g., rà «pa, vedanÃÂ, etc. If it depends on other things to produce a cognition, then it exists conceptually/relatively â e.g., a vase, army, etc.</blockquote>Furthermore, things that truly exist are also of two types: those things that just have their own nature and those things that have both their own nature and also have activities (kÃÂritra). Additionally, this last type is divided into two: "with or without function (sÃÂmarthya/vyÃÂpara/à Âakti)". Lastly, relative existents are also of two types, "having existence on the basis of something real or on something relative, like a vase and an army, respectively."
According to Jan Westerhoff, one reason they had for holding this theory was that moments of consciousness are intentional (are directed, "about something") and thus if there are no past entities which exist, thoughts about them would be objectless and could not exist. Another argument is that to account for past actions (karma) which have effects at a later time. If an act of karma no longer exists, it is difficult, argues the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika, to see how they can have fruits in the present or future. Finally, past, present and future are mutually interdependent ideas. If past and future are non-existent, argued the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, how can one make sense of the existence of the present?
In the Samyukta-abhidharma-hrdaya, a fourth century Gandharan SarvÃÂstivÃÂda text, the core SarvÃÂstivÃÂda theory is defended thus:
Vasubandhu outlines the main arguments based on scripture and reason for all exists as follows:
Regarding time (adhvan), for VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, it is just a superimposition on the activity of these different types of dharmas and does not exist independently. Because of this, there was a need to explain how one experiences time and change. Among the different SarvÃÂstivÃÂda thinkers, there were different ideas on how dharmas change so as to give rise to the experience of time. The MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a (MVà Â) speaks of four major theories which attempt to do this:
The positions are further outlined by Vasubandhu as follows:
In the Abhidharmakoà Âa, Vasubandhu argues that: "The best system is that of Vasumitra." The Samyukta-abhidharma-hrdaya agrees.
Later SarvÃÂstivÃÂda developed a combination of the first and third views. This can be seen in Saá¹Âghabhadra, who argues that while a dharma's essential nature does not change, its function or activity (kÃÂritra) and its existence (bhÃÂva) changes:<blockquote>The essential nature of a dharma remains eternally; its bhÃÂva [existence] changes: When a saá¹Âská¹Âta [conditioned] dharma traverses through adhvan [time], it gives rise to its kÃÂritra [activity] in accordance with the pratyayas [conditions], without abandoning its substantial nature; immediately after this, the kÃÂritra produced ceases. Hence it is said that the svabhÃÂva exists eternally and yet it is not permanent, since its bhÃÂva changes.</blockquote>Thus, for Saá¹Âghabhadra, "a dharma is present when it exercises its kÃÂritra, future when its kÃÂritra is not yet exercised, past when it has been exercised." The term kÃÂritra is defined as "a dharmaâÂÂs capability of inducing the production of its own next moment". When the right set of conditions come together, a dharma becomes endowed with activity (which vanishes in a single moment). When it does not have activity, a dharma's own nature still has the capacity to causally contribute to other dharmas.
Regarding the essential nature (svabhÃÂva) or reality (dravya) of a dharma, all VaibhÃÂá¹£ika thinkers agreed that it is what remains constant and does not change as a dharma moves throughout the three times. However, as noted by Dhammajoti, this does not necessarily mean that a dharma's svabhÃÂva "is immutable or even permanent, for a dharmaâÂÂs mode of existence and its essential nature are not different, so that when the former is undergoing transformation, so is its svabhÃÂva."
From the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika perspective this is not a contradiction, since it is the same process that remains (even while changing) throughout time. Thus, in this particular sense, there is no change in the svabhÃÂva or svalaká¹£aá¹Âa. This is said to be the case even though a dharma is always being transformed into different modes of being. Each of these is actually a new occasion or event in a causal stream (though it is not different in terms of its nature than previous dharmas in that stream). Thus according to Dhammajoti, there is a way in which the essential natures are transformed, and yet, one can say that they remain the same ontologically. DharmatrÃÂta used the example of a piece of gold that is transformed into different things (cups, bowl, etc). While there are different entities, the essential nature of gold remains the same.
This perspective is expressed by Saá¹Âghabhadra who argues that svabhÃÂva is not permanent since it goes through time and its existence (bhÃÂva) varies through time. Saá¹Âghabhadra also notes that a dharma is produced by various causes (and is part of a causal web which has no beginning), and once a dharma has ceased, it does not arise again. However, for Saá¹Âghabhadra, one can still say that dharmas do not lose their svabhÃÂva. He uses the example of vedanÃÂs (sensation). Even though we speak of various modes of sensation, all the types of sensation in a person's mindstream have the same nature of being sensitive phenomena (prasÃÂda rà «pa). Saá¹Âghabhadra then states:<blockquote>It is not the case that since the function is different from the existence, that there can be the difference in the functions of seeing, hearing, etc. Rather, the very function of seeing, etc., is none other than the existence of the eye, etc. On account of the difference in function, there is definitely the difference in the mode of existence⦠Since it is observed that there are dharmas that co-exist as essential substances and whose essential characteristics do not differ but that [nevertheless] have different modes of existence, we know that when dharmaâÂÂs traverse the three times, their modes of existence vary while their essential characteristics do not change.</blockquote>He also states:<blockquote>[Our explanations] also have properly refuted the objection that [our theory of sarvÃÂstitva] implies the permanence of [a dharmaâÂÂs] essential nature, for, while the essential nature remains always [the same], its avasthà[condition] differs [in the stages of time] since there is change. This difference of avasthàis produced on account of conditions and necessarily stays no more than one ká¹£aá¹Âa [moment]. Accordingly, the essential nature of the dharma too is impermanent, since it is not distinct from the difference [that arises in it]. [But] it is only in an existent dharma that changes can obtain; there cannot be change in a non-existent. In this way, therefore, we have properly established the times.</blockquote>According to Dhammajoti, what the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas had in mind with this view was that even though the different dharmas in a causal series are different entities, there is an overall "individuality or integrity", and the series thus remains "dynamically identical". This is a relationship of identity-in-difference (bhedÃÂbheda). In this sense, a svabhÃÂva is not a static entity, it is impermanent and undergoes change and yet "ontologically it never becomes a totally different substance." Saá¹Âghabhadra claimed that it is only when understood in this way that the doctrine of "all exists" is logically compatible with the doctrine of impermanence.
Orthodox SarvÃÂstivÃÂda also defended the theory of moments (ká¹£aá¹ÂavÃÂda). This doctrine held that dharmas last only for a moment, this measure of time is the smallest measure of time possible, it is described in the Samyukta-abhidharma-hrdaya as:
An important topic covered in VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma was the investigation of causes, conditions and their effects. VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas used two major schemes to explain causality: the four conditions (pratyaya) and the six causes (hetu). In this system, the arising of dharmas is totally dependent on specific causes. Causal force is what makes a dharma real and thus they are also called saá¹ÂskÃÂras (conditioning forces). Because of this, all dharmas belong to some kind of causal category, and are said to have causal efficacy. Indeed, it is only through examining their causes that the intrinsic nature manifests in a cognisable way. In the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika system, the activities of dharmas arises through the mutual interdependence of causes. Thus, their intrinsic natures are said to be "feeble", which means they are not able to act on their own, and their activity is dependent on other dharmas.
A particularly unique feature of the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika system is their acceptance of simultaneous causation. These "co-existent causes" are an important part of the SarvÃÂstivÃÂda understanding of causality. It allowed them to explain their theory of direct realism, that is to say, their affirmation that we perceive real external objects. It also was used in their defense of temporal eternalism. Thus, it was central to their understanding of cause and effect. For thinkers like Saá¹Âghabhadra, a sense organ and its object must exist at the same moment together with its effect, the perception. Thus, for a cause to be efficacious, it must exist together with its effect. This view of simultaneous causation was rejected by the SautrÃÂntikas, but later adopted by the YogÃÂcÃÂra school.
Saá¹Âghabhadra argues that even though the arising of dharmas depends on numerous conditions, the Buddha taught only four conditions in the sà «tras. Against the SautrÃÂntikas, who held that these were mere conceptual designations, VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas assert that they are real existents.
The four conditions are first found in Devaà ÂarmanâÂÂs VijñÃÂnakÃÂya (c. 1st century CE) and they are:
The SarvÃÂstivÃÂda also taught that there are five fruits i.e. causal effects:
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika epistemology defended a form of realism that is established through experience. Their theory of knowledge held that one could know dharmas as unique forces with unique characteristics by two means of knowledge (pramÃÂá¹Âa): direct perception (which includes spiritual vision) or inference (anumÃÂna), which relies on direct experience.
For VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas like Saá¹Âghabhadra âÂÂthe characteristic of an existent (sal-laká¹£aá¹Âa) is that it can serve as an object producing cognition (buddhi).â Because of this, an object of knowledge is necessarily existent, though it can be either a true existent (dravyata) or a conceptual existent (prajñapti). As Dhammajoti notes, "the possibility of knowing an object necessarily implies the true ontological status of the object."
This view was rejected by SautrÃÂntikas like à ÂrëlÃÂta, who argued that a cognitive object could be unreal, pointing to examples such as optical illusions, dreams, the false cognition of a self or really existent person (pudgala), and so on. The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika response to this is that even in the case of such mistaken cognitive constructs, there is a real basis which acts as part of the causal process. As explained by Dhammajoti: <blockquote>An absolute non-existent (atyantam asad) has no function whatsoever and hence can never engender a consciousness. Thus, in the case of the perception of the unreal pudgala, the perceptual object is not the pudgala which is superimposed, but the five skandhas which are real existents. </blockquote>Furthermore, as noted by Dhammajoti: "sensory perception as a pratyaká¹£a experience is fully accomplished only in the second moment on recollection." This is because the external object must first be experienced by "direct perception supported by a sense faculty" (indriyÃÂà Ârita-pratyaká¹£a) before a discerning perception (buddhi-pratyaká¹£a) can arise, since the discerning perception uses the previous sense faculty perception as a cognitive support (ÃÂlambana).
VaibhÃÂá¹£ika defended the real existence of external objects by arguing that mental defilements arise in different ways because of the causal force of the mind's intentional object. Likewise, sensory perception (pratyaká¹£a) is said to arise due to various causes and conditions, one of which is a real external object. According to Dhammajoti, for VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas like Saá¹Âghabhadra, "a sensory consciousness necessarily takes a physical assemblage or agglomeration of atoms (he ji Ã¥ÂÂéÂÂ; *saá¹Âcaya, *saá¹ÂghÃÂta, *samasta). What is directly perceived is just these atoms assembled together in a certain manner, not a conceptualised object such as a jug, etc."
For VaibhÃÂá¹£ika knowledge (jñÃÂna) is a ÃÂaitta (mental factor) that has the distinguishing characteristic of being "understanding that is decisive or definite (nià Âcita)." There are various kinds of knowledge, for example, dharma-knowledge (dharma-jñÃÂna), is the knowledge that realises the true nature of dharmas, conventional-knowledge (saá¹Âvá¹Âti-jñÃÂna) deals with conventional (not ultimate) things and knowledge of non-arising (anutpÃÂda-jñÃÂna) refers to the knowledge one has when one knows nirvÃÂá¹Âa has been achieved.
The goal of Buddhism is often seen as the freedom from suffering which arises from the complete removal of all defilements (kleà Âa). This is a state of perfection that is known by an arhat or Buddha through the "knowledge of the destruction of the outflows" (ÃÂsravaká¹£aya-jñÃÂna). ÃÂbhidharmikas saw the Abhidharma itself, which in the highest sense is just wisdom (prajñÃÂ), as the only means to end the defilements.
Kleà Âa is commonly defined as that which "soils" or defiles as well as that which disturbs and afflicts a psycho-physical series. Another important synonym for defilement is anuà Âaya, which is explained by VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas as a subtle or fine (aá¹Âu) dharma that adheres and grows with an object, "like the adherence of dust on a wet garment or the growth of seeds in an irrigated field." This is in contrast to other interpretations of anuà Âaya, such as that of the SautrÃÂntikas, who saw them as "seeds" (bëja) of kleà Âas. Thus, for VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas there is no such thing as a latent defilement.
The defilements are seen as the root of existence (mà «laá¹ bhavasya), since they produce karma, which in turn leads to further rebirths. The most fundamental defilements are known as the three unskillful roots (akuà Âala-mà «la), referring to greed (rÃÂga), hostility (pratigha) and ignorance (avidyÃÂ). Out of these, ignorance is the most fundamental of all. It is defined by Saá¹Âghabhadra as "a distinct dharma which harms the capability of understanding (prajñÃÂ). It is the cause of topsy-turvy views and obstructs the examination of merits and faults. With regard to dharmas to be known it operates in the mode of disinclination, veiling the thought and thoughtconcomitants."
According to Dhammajoti, other major terms used to describe defilements are: 1. fetter (saá¹Âyojana); 2. bondage (bandhana); 3. envelopment (paryavasthÃÂna); 4. outflow (ÃÂsrava); 5. flood (ogha); 6. yoke (yoga); 7. clinging (upÃÂdÃÂna); 8. corporeal tie (kÃÂya-grantha); 9. hindrance (nivaraá¹Âa). These numerous categories are used to describe various doctrinal topics and create a taxonomy of dharmas. For example, all dharmas are either with or without outflows (ÃÂsrava), which are dharmas that keep sentient beings flowing on through existence and also cause impurities to flow through the sense fields.
These are also further divided into sub-categories. For example, there are three ÃÂsrava types: sensuality-outflow (kÃÂmÃÂsrava), existence-outflow (bhavÃÂsrava) and ignorance-outflow (avidyÃÂsrava); there are four clingings: sensuality-clinging (kÃÂmopÃÂdÃÂna), view-clinging (dá¹Âá¹£á¹Ây-upÃÂdÃÂna), clinging to abstentions and vows (à ÂëlavratopÃÂdÃÂna), and soul-theory-clinging (ÃÂtmavÃÂdopÃÂdÃÂna); and there are five hindrances: (i) sensual-desire, (ii) malice, (iii) torpor-drowsiness (styÃÂna-middha), (iv) restlessness-remorse (auddhatyakauká¹Âtya), and (v) doubt.
For VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, the elimination of the defilements thus begins with an investigation into the nature of dharmas (dharma-pravicaya). This examination is carried out in various ways, such as investigating how defilements arise and grow, what its cognitive objects are, and whether a defilement is to be abandoned by insight into the four noble truths (darà Âanapraheya) or by cultivation (bhÃÂvanÃÂpraheya).
In the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika system, the abandonment of a defilement is not the complete destruction of it, since all dharmas exist throughout the three times. Instead, one becomes defiled when the dharma of acquisition links one with the defilement (saá¹Âyoga), and one abandons the defilement when there is both the ceasing of the dharma of acquisition as well as the arising of the acquisition of disconnection (visaá¹Âyoga-prÃÂpti). While the abandonment of a dharma happens at once and is not repeated, the acquisition of disconnection can take place over and over again, reflecting deeper and firmer spiritual progress.
This is important because as Dhammajoti notes, VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas affirm that "freedom from duḥkha must be gained by gradually and systematically abandoning the defilements" and reject the view that awakening happens abruptly. There are four methods of abandoning a defilement, the first three deal with abandonment by insight (darà Âana-heya):
While the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas acknowledge the profound and ultimately inconceivable nature of karma, they still attempted to give a rational account of its basic workings and to show how it was a middle way between determinism and absolute freedom. The MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a (MVà Â) notes that there are different but related ways in which the term karma is used. It can refer to actions in a general sense and it can refer specifically to ethical actions which have desirable or undesirable effects.
Karma is also used to refer to the actual retribution causes (vipÃÂkaâÂÂhetu) of actions, which according to Dhammajoti, play a crucial role "in determining the various spheres (dhÃÂtu), planes (gati) and modes of birth (yoni) of a sentient beingâÂÂs existence and in differentiating the various types of persons (pudgala) with their various life-span, physical appearances, social status, etc."
It is also important to note that, karma is not the only contributing factor to rebirth, as Vasubandhu states: "It is not karma alone which is the projector of a birth (janman)." Karma is also related to the defilements since the defilements act as the generating cause and supporting condition for karma.
There are three main types of karma: bodily, vocal and mental. Out of all the different elements of karma, it is the volitional aspect (abhisaá¹Â-ká¹Â, cetanÃÂ), which comprises all mental karma, that is the most central and fundamental, since it originates and assists the other types of karma. Saá¹Âghabhadra, citing the sà «tras, states that volition (i.e. mental karma) is karma "in the proper or specific sense inasmuch as it is the prominent cause (*vià Âiá¹£á¹Âa-hetu) in projecting a sentient existence."
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas also had further classifications of the different types of karma. For example, there are:
The informative and non-informative category is particularly important. For the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika, both types are real entities and are included as cetayitvàkarma. Also, the nature of informative karma is material, it is the specific bodily shape at the time of the accomplishment of an action (which includes sound). Saá¹Âghabhadra defends this by arguing that if all karma is mere volition (as held by SautrÃÂntika), then as soon as one has the intention to kill, this is the same as committing the deed. VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas also held that non-informative karma was a kind of subtle "non-resistant" matter which preserved karmic efficacy, a view that was vigorously attacked by the SautrÃÂntikas.
Like other Buddhist schools, the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas taught the ten paths of karma as a major ethical guide to what should be avoided and what should be cultivated. It should be emphasised that volition remains the core of this teaching, that is, even if one avoids acting on one's harmful intentions, the intention itself remains an unskillful karma.
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika theory of karma is also closely related to their theory of tri-temporal existence, since karmas also exist in the past and in the future. Indeed, the efficacy of past karma is part of their argument for "all exists", since, for the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika, if a past karmic retributive cause ceases to exist completely, it cannot lead to the karmic effect or fruit. As Dhammajoti explains:<blockquote>At the very moment when a retributive cause arises, it determines the causal connection with the fruit-to-be; i.e., âÂÂit grasps the fruit.â At a subsequent time, when the necessary conditions obtain, it, although past, can causally actualize the fruit by dragging it, as it were, out of the future into the present; i.e., âÂÂit gives the fruit.âÂÂ</blockquote>This was of course rejected by the SautrÃÂntikas, who posited a competing theory, known as the theory of seeds, which held that a volition creates a chain of momentary dharmas called seeds, which are continuously transmitted in the mind stream until they sprout, producing the karmic effect.
Saá¹Âghabhadra critiques this theory by pointing out that when a seed turns into a plant, there is no interruption in the process. But in the SautrÃÂntika view, there can be an interruption, as when a person has thoughts of a different ethical type or when they enter into meditations that completely interrupt mental activity (such as asaá¹Âjñi-samÃÂpatti or nirodha-samÃÂpatti). And since SautrÃÂntikas are presentists, the past karma has also ceased to exist at this point and thus cannot be a cause for its fruit.
In VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma, the nature of karmic retribution, i.e. how a person experiences the results of their actions, is not fixed and depends on different conditions, such as the spiritual status and wisdom of the person. There are six factors that effect the gravity of karmic retribution (and subsequently, how bad one's future rebirth is):
There are also said to be some karmas that may or may not lead to retribution at all, these are indeterminate (aniyata) karmas which are contrasted with determinate karmas, i.e. those that necessarily cause retribution (whether in this life, in the next or in some further life). These indeterminate karmas can be rendered weak or fruitless through the practice of the spiritual path. The "Salt Cristal Sà «tra" (Loá¹Âaphala Sutta) is cited in support of this. Determinate karmas are particularly dark acts, such as killing one's parents, which cannot be so transformed.
Another important distinction here is that between karma that is done (ká¹Âta) which refers to preparatory and principal actions, and karma that is accumulated (upacita) which refers to the consecutive actions which "complete" the action. For example, one may prepare to kill someone and attempt to do so, but fail. In this sense, the action is not accumulated. Also, an action not done intentionally is not accumulated. Though the preparation is still a bad karma, it is not necessarily retributive. If however, something willed and accomplished is necessarily retributive.
Yet another key distinction is that between projecting (ÃÂká¹£epaka) and completing (paripà «raka) karmas. A projecting karma is a single act which is the principal cause that projects one's future existence (as well as for the intermediate existence, the antarÃÂ-bhava), while completing karmas are responsible for specific experiences within that one existence, such as lifespan.
Finally, it is important to note that in this system, karma is primarily individual. That is to say, one person's karma will not cause a retribution fruit to be experienced by another person.
However, there is a karmic fruit which is experienced by a collective of individuals, which is the fruit of dominance (adhipati-phala), which affects the vitality and durability of external things, such as plants and planets. This is used to explain how, when persons do good actions, the external world is affected by the "four increases": "of lifespan, of sentient beings, of external items of utility and enjoyment (pariá¹£kÃÂra), and of skillful dharmas". In this sense then, there is "collective karma." Thus, for the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, the whole universe is the collective karma (i.e. the fruit of dominance) of all beings living in it.
The SarvÃÂstivÃÂda Abhidharma interpretation of the key Buddhist doctrine of Dependent Origination (pratëtya-samutpÃÂda) focuses on how the 12 links (nidÃÂna) contribute to rebirth from the perspective of three periods of existence (past, present, future). This is explained in the following way:
Though presented in a linear way in the form of a list, these factors are said to be mutually conditioning among each other in various interconnected ways.
Though the three life model, also called "prolonged" (prÃÂkará¹£ika), is the most widely used way of understanding dependent origination, SarvÃÂstivÃÂda Abhidharmikas also accepted three other ways of explaining it:
The study of the nature and function of spiritual paths is important to Abhidharma. For the VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas the spiritual path is a gradual process of abandoning the defilements; there is no "sudden enlightenment". The analysis of the various spiritual paths provided by the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika Abhidharma correspond to the abandoning of various defilements.
The beginning of the path consists of preliminary practices: approaching "true persons", listening to the Dharma, contemplating the meaning and practicing the Dharma and what accords with the Dharma. Preparatory practices also include the observance of the ethical precepts (à Âëlaá¹ pÃÂlayati), giving, and studying the Abhidharma.
The MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£a (MVà Â) contains the following succinct explanation of the stages leading up to stream entry:<blockquote>At the beginning, because of his aspiration for the fruit of liberation, he diligently practices [i] giving (dÃÂna) and the pure precepts (à Âëla); [ii] the understanding derived from listening, the contemplation of the impure, mindfulness of breathing and the foundations of mindfulness (smá¹ÂtyupasthÃÂna); and [iii] warmth, summits, receptivities and the supreme mundane dharmaâÂÂs; and [then he enters into] [iv] the 15 moments of the path of vision. This is collectively said to be âÂÂfirmly on oneâÂÂs feetâÂÂ.</blockquote>
VaibhÃÂá¹£ika developed an influential outline of the path to awakening, one which was later adapted and modified by the scholars of the MahÃÂyÃÂna tradition into the schema of the "five paths" (pañcamÃÂrga). The original VaibhÃÂá¹£ika schema is divided into seven stages of preparatory effort (prayoga) and four stages of spiritual fruits (phala):
<u>Seven prayogas</u>:
<u>Four phalas:</u>
Each has two stages, the candidacy stage and the fruit stage.
In the prayoga stages, the contemplation of the four noble truths was done with knowledge that are with-outflow (sÃÂsrava). Immediately after the last prayoga stage, one is able to access outflow-free knowledges (anÃÂsrava-jñÃÂna), and must apply these to the noble truths. This is known as direct realisation (abhisamaya), direct spiritual insight into the intrinsic and common characteristics of the four truths. This takes 16 thought moments. Insight into the truths is achieved in two moments called "paths". Dhammajoti explains them as follows:
<blockquote>In the first moment, called the unhindered path (ÃÂnantarya-mÃÂrga), the outflow-free understanding that arises is called a receptivity (ká¹£ÃÂnti) to knowledge, and with this, the defilements abandonable by vision into the particular truth are abandoned. In the following moment, called the path of liberation (vimukti-mÃÂrga), knowledge proper arises through the induction of which the acquisition (prÃÂpti) of the cessation through deliberation (pratisaá¹ÂkhyÃÂ-nirodha) of the defilements arises. In this way, for the whole contemplative process covering the sphere of sensuality followed by the two upper spheres, there arise eight receptivities and eight knowledges, all being prajñàin their intrinsic nature.</blockquote>
From the first moment of insight, which is the first moment of receptivitity, one is said to be an ÃÂrya, a noble being. This is because the out-flow free path has arisen in them and thus they are no longer an ordinary worldling (pá¹Âthagjanatva). Also, according to this system, when one has entered into stream entry, there is no going back, no retrogression. Regarding arhatship, some arhats can retrogress, mainly those who, due to their weak faculties, entered the path as a "pursuer through faith" (à ÂraddhÃÂnusÃÂrin). Those who have sharp faculties and have studied and understood the teachings (dharmÃÂnusÃÂrins) are not retrogressible, they are âÂÂones liberated through wisdomâ (prajñÃÂ-vimukta).
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ika SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins are known to have employed schema of the three vehicles, which can be seen in the MahÃÂvibhÃÂá¹£ÃÂ:
The VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas held that though arhats have been fully liberated through the removal of all defilements, their wisdom (prajñÃÂ) is not fully perfected and thus inferior to a Buddha's wisdom. Also, arhats have subtle traces (vÃÂsanÃÂ) that the defilements have left behind after they have been abandoned. Thus, for VaibhÃÂá¹£ikas, arhats are said to have a certain non-defiled ignorance (akliá¹£á¹ÂÃÂjñÃÂna), which Buddhas lack. Furthermore, a Buddha has both omniscience (sarvajñÃÂ) and âÂÂwisdom of all modesâ (sarvaâÂÂÃÂkÃÂraâÂÂjñÃÂna), i.e. a knowledge of all the spiritual paths.
The inferiority of the arhat attainment can be seen in texts such as the SarvÃÂstivÃÂdin NÃÂgadatta Sà «tra, which critiques the Mahëà ÂÃÂsaka view of women in a narrative about a bhiká¹£uá¹Âë named NÃÂgadatta. Here, the demon MÃÂra takes the form of her father, and tries to convince her to work toward the lower stage of an arhat. NÃÂgadatta rejects this, saying, "A Buddha's wisdom is like empty space of the ten-quarters, which can enlighten innumerable people. But an Arhat's wisdom is inferior."
However, against the docetic view of the MahÃÂsÃÂá¹Âghikas, the SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins viewed the Buddha's physical body (Skt. rà «pakÃÂya) as being impure and improper for taking refuge in, and they instead regarded taking refuge in the Buddha as taking refuge in bodhi itself (awakening) and also in the DharmakÃÂya (body of the teaching).
The SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins also admitted the path of a bodhisattva as a valid one. References to the bodhisattva path and the practice of the six pÃÂramitÃÂs are commonly found in SarvÃÂstivÃÂda works. The MahÃÂvibhÃÂṣàof the VaibhÃÂá¹£ika SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins includes a schema of four pÃÂramitÃÂs: generosity (dÃÂna), discipline (à Âëla), energy (vërya), and wisdom (prajñÃÂ), and it says that the four pÃÂramitÃÂs and six pÃÂramitÃÂs are essentially equivalent (seeing patience as a kind of discipline and meditation as a kind of intuitive wisdom).