RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti (also known as RatnÃÂkara, à ÂÃÂntipa, and à ÂÃÂnti) (late 10th-century CE to mid 11th-century CE) was an influential Buddhist philosopher and vajrayana tantric adept and scholar. He was the "gate scholar" of Vikramaà Âilàuniversity's eastern gate (modern-day Bihar in India), a key post in the university's leadership. RatnÃÂkara was known by the title kalikÃÂlasarvajña ("the Omniscient One of the Degenerate Age") and is depicted as one of the eighty-four mahÃÂsiddhas (great yogic masters).
RatnÃÂkara wrote over forty works which include several influential commentaries to Mahayana sutras and tantras (especially the Hevajra tantra), treatises on YogÃÂcÃÂra, Madhyamaka, and PramÃÂá¹Âa. Because his unique philosophy attempts to merge the insights of both YogÃÂcÃÂra and Madhyamaka, RatnÃÂkara referred to it as TrisvabhÃÂva-mÃÂdhyamaka ("the middle way of the three natures"). He also known as a major defender of the "nirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda" (without images") interpretation of YogÃÂcÃÂra.
At Vikramaà ÂilÃÂ, RatnÃÂkara was a teacher to Atëà Âa, Maitrëpa, Drokmi à ÂÃÂkya Yeshe among others. He was also a contemporary of VÃÂgëà Âvarakërti. RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti was influential on some Tibetan Buddhist figures. Defenders of the shentong view him as a forerunner of this tradition and as a defender of shentong. His work on the Hevajra Tantra was also influential.
There is much uncertainty about the facts of RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti's life since Tibetan and Sanskrit sources disagree on many issues. Many sources refer to him as a "pà «rvadeà Âëya" born in Magadha (modern-day Bihar in India).
Abhayadatta Sri places him during the reign of the PÃÂla king DevapÃÂla (c. 810-850 CE). However, modern scholars have now determined that the most likely dating for RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti's birth (based on philological, philosophical and biographical evidence) is in the late tenth century, "slightly before JñÃÂnaà Ârëmitra, Ratnakërti, and Atià Âa." TÃÂranÃÂtha says that he took his post at Vikramaà Âëla during the reign of King Canaka (active in the early 11th century).
Naktso LotsÃÂwa Tsultrim Gyelwa, a Tibetan student of RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, states that RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti was a student of *Dharmakërtià Ârë (a.k.a. Bla ma Gser ling pa, *Dharmakërti of Suvará¹Âadvëpa). Tibetan sources also state he was a student of NÃÂropa, though it is hard to say how reliable this claim is as many of these sources are unreliable historically.
In the early stages of his career, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti received his ordination at the monastery of Odantapuri. He seems to have gained much fame and status during the middle of his life when he became acting head of Vikramaà Âëla and attracted many offers to teach abroad and this allowed him to secure many donations for the upkeep of Vikramaà Âëla. Several sources mention that RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti lived long and was still at Vikramaà Âëla when Adhëà Âa (Atisha) when to Tibet in 1041. Sources seem to indicate that he died sometime before 1050 CE.
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti is perhaps best known for representing the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda view in the debates between the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda and SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda positions within YogÃÂcÃÂra philosophy. This debate concerned the question of the status of mental images (ÃÂkÃÂra). Both factions agreed in their denial of an external world apart from consciousness. That is, for both sides, the appearance of the external world is just an image within consciousness. However, where the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdins maintained that the images showing up within cognition are real, since they are not different from the ultimately real consciousness, the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdins argued that reality is ultimately free of images, as images are constructed by ignorance and therefore false. Thus, according to the NirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda, only primordial mind as self-cognition exists.
While both factions inherited Dharmakërti's assertion of a tÃÂdÃÂtmya (identity) relation between appearance and consciousness, they differed in their understanding of it. For the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdin, consciousness and images are identical and any conscious experience necessarily has an image. According to the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdin, for example, in the experience of a patch of blue, there is no consciousness apart from blue: there is just blue-consciousness. On the other hand, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti argues that the tÃÂdÃÂtmya relation simply means that appearances are grounded in consciousness, existing in virtue of it, but it does not follow from this that consciousness exists in virtue of appearance. For RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, the relationship is therefore asymmetrical: while consciousness and appearance are non-distinct in some sense, they are not identical in every respect. Davey Tomlinson describes this as a "compositional identity," giving the example of a statue and a lump of clay: in the same way that the statue is composed of clay, images have luminous awareness as their compositional identity. But just as the clay is not identical to the statue in every respect, so too luminosity and images are not entirely identical, and what is the case for one is not necessarily so for the other.
With this view, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti maintained that opposing properties such as being false and being real may be predicated of one and the same thing, such that an appearance is false but the luminous awareness out of which it is composed is real. As such, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti argued against MÃÂdhyamikas such as à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita who maintained that, since appearances do not withstand the neither-one-nor-many argument, and are therefore false, so too must luminosity be false if appearances and luminosity are not distinct. While RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti agrees with the MÃÂdhyamika that images do not withstand the neither-one-nor-many argument, it does not follow for him that luminosity is thereby also false. At the same time, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti argues against the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdin who maintains that appearances and luminosity, being identical, both withstand the neither-one-nor-many argument and are therefore both real. While RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti agrees with the SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdin that luminosity is real, it does not follow for him that appearance is also real.
SÃÂkÃÂravÃÂdins such as JñÃÂnaà Ârëmitra argued that the manifestation of something unreal to consciousness was incoherent: since consciousness is real, whatever is manifest to it, being identical to that consciousness, must also be real. In response to this view, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti gives the example of generic properties or universals, which all Buddhists take to be false. Generic properties, such as "cow-ness" (gotva) for instance, are agreed by all parties to be products of ignorance and habituation. But while the generic property is false, it is nonetheless undeniably luminous and shows up in awareness. RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti points out that no self-respecting Buddhist would argue that a generic property is real just because it has this compositional identity with awareness. RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti then extends this argument to appearances, such as blue: in the same way that generic properties show up in awareness without being real thereby, blue may have a compositional identity with awareness without being real.
For RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, when we think we are seeing blue, there is something real that is seen, namely awareness itself. According to RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, this self-awareness cannot be refuted, as he states, "Because it is a direct perception, because there is nothing superior, and because it is not imputed, self-awarenessâÂÂwhich is the nature of cognitionâÂÂis not harmed, [but] blue and so forth are refuted." In this way, awareness is thus the dependent nature (paratantrasvabhÃÂva), which is neither a convention nor an imputation. However, while real, Daniel McNamara explains that for RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, "Due to karmic distortions, the dependent nature manifests in an impure manner as the imagination of the unreal (abhà «taparikalpa)âÂÂspecifically, even though we are seeing awareness, its presentation is distorted by karma such that awareness seems like 'blue.'" At the same time, for RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, even while the defiled aspect arises and dissolves, the basis also has a pure aspect which remains. According to Luo, "For RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, the imagination of the unreal is a duality in which two rà «pas [forms] manifest: clear light (prakÃÂà Âa), the perfect rà «pa, and a mental image (ÃÂkÃÂra), the imagined one."
Moriyama observes that for RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti the relationship between cognition and images is one of bhedÃÂbheda (difference and non-difference), similar to colors appearing in a mirror: the colors are neither identical to the mirror itself nor different from it.
While being a YogÃÂcÃÂra philosopher who defended the nirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda ("without images", also known as alikÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda) view of YogÃÂcÃÂra, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti also argued for the compatibility of Madhyamaka with this YogÃÂcÃÂra view. His works, like the PrajñÃÂpÃÂramitopadeà Âa, state that the YogÃÂcÃÂra and Madhyamaka schools are congruent, having the same ultimate intent and final realisation, even if they describe it somewhat differently.
Due to his unique doctrinal view, which draws on both YogÃÂcÃÂra and Madhyamaka, Tibetan authors like Taranatha labelled RatnÃÂkara's position "Vijñapti-madhyamaka" (rNam rig gi dbu ma). Modern scholars have also described his position with other terms including just "nirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda", "nirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda yogÃÂcÃÂra-mÃÂdhyamika" and trisvabhÃÂva-mÃÂdhyamika. H. Luo notes that various texts by RatnÃÂkara show that he associated his view with the term "Rang bzhin gsum gyi dbu ma pa" which can be reconstructed in Sanskrit as *TrisvabhÃÂva-mÃÂdhyamika ("the middle way of the three natures"). The term indicates that he saw himself as a follower of Nagarjuna's mÃÂdhyamaka thought who also defended the yogacara school's doctrine of the three natures (trisvabhÃÂva).
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti's PrajñÃÂpÃÂramitopadeà Âa states:<blockquote>The Yogacaras and likewise the Madhyamikas assert that the fourth [and final] yogabhumi consists of the supramundane wisdom that is absolute without stains and infinite, appearing like space, and in which, by emptiness, all phenomena are not observable and do not appear at all...the Yogacaras assert that the fundamental nature of phenomena - sheer lucidity - exists substantially, while the Madhyamikas do not even assert such a substance. However, this difference is understood as [being one in] name only. Therefore, those Yogacaras and Madhyamikas who dispute with each other without any basis [to do so] are persons of very bad character.</blockquote>According to RatnÃÂkara, true MÃÂdhyamikas cannot ultimately deny reflexive awareness (Sanskrit: svasaá¹Âvedana or svasaá¹Âvitti). Those who deny this undermine the very epistemic force (pramÃÂá¹Âa) of their system and their own negative arguments. This is because for RatnÃÂkara to be able to logically refute anything there must be a foundation for one's epistemology. Thus, RatnÃÂkara argues that as long as MÃÂdhyamikas accept reflexive awareness as a real foundation, their intent is equal to that of nirÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda YogÃÂcÃÂra.
RatnÃÂkara called those Madhyamikas who denied the real existence of reflexive awareness âÂÂpseudo-MÃÂdhyamikasâ (Tibetan: dbu maâÂÂi ltar snang, *madhyamakÃÂbhÃÂsa) and he states that they fail to understand NÃÂgÃÂrjunaâÂÂs true intent, which he sees as fully consistent with the MadhyÃÂntavibhÃÂga and DharmakërtiâÂÂs PramÃÂá¹ÂavÃÂrttika. RatnÃÂkara's main critique is against à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita, whom he cites and attempts to refute in the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂravá¹Âtti madhyamÃÂpratipad-siddhi (Proving the Middle Path: A Commentary that Ornaments Madhyamaka).
à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹Âkàaccepts the YogÃÂcÃÂra analysis of things at the conventional level, but he sees it as a view which must be superseded by Madhyamaka's anti-foundationalism at the level of ultimate truth. This is because à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita thinks that the dependent nature, the YogÃÂcÃÂra explanation of the ultimate reality, cannot be defended as being either a single thing or as manifold (and thus, it cannot be ultimately real).
According to Daniel McNamara, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti criticises this view, holding that "there must be a substratumâÂÂthe other-dependent natureâÂÂand that this does indeed survive the neither-one nor-many argument." RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti argues that à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's position is untenable epistemically (since there would be no foundation for pramÃÂá¹Âas and thus, for knowledge) and metaphysically (since pure negation cannot explain dependent arising and causality). RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti states:<blockquote>Now, some do not accept that the imagination of the unreal exists; they posit that everything is false. To them, we respond: If [everything] were just false, there would be no cause and no regularity. There would be no causal capacity, only error. Every kind of pramÃÂá¹Âa would be impossible. If everything were false, there would be no causes, so [everything] would arise causelessly. They would also not arise only on particular occasions (re âÂÂgaâÂÂ). [As Dharmakërti states, in Pramanavarttika 1.35ab]: Since that which is causeless does not depend on anything else, it would be either permanently existent or permanently nonexistent. There would be no causal capacity because capacity is defined in terms of existence; it is not possible for something non-existent to have causal capacity, The [view that] everything is only error would be attained because what is manifest is non-existent. It would then absurdly follow that the ÃÂryas, who do not [see] delusory things, would not see [anything]. Moreover, if everything were an error, there would be no valid direct perception or inference, and so everything without exception would be non-pramÃÂá¹Âa.</blockquote>Thus, according to RatnÃÂkara, "pseudo-Madhyamikas" undermine their own arguments when they reject a foundation like the dependent nature. For RatnÃÂkara, without some ultimate reference point which really exists, one cannot establish the truth of anything via epistemology - including basic Buddhist theories like dependent arising.
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti defends the importance of the YogÃÂcÃÂra three natures theory for Mahayana Buddhism and for understanding the ultimate truth. Following closely the MadhyÃÂntavibhÃÂga and the Triá¹Âà ÂikÃÂ, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti maintains that the perfected or consummate nature (pariniá¹£panna svabhava) is the dependent (paratantra) nature's emptiness of the imagined (parikalpita) nature.
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti summarises his interpretation of the three natures theory and how it relates to the two truths theory of Madhyamaka in the following verse (found in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂropadeà Âa and in his MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂravá¹Âtti madhyama pratipatsiddhi):<blockquote>Every dharma which has as its nature the two, [i.e., the apprehended and the apprehending,] does not exist; [every dharma which] has as its nature the error as being two, [however,] exists; [every dharma which has] as its nature the emptiness of [the two also exists]. That is accepted as the Middle Way. The three natures are named the Imagined, the Dependent, and the Consummate, because, thus in sequence, the Imagined is superimposed as an error, the Dependent arises from the causes, the Consummate is changeless.</blockquote>In this way, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti seeks to provide a theory of the middle way which unites the two main Indian Mahayana schools at the time. In this view, the consummate nature is seen as ultimate and changeless, while the other two natures are relative truth.
The MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂravá¹Âtti madhyama pratipatsiddhi further explains why the three natures are the madhyamaka middle way:<blockquote>To say âÂÂ[All dharmas] existâ is one extreme, to say âÂÂ[All dharmas] do not existâ is another extreme. The middle of these two is the Middle Way, which is the definitive realization of the [three] natures. What, then, is that [definitive realization]? That which [asserts]: All dharmas are neither existent nor non-existent, that is to say, from the perspective of the Imagined, [all dharmas] are not existent, from the perspective of the Dependent and the Consummate, they are not nonexistent. </blockquote>According to H. Luo, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti's understanding of Madhyamaka is similar to later Tibetan views described as shentong, such as the view of Sakya Chokden.
According to Karl Brunnholzl, there are two models of the three natures and their relationship to emptiness found in Indian sources:
Brunnholzl argues that RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti defends model one in all texts except the Sutrasamuccaya-bhasya (which is a questionable text).
However, Hong Luo disagrees with this view and instead argues that model 2 (together with model 1) can be found in PrajñÃÂpÃÂramitopadeà Âa, MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂropadeà Âa and in the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂravá¹Âtti.
Luo quotes the PrajñÃÂpÃÂramitopadeà Âa which states:<blockquote>Therefore, all factors are mere mind (cittamÃÂtram), mere cognition (vijñÃÂnamÃÂtram), mere luminosity (prakÃÂà ÂamÃÂtram). There is neither external object-referent to be apprehended by cognition nor the apprehending nature of the cognition. These two, [i.e., the apprehended and the apprehending,] are the Imagined of the factors, because they are fabricated by mental speech. Where are they fabricated? In the imagination of the unreal, [which] arises through the strength of the impregnation of the attachment to the Imagined, [and which] contains the image of an object-referent despite the non-existence of object-referent. The imagination of the unreal is the Dependent of the factors, [it is] an error (bhrÃÂntiḥ), a perverseness (viparyÃÂsaḥ), a false cognition (mithyÃÂjñÃÂnam). Thus, in the [imagination of the unreal], the image of the apprehending as well as the image of the apprehended are indeed unreal. By the power of confusion (viplavavaà ÂÃÂt), [which arises] only through the strength of error (bhrÃÂntivaà ÂÃÂt), the imagination of the unreal manifests. Therefore, the form (rà «pam) of the [imagination of the unreal] is unreal. What is the real? [It is] mere luminosity. </blockquote>Furthermore, the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ kÃÂropadeà Âa also argues that only the consummate/perfected nature is true: "there is nothing which establishes luminosity, because it is undifferentiated, and because, [otherwise,] there will be an undesirable infinite regress. Thus, since luminosity as such cannot be erroneous to itself, it is valid knowledge." The text then states that the other two natures "like hairs in the sky, are erroneous."
Thus, for RatnÃÂkara, what is truly real is luminosity (prakÃÂÃ Âa), the perfected nature, also termed Suchness (tathatÃÂ), and the transcendent wisdom of a buddha, which is empty of the imagined and the dependent natures and is always without change.
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti also held that ultimate reality is an implicative negation, which is the natural luminosity (prakrti-prabhasvara) and the tathagatagarbha (i.e. buddha-nature) which is also non-dual self-awareness (svasamvedana). This non-dual self-awareness is what remains after all afflictive and cognitive obscurations and duality have been removed.
In the MadhyamakÃÂlaá¹ÂkÃÂravá¹Âtti madhyamÃÂpratipad-siddhi, RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti encapsulates his view of the ultimate reality as follows: "Those dharmasâÂÂwhich do not existâÂÂappear Not from matter, nor from what is other, Nor from non-existence, because of two faults. Therefore, their identity is awareness." He comments that the dharmas, the apparent relative phenomena, are not truly existent since they are non-dual, "they lack a nature which is singular or multiple." They do not arise from matter "because appearances are established through awareness alone", nor from something other than awareness, "because phenomena could not manifest in a field of experience from which they are separate." Thus, the only real thing is "the true nature of awareness itself, that is falsely apprehended as appearances."
This ultimate reality is also described as having the nature of radiance (prakÃÂà Âa, âÂÂshining forthâÂÂ), which is the true nature of all phenomena. In the PrajñÃÂpÃÂramitopadeà Âa, Ratnakara says that all dharmas which appear must have radiance (prakÃÂà Âa), which is the capacity to appear (pratibhÃÂsa), as their self-nature (ÃÂtmabhà «taḥ). Without this capacity for shining forth that consciousness has, nothing could appear to consciousness.
RatnÃÂkara mentions buddha-nature in his *GuhyasamÃÂja-maá¹Âá¸Âalavidhi-á¹ÂëkÃÂ. He describes buddha-nature as the five kinds of Buddha wisdom (such as ÃÂdarà ÂajñÃÂna, mirror-like wisdom, and the rest) which are completely pure, abide in sentient beings "forever, throughout beginningless and endless time", and are merely veiled by adventitious stains but always remain unchanged.
RatnÃÂkara calls the buddha-nature the seed of a Bodhisattva (*bodhisattvabëja), and the âÂÂspiritual dispositionâ of a Buddha, or the TathÃÂgata-family (tathÃÂgatagotra). Thus, RatnÃÂkara argues that only some sentient beings have buddha-nature, mainly, those who have the disposition (gotra) to become bodhisattvas (but not sravakas or pratyekabuddhas). This is why he says in his MuktÃÂvalë that "all bodhisattvas are Buddha-nature (tathÃÂgatagarbha)".
According to RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti, Buddhahood is the merging of a transcendent awareness with a pure mundane awareness (which is ultimately free of ÃÂkÃÂras - representations). Out of their great compassion, all Buddhas deliberately retain a tiny amount of cognitive distortion or mistakenness (bhrÃÂnti), so that they interact with and aid sentient beings.
There are about 40 texts attributed to RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti in the Tibetan canon.
His philosophical works, generally written from a YogÃÂcÃÂra alikÃÂkÃÂravÃÂda perspective, include several commentaries to the Perfection of Wisdom literature. Three key works stand out:
He also wrote three doxographical texts (two of which are commentaries to à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita's MadhyamÃÂkalaá¹ÂkÃÂra):'
He is often critical of the viewpoints of Madhyamikas, including Candrakërti and à ÂÃÂntaraká¹£ita.
RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti composed three commentaries to the GuhyasamÃÂja Tantra, as well as commentaries to the Hevajra Tantra and the MahÃÂmÃÂyàTantra. His three main tantric texts are:
He also wrote KusumÃÂñjalënÃÂma GuhyasamÃÂjanibandha, a commentary on the GuhyasamÃÂja.
Furthermore, he also wrote a technical treatise on Buddhist pramÃÂá¹Âa theory called the AntarvyÃÂptisamarthana.
A Sutrasamuccaya-bhasya is attributed to an author named RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti. However, this treatise defends the ekayana view of buddha-nature, and thus it is likely to be by a different figure using this name, and not by RatnÃÂkaraà ÂÃÂnti the YogÃÂcÃÂra philosopher from Vikramaà Âëla.