(Sanskrit: à ¤¶à ¤¾à ¤¨à ¥Âà ¤¤à ¤°à ¤Âà ¥Âà ¤·à ¤¿à ¤¤; , 725âÂÂ788), whose name translates into English as "protected by the One who is at peace" was an important and influential Indian Buddhist philosopher, particularly for the Tibetan Buddhist tradition. à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita was a philosopher of the Madhyamaka school who studied at Nalanda monastery under JñÃÂnagarbha, and became the founder of Samye, the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet.
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita defended a synthetic philosophy which combined Madhyamaka, YogÃÂcÃÂra and the logico-epistemology of Dharmakirti into a novel Madhyamaka philosophical system. This philosophical approach is known as YogÃÂcÃÂra-MÃÂdhyamika or YogÃÂcÃÂra-Svatantrika-MÃÂdhyamika in Tibetan Buddhism. Unlike other Madhyamaka philosophers, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita accepted YogÃÂcÃÂra doctrines like mind-only (cittamatra) and self-reflective awareness (svasamvedana), but only on the level of conventional truth. According to James Blumenthal, this synthesis is the final major development in Indian Buddhist philosophy before the disappearance of Buddhism from India (c. 12-13th centuries).
There are few historical records of à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita, with most available material being from hagiographic sources. Some of his history is detailed in a 19th-century commentary by Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso drawn from sources like the Blue Annals, Buton and Taranatha. According to Ju Mipham, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita was the son of the king of Zahor. Some sources have identified Zahor with the area surrounding Bhagalpur and Banka in eastern Bihar. Tibetan sources refer to him, JñÃÂnagarbha and Kamalasila as rang rgyud shar gsum meaning the "three eastern SvÃÂtantrikas".
Most sources contain little information about his life in India, as such all that can be known is that he was an Indian monk in the Mulasarvastivada lineage who lived during the time of the Pala Empire. Tibetan sources also state he studied under JñÃÂnagarbha and eventually became the abbot of Nalanda University after mastering all branches of learning.
He was first invited to Tibet by king Trisong Detsen (c. 742âÂÂ797) to help establish Buddhism there and his first trip to Tibet can be dated to 763. However, according to Tibetan sources like the Blue Annals, his first trip was unsuccessful and due to the activities of certain local spirits, he was forced to leave. He then spent six years in Nepal before returning to Tibet.
Tibetan sources then state that à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita later returned along with a tantric adept called Padmasambhava who performed the necessary magical rites to appease the unhappy spirits and to allow for the establishment of the first Buddhist monastery in Tibet. Once this was done, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita oversaw the construction of Samye monastery (meaning: "the Inconceivable", Skt. acintya) starting in 775 CE on the model of the Indian monastery of Uddaá¹Âá¸Âapura.
He then ordained the first seven Tibetan Buddhist monastics there with the aid of twelve Indian monks (circa 779). He stayed at Samye as the abbot (upadhyaya) for the rest of his life (thirteen years after completion). At Samye, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita established a Buddhist monastic curriculum based on the Indian model. He also oversaw the translation of Buddhist scriptures into Tibetan. During this period, various other Indian scholars came to Tibet to work on translation, including Vimalamitra, Buddhaguhya, à ÂÃÂntigarbha and Vià Âuddhasiá¹Âha. Tibetan sources state that he died suddenly in an accident after being kicked by a horse.
According to Tibetan sources, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita and his students initially focused on teaching the 'ten good actions' (Sanskrit: daà Âakuà Âalakarmapatha), the six paramitas (transcendent virtues), a summary of the MahÃÂyÃÂna and 'the chain of dependent origination' (pratëtyasamutpÃÂda).
Tibetan sources indicate that he and his student Kamalaà Âëla mainly taught a gradual path to Buddhahood (most thoroughly outlined in the BhÃÂvanÃÂkrama of Kamalaà Âëla). Ju Mipham writes that when he came to Tibet, "he set forth the ten good virtues, the eighteen dhatus, and the twelve fold chain of dependent arising."
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita is best known for his syncretic interpretation of Madhyamaka philosophy which also makes use of YogÃÂcÃÂra and Dharmakirtian epistemology. His Madhyamaka view is most clearly outlined in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra (The Ornament of the Middle Way) and his own commentary on that text, the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂravá¹Âtti (The Auto-Commentary on The Ornament of the Middle Way). à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita is not the first Buddhist thinker to attempt a synthesis of Madhyamaka thought with YogÃÂcÃÂra. Though à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita is often regarded as the leading exponent of this approach, earlier figures such as Vimuktisena, Srigupta and à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's teacher JñÃÂnagarbha had already written from a similar syncretic perspective.
Like other Indian Madhyamaka thinkers, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita explains the ontological status of phenomena through the use of the doctrine of the "two truths": the ultimate (paramÃÂrtha) and the conventional (saá¹Âvá¹Âti). While in an ultimate or absolute sense, all phenomena as seen by Madhyamaka as being "empty" (shunya) of essence or inherent nature (svabhÃÂva), they can be said to have some kind of conventional, nominal or provisional existence. James Blumenthal summarizes à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's syncretic view thus: "à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita advocates a Madhyamaka perspective when describing ultimate truths, and a YogÃÂcÃÂra perspective when describing conventional truths."
According to Blumenthal, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's thought also emphasized the importance of studying the "lower" Buddhist schools. These lesser views were "seen as integral stepping stones on the ascent to his presentation of what he considered to be the ultimately correct view of Madhyamaka". This way of using a doxographic hierarchy to present Buddhist philosophy remains influential in Tibetan Buddhist thought.
Like other Madhyamaka thinkers, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita sees the ultimate truth as being the emptiness of all phenomena (i.e., their lack of inherent existence or essence). He makes use of the "neither-one-nor-many argument" in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra as a way to argue for emptiness. The basic position is outlined by the following stanza:<blockquote>These entities, as asserted by our own [Buddhist schools] and other [non-Buddhist schools], have no inherent nature at all because in reality they have neither a singular nor manifold nature, like a reflected image.</blockquote>The main idea in his argument is that any given phenomenon (i.e. dharma), cannot be said to have an inherent nature or essence (i.e. svabhÃÂva), because such a nature cannot be proven to exist either as a singular nature (ekasvabhÃÂva) or as a multiplicity of natures (anekasvabhÃÂva).
In the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita analyses all the different phenomena posited by Buddhist and non-Buddhist schools through the neither-one-nor-many schema, proving that they cannot be shown to exist as a single thing or as a manifold collection of many phenomena. à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita usually begins by looking at any phenomenon that is asserted by his interlocutor as having a truly singular nature and then showing how it cannot actually be singular.
For example, when analyzing the SÃÂá¹Âkhya school's doctrine of a Fundamental Nature (Praká¹Âti, the permanent, un-caused absolute cause of everything), à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita states that this permanent and fundamental nature cannot be truly singular because it "contributes to the production of successive effects." Since "each successive effect is distinct", then this fundamental nature which is contributing to all these different effects arising at different times is not really singular.
After critiquing the non-Buddhist ideas, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita turns his arguments against Buddhist ideas, such as the theory of svabhÃÂva, the theory of atoms (paramanu), the theory of the person (pudgala), theories regarding space (akasa) and nirvana. He also critiques the Sautrantika and Yogacara Buddhists who held that consciousness (vijñÃÂna) is truly singular and yet knows a variety of objects. In his analysis of consciousness, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita concludes that it is just like other entities in the sense that it can be neither unitary nor multiple. Therefore, he (like other Madhyamikas) refuses to assign any ultimate reality to consciousness and sees it as empty of any inherent nature. Furthermore, he also critiques the Yogacara theory of the three natures.
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita then turns to a critique of the idea that there is a truly manifold nature in phenomena. à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's main argument here is that any manifold nature or essence would depend on an aggregation of singular essences. But since singular essences have been proven to be irrational, then there can also be no manifold essence. Because of this, phenomena cannot have any inherent nature or essence at all, since the very idea of such a thing is irrational.
All Madhyamikas agree on an anti-essentialist view which rejects all permanent essences, inherent natures, or true existence. However, they do not all agree on conventional truth, that is, the best way of describing how it is that phenomena "exist" in a relative sense. In his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita argues that phenomena which are "characterized only by conventionality" are those phenomena that "are generated and disintegrate and those that have the ability to function."
According to Blumenthal, the main criteria for conventional entities given by à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra and its commentary are the following:
Furthermore, causal efficacy and impermanence are qualities that conventional truths have due to the fact that they are dependently originated, that is, they arise due to causes and conditions which are themselves impermanent (and so on). Also, conventional truths are described by à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita as being known by conceptual thought and designated based on worldly custom.
One important element of à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's presentation of conventional truth is that he also incorporates certain views from the YogÃÂcÃÂra school, mainly the idea that conventional phenomena are just consciousness as well as the concept of self-cognizing consciousness or reflexive awareness (svasamvedana). The MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂra argues in favor of the YogÃÂcÃÂra position on a conventional level and states that "that which is cause and result is mere consciousness only". Thus, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita incorporates the YogÃÂcÃÂra school's analysis into his Madhyamaka framework as a useful way of understanding conventional reality and as a stepping stone to the highest view of emptiness of all phenomena.
Around 11 works may have been written by à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita, some survive in Tibetan translation and others in Sanskrit. Some of his texts survive in Jain libraries, showing that he was a figure that was taken seriously even by some of his non-Buddhist opponents.
His main known works include:
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's Tattvasaá¹ graha (Compendium on Reality/Truth) is a huge and encyclopaedic treatment (over 3,600 verses distributed into 26 chapters) of the major Indian philosophic views of the time. In this text, the author outlines the views of the numerous non-Buddhist Indian traditions of his time.
Unlike previous Madhyamaka texts which were organized around Buddhist categories to be refuted and discussed, the Tattvasaá¹ graha is mainly organized around refuting non-Buddhist views which were becoming increasingly sophisticated and prominent during à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's era (though space is also saved for certain Buddhist views as well, like pudgalavada i.e. "personalism"). In this text, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita explains and then refutes many non-Buddhist views systematically, including SÃÂá¹ khya's primordial matter NyÃÂya's creator god (êà Âvara) and six different theories on the self (ÃÂtman). He also defends the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness, rejects the Vaià Âeá¹£ika ontological categories, discusses philosophy of language and epistemology as well as Jain theories, Sarvastivada philosophy, and critiques the materialism of the CÃÂrvÃÂkas and the scriptural views of MëmÃÂá¹ÂsÃÂ.
A Sanskrit version of this work was discovered in 1873 by Dr. G. Bühler in the Jain temple of PÃÂrà Âva at Jaisalmer. This version contains also the commentary by à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's pupil Kamalaà Âëla.
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's synthesis of Madhyamaka, Yogacara, and Dharmakirtian thought was expounded in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂra (Ornament of the Middle Way). In this short verse text, à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita critiques some key Hindu and Buddhist views and then details his presentation of the two truths doctrine. This presents Yogacara Idealism as the superior way of analyzing conventional truth while retaining the Madhyamaka philosophy of emptiness as the ultimate truth. In the last verses of this text, he summarizes his approach as follows: <blockquote>âÂÂBased on the standpoint of mind-only one must know the non-existence of external entities. Based on this standpoint of the non-intrinsic nature of all dharmas one must know that there is no self at all even in that which is mind-only. Therefore, those who hold the reins of logic while riding the carriage of the two systems [MÃÂdhyamika and YogÃÂcÃÂra], attain the stage of a true MahÃÂyÃÂnist.â </blockquote>
Mipham lists à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's main Indian students as Kamalaà Âëla, Haribhadra and Dharmamitra. He also notes that other Indian scholars like masters Jñanapada, and AbhayÃÂkaragupta (c. 1100 CE) "also established the view of Prajnaparamita in accordance with this tradition". Furthermore, according to David Seyfort Ruegg, other later Indian scholars such as VidyÃÂkaraprabha (c. 800 CE), Nandasri, BuddhajñÃÂna(pÃÂda), JitÃÂri, and KambalapÃÂda also belongs to this YogÃÂcÃÂra-MÃÂdhyamaka tradition.
Ju Mipham further states that this tradition was continued by Tibetan scholars such as Ngok Lotsawa, Chaba Chökyi Senge and Rongton Choje. à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's work also influenced numerous later Tibetan figures such as Yeshe De (ca. 8th c.), Sakya Pandita (1182âÂÂ1251), Tsongkhapa (1357âÂÂ1419) and Ju Mipham Gyatso (1846âÂÂ1912).
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's philosophy remained the main interpretation of Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism from the 8th century until the time of the second dissemination in the eleventh and twelfth centuries when Candrakirti's work began to be translated. Blumenthal notes that already in the time of Patsab (12th century) "the Prasaá¹ gika-Madhyamaka view began to be widely taught and the privileging of à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's system began to encounter serious opposition." Je Tsongkhapa's (1357-1419) interpretation of Prasaá¹ gika Madhyamaka, and his new school, the Gelug, raised serious and influential critiques of à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's position. In no small part due to his efforts, Prasaá¹ gika Madhyamaka replaced à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's Madhyamaka as the dominant interpretation of Madhyamaka in Tibetan Buddhism.
In the late 19th century, Ju Mipham attempted to promote YogÃÂcÃÂra-MÃÂdhyamaka again as part of the Rimé movement and as a way to discuss specific critiques of Je Tsongkhapa's widely influential philosophy. The Rimé movement was funded by the secular authorities in Derge, Kham, and began to establish centres of learning encouraging the study of traditions different from the dominant Gelug tradition in central Tibet. This Rimé movement revitalised the Sakya, Kagyu, Nyingma and Jonang traditions, which had been by almost supplanted by the Gelug hegemony.
As part of that movement the 19th century Nyingma scholar Jamgon Ju Mipham Gyatso wrote the first commentary in almost 400 years about à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂra. According to his student Kunzang Palden, Mipham had been asked by his teacher Jamyang Khyentse Wangpo to write a survey of all the major Mahayana philosophic shastras for use in the Nyingma monastic colleges. Mipham's commentaries now form the backbone of the Nyingma monastic curriculum. The MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂra, which was almost forgotten by the 19th century, is now studied by all Nyingma shedra students.