The Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (, ', abbreviated as , ') was a political and military organization formed in Prague on 14 November 1944 under the leadership of former Red Army general Andrey Vlasov. Established with the approval of Nazi Germany, it served as the principal political body of the Vlasov movement and represented the most developed institutional form of the broader Russian Liberation Movement (), an anti-Stalinist collaborationist movement composed primarily of Soviet citizens and émigrés who sought the overthrow of Joseph StalinâÂÂs government during the final phase of the Second World War.
The KONR attempted to present itself as a political alternative to both Stalinism and Western capitalism. Its program, most clearly articulated in the Prague Manifesto, called for the abolition of forced labour and collective farms, the restoration of civil liberties, and the recognition of the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination. The movement brought together a politically diverse coalition that included Russian nationalists, anti-Stalinist socialists, former Soviet officials, prisoners of war, émigrés, and supporters of a so-called âÂÂthird forceâ that sought an independent anti-Soviet path between Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.
Although the KONR claimed to represent the peoples of Russia, its practical authority was limited and heavily dependent on German military and political support. In early 1945 it assumed nominal control over the Russian Liberation Army and related formations, but its development was cut short by the collapse of the Third Reich. In the final weeks of the war, units associated with the KONR fought both Soviet and German forces and briefly intervened in the Prague uprising before attempting to surrender to the Western Allies.
The origins of the KONR lay in earlier attempts by Soviet prisoners of war, defectors, émigrés, and anti-Soviet activists to formulate an alternative to StalinâÂÂs rule under German patronage. After the German invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941, a number of Russian collaborationist and anti-Bolshevik initiatives emerged, though most remained fragmented and received only limited support from the German leadership. These initiatives formed part of what later became known as the Russian Liberation Movement (ROD), a loose political and military current that sought to organize anti-Soviet armed resistance during the war and, in some conceptions, after it. Supporters of the movement generally believed that Bolshevism could not be overthrown from within the Soviet Union alone and that the German-Soviet war might create the conditions for a renewed Russian civil conflict, in which anti-Stalinist forces could emerge as an independent political actor.
The social and political backgrounds of participants varied widely. Historians have identified motives including anti-communism, anti-Stalinism, Russian nationalism, resentment over collectivization and repression, hostility to Soviet nationality policy, religious opposition, opportunism, coercion, and survival. This diversity contributed to the movementâÂÂs ideological ambiguity and organizational instability throughout the war.
One of the earliest important documents associated with the later Vlasov movement was a memorandum sent by Andrey Vlasov to the German high command on 3 August 1942. In later historiography, it became known as the âÂÂVlasovâÂÂBoyarsky memorandumâÂÂ. The memorandum proposed the creation of a unified Russian political centre and the organization of anti-Soviet armed forces from prisoners of war and other collaborators. At the same time, other collaborationist political projects were also being developed. These included the activities of Konstantin Voskoboinik, Bronislav Kaminski, Ivan Bessonov, and the âÂÂPolitical Centre for the Struggle against BolshevismâÂÂ. These efforts reflected a broader search for a Russian anti-Soviet political platform, but none achieved decisive institutional form before late 1944.
A major precursor to the KONR was the Smolensk Declaration (also known as the Smolensk Appeal), issued on 27 December 1942 in the name of the Russian Committee. Addressed to Soviet soldiers, officers, civilians, and âÂÂall the Russian people and other peoplesâÂÂ, it was the first major political declaration associated with VlasovâÂÂs movement. The declaration portrayed Bolshevism as the principal enemy of the Russian people and denounced StalinâÂÂs government for repression, forced labour, military defeat, and the destruction of towns and villages. It also attacked the Soviet UnionâÂÂs Western allies as âÂÂAnglo-American capitalistsâ and called for a political and military struggle against Stalin in cooperation with Germany.
Its program included the overthrow of Stalin, the destruction of Bolshevism, an âÂÂhonourable peaceâ with Germany, the liquidation of collective farms, transfer of land into private peasant ownership, restoration of trade and private initiative, guarantees of civil and religious freedoms, release of political prisoners, reconstruction of the country, and state support for war invalids and their families. Many of these themes later reappeared in the Prague Manifesto. At the same time, the Smolensk Declaration was more overtly propagandistic and more explicitly pro-German in tone. It marked an important political milestone, but at the time it did not yet correspond to a fully developed organization or army.
Throughout 1942 and 1943, Vlasov and his associates sought German approval for a formally recognized Russian political centre and army. These efforts were repeatedly frustrated by divisions within the German leadership and by Adolf HitlerâÂÂs reluctance to permit the formation of an autonomous Russian movement. A turning point came in September 1944, when Vlasov met with Heinrich Himmler. By that stage, GermanyâÂÂs deteriorating military position made collaborationist initiatives more attractive to the SS leadership. Himmler agreed to the establishment of a recognized anti-Bolshevik political body and associated armed forces. The KONR was formally proclaimed in Prague on 14 November 1944. Prague was chosen in part because it was a major Slavic city still under Axis control, and because Vlasov wished the event to take place on what he considered Slavic soil. German representatives present included Werner Lorenz and Wilhelm Frick, though Himmler himself did not attend.
A total of 37 individuals signed the Prague Manifesto at the founding session. These included former Soviet military officers, professors, émigrés, and civilians. Vlasov became chairman of the KONR and commander-in-chief of its armed forces. The committee held further meetings in Berlin on 18 November and 17 December 1944, and in Prague on 27 February 1945. By early 1945, it had reportedly expanded to 102 members, though after February, only the Presidium continued to meet regularly.
The Prague Manifesto was the principal political statement of the KONR and the document that gave the movement its clearest ideological form. It was drafted in November 1944 by a commission chaired by Georgy Zhilenkov, with participation from figures including Vasily Malyshkin, Fyodor Trukhin, Dmitry Zakutny, and Nikolai Troitsky.
Before publication, the text was submitted to Himmler. According to Russian-language accounts, he attempted to insert language concerning struggle against the United States and the United Kingdom, as well as a more explicit anti-Jewish plank. The latter was reportedly rejected, while anti-Western language was retained in the preamble. The proclamation ceremony took place in the Spanish Hall of Prague Castle before several hundred attendees. German dignitaries reportedly included Karl Hermann Frank and Emil Hácha, and greetings were sent by Himmler and other Axis-aligned figures.
The Prague Manifesto consisted of fourteen points outlining the KONRâÂÂs political, social, and economic program. It declared that the movementâÂÂs goals were the overthrow of Stalinist rule, the liberation of the peoples of Russia from Bolshevism, the end of the war through an âÂÂhonourable peaceâ with Germany, and the creation of a new state free from both Bolshevik dictatorship and exploitation.
Its principles included:
The manifesto attempted to combine anti-Bolshevik politics with a socially interventionist program, presenting the movement as an alternative to both Stalinism and capitalism.
The ideology of the KONR was internally diverse and has been described by historians as politically eclectic. It brought together Russian nationalists, anti-Stalinist socialists, non-Stalinist Marxists, former Soviet officials, émigrés, and advocates of greater autonomy or independence for non-Russian peoples of the former Soviet Union. A recurring idea within the broader Russian Liberation Movement was the concept of a âÂÂthird forceâÂÂâÂÂthe belief that an anti-Stalinist Russian movement could emerge that was neither Soviet nor genuinely subordinate to Nazi Germany. This idea was especially associated with some émigré political circles, including members of the National Alliance of Russian Solidarists (NTS), who hoped that the war would create the conditions for an independent Russian national state. In practice, however, this position remained deeply contradictory, since the movement depended heavily on German patronage and operated within the framework of Axis occupation and military policy.
According to Russian-language interpretations, the movement drew on pre-revolutionary Russian political traditions, the upheavals of 1917, and strands of non-Stalinist socialism. Notably, KONR documents did not sharply distinguish between the February Revolution and the October Revolution, and they did not explicitly condemn Vladimir Lenin. Andreyev has argued that this reflected both tactical ambiguity and the fact that many of the movementâÂÂs leaders were themselves products of Soviet political culture.
Economically, the movement advocated a mixed system. It supported the destruction of collective agriculture, the restoration of peasant landholding, and the revival of small-scale private initiative, while generally retaining state control over heavy industry, transport, and communications. In this sense, the KONR opposed both Stalinist centralization and laissez-faire capitalism. The movement also attempted to frame the war in ideological terms distinct from those of Nazi Germany. Its rhetoric often portrayed the conflict as a struggle against both Stalinist internationalism and Western imperialism, while leaving its relationship to German war aims deliberately ambiguous.
The KONRâÂÂs relationship with Nazi Germany was marked by both dependence and distrust. The movement could not function without German military and political support, yet many German officials regarded it with suspicion and considered it ideologically unreliable. The KONR also faced structural obstacles rooted in German policy. Nazi authorities were generally hostile to the development of an autonomous Russian nationalist movement, and Hitler in particular remained deeply suspicious of any project that might strengthen Russian political identity or military self-organization. At the same time, German policy often encouraged national separatism among non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, which complicated the KONRâÂÂs attempt to present itself as a unified political centre for the âÂÂpeoples of RussiaâÂÂ.
German criticism of the movement was sometimes explicit. A memorandum by Propaganda Ministry official Eberhard Taubert reportedly described the movement as insufficiently National Socialist, criticized its lack of emphasis on the âÂÂJewish QuestionâÂÂ, and denounced it as a mixture of liberal and Bolshevik tendencies. Some evidence also suggests that draft proposals associated with the movement contemplated major concessions to Germany, including possible territorial arrangements involving Crimea and promises of autonomy to Cossack and other groups. The extent to which such proposals reflected settled KONR policy remains unclear.
The movement was also internally divided. Tensions frequently emerged between former Soviet citizens and White émigrés, whose political experiences, social backgrounds, and historical memories often differed sharply, especially in relation to the legacy of the Russian Civil War. Although the KONR was formally recognized by the Third Reich late in the war, German support remained inconsistent and largely subordinate to immediate military necessity.
The KONR developed a formal organizational structure, though many of its institutions remained only partially developed due to the rapid collapse of Germany in 1945.
Its central departments reportedly included:
The committee also attempted to establish financial and administrative autonomy. Its financial department, for example, obtained a loan from the German government in January 1945.
The military arm of the KONR was the Armed Forces of the Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia (VS KONR). In theory, these forces included several formations already in German service that were brought under the committeeâÂÂs nominal political authority.
The military background of the KONR extended beyond the formal structures created in late 1944. Earlier and parallel anti-Soviet formations in German service included auxiliary units (Hiwis), local security battalions, the Russian Corps in Yugoslavia, RONA, and various Cossack formations. Many of these units had distinct local, political, or ethnic origins and were only loosely connected, if at all, to the later institutional framework of the KONR.
Among the principal formations associated with the KONR were:
In practice, these units were only imperfectly integrated into a single military structure. The 1st Division began forming at Münsingen in late 1944 under Bunyachenko, and the 2nd Division began organization in January 1945 under Zverev. On 28 January 1945, Hitler formally confirmed Vlasov as commander-in-chief of the KONRâÂÂs forces. On 10 February, the first two divisions were ceremonially transferred to his command at Münsingen, where the Russian white-blue-red tricolour was raised alongside the Reich flag. Other formations, particularly Cossack and émigré units, were often only nominally subordinated to KONR authority. Their incorporation reflected the movementâÂÂs late and incomplete institutionalization rather than a fully unified command structure.
The proclamation of the Prague Manifesto reportedly generated a significant response among former Soviet citizens living in the Reich. The KONR received letters and petitions from prisoners of war, displaced persons, and civilians expressing support, requesting release from camps, or asking for admission to the liberation army. At the committeeâÂÂs December 1944 meeting, the success of the manifesto was emphasized as a political achievement. Donations and contributions also supported an organization known as âÂÂPeopleâÂÂs AidâÂÂ, which attempted to assist prisoners of war and displaced persons. According to Russian-language accounts, this included Christmas gift distributions for the children of eastern workers in Berlin camps.
The proclamation also had military consequences, as it marked the Third Reich's formal recognition of the KONR and gave renewed momentum to the formation of its armed forces. The movement also received support from some émigré and religious circles outside the formal military structures, including clergy and anti-Soviet Russian émigré networks, though the extent and political significance of that support varied.
In the final months of the war, the KONR attempted to consolidate its armed forces in western Czechoslovakia and Austria. These units briefly fought the Red Army during the last phase of the German retreat, while additional collaborationist formations were formally attached to KONR authority in April 1945. In May 1945, forces associated with the KONR took part in the Prague uprising, fighting against German troops. Historians have generally interpreted this intervention as an effort to improve their chances of surrendering to the Western Allies rather than the Soviet Union.
During the final months of the war, Vlasov and some of his associates increasingly hoped that the Western Allies, especially the United States and the United Kingdom, might support the movement as an anti-Soviet âÂÂthird forceâ in the event of a postwar confrontation with the USSR. This expectation shaped the movementâÂÂs conduct in 1945, including its attempts to avoid Soviet capture and to surrender to Western rather than Soviet forces. As Soviet forces approached Prague, KONR units withdrew and attempted to move westward. Many surrendered to the United States Army, though large numbers were subsequently repatriated to the Soviet Union, either directly or through Allied handovers later associated with Operation Keelhaul. The KONR ceased to function as an organization with the collapse of Nazi Germany in May 1945.
Although the KONR itself was short-lived, its political legacy survived among some émigré and anti-communist circles after the war. Former participants and sympathizers founded or joined several successor organizations that attempted to preserve the political memory of the Vlasov movement while reinterpreting its significance in exile. Among these were the Union of the St. Andrew Flag, the Committee of United Vlasovites, and the Union for the Struggle for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia. Russian-language accounts also identify the Anti-Communist Centre of the Liberation Movement of the Peoples of Russia (ACODNR) as a postwar organization that explicitly claimed succession from the KONR and reaffirmed the fourteen points of the Prague Manifesto in 1948.
Interpretations of the movementâÂÂs legacy varied. Some émigré groups presented it as a continuation of the broader Russian anti-Bolshevik struggle, while others treated it more narrowly as an episode within the history of wartime collaboration. In addition to émigré political activity, some Russian-language accounts describe limited anti-Soviet armed resistance by former collaborators and associated militants in parts of western Russia after 1945, especially in the former Lokot region. These activities remained localized and fragmented and did not represent an organized continuation of the KONR itself, but they contributed to the broader afterlife of the Russian Liberation Movement in memory and exile politics.
In the United States, a separate CIA-backed body with a similar name, the American Committee for the Liberation of the Peoples of Russia, emerged during the early Cold War and became associated with broader anti-Soviet propaganda and exile politics, including institutions later connected with Radio Liberty.