BhÃÂviveka, also called BhÃÂvaviveka (; ), and Bhavya was a sixth-century (c. 500 â c. 570) madhyamaka Buddhist philosopher. Alternative names for this figure also include Bhavyaviveka, BhÃÂvin, BhÃÂviviveka, Bhagavadviveka and Bhavya. BhÃÂviveka is the author of the Madhyamakahrdaya (Heart of the Middle), its auto-commentary the TarkajvÃÂlà(Blaze of Reasoning) and the PrajñÃÂpradëpa (Lamp for Wisdom).
In Tibetan Buddhism BhÃÂviveka is regarded as the founder of the svÃÂtantrika tradition of mÃÂdhyamaka, as opposed to the prÃÂsaá¹ gika madhyamaka of Chandrakirti.
There is also another later author called BhÃÂvaviveka who wrote another set of madhyamaka texts. He is sometimes called BhÃÂvaviveka II by modern scholars.
The life details of BhÃÂviveka are unclear. The earliest source is Xuanzang's 7th century The Great Tang Dynasty Record of the Western Regions. According to Xuanzang, BhÃÂviveka was a 6th-century scholar from south India (Andhra Pradesh) who traveled north in an attempt to engage in debate with the Yogacara master DharmapÃÂla (who refused to meet him). Malcolm Eckel states that the sixth century was a period of "unusual creativity and ferment in the history of Indian Buddhist philosophy", when the Mahayana Buddhism movement was emerging as a "vigorous and self-conscious intellectual force" while early Buddhist traditions from the eighteen (Nikaya) schools opposed this Mahayana movement.
Eckel states that BhÃÂviveka may have been one of the many itinerant scholars at the time who traveled the country engaging their opponents in debate. During this time, formal debate was a high stakes endeavor which played a central role in Indian monastic life and could determine the support monasteries received from kings who attended the debates. In some cases, one was not even allowed to enter an elite institution like NÃÂlÃÂnda unless one demonstrated a certain amount of knowledge to the gatekeeper scholar. Because of this, an effective debater like BhÃÂviveka needed to be conversant with the doctrines of their opponents, and this need is reflected in the writing of doxographical works like BhÃÂviveka's.
According to Olle Qvarnström, Bhavya developed and revised some of the methods and ideas of the MÃÂdhyamaka philosophy first established by NÃÂgÃÂrjuna. Qvarnström argues that the need for this revision was that Madhyamaka was in danger of "being absorbed or overshadowed by the Yogacara school" and was also coming under pressure from various Brahmanical systems of philosophy. Qvarnström writes that "in order to avert these threats and to bring Madhyamaka philosophy into conformity with the prevalent philosophical requirements of the intellectual milieu in the sixth century, Bhavya used logical devices originally formulated by Dignaga and others."
Unlike previous mÃÂdhyamaka authors, BhÃÂviveka adopted Indian pramÃÂá¹Âa reasoning (as developed by the earlier Buddhist logician Dignaga) and applied it to the development of madhyamaka arguments in order to show that phenomena (dharmas) have no self-nature (svabhÃÂva), and to establish that the true nature of all phenomena is emptiness. According to Ames (1993: p. 210), BhÃÂviveka was one of the first Buddhist logicians to employ the "formal syllogism" (, ) of Indian logic in expounding mÃÂdhyamaka. He employed these to considerable effect in his commentary to NÃÂgÃÂrjuna's Mà «lamadhyamakakÃÂrikÃÂ, entitled the Wisdom Lamp.
Qvarnström outlines BhÃÂviveka's development of madhyamaka as follows:<blockquote>According to Bhavya, the refutation of a system by depicting its inherent contradictions without stating a positive thesis of one's own was not sufficient to settle a debate. This "reductio ad absurdum" (prÃÂsaá¹Âgika) argumentation had to be supplemented by independent propositions (svatantra), sometimes incorporated in formal syllogisms (prayogavÃÂkya). By means of independent inferences (svatantrÃÂnumÃÂna) and proper syllogisms, Bhavya considered himself capable of both proving the validity of his own propositions and of refuting any upcoming counterposition, Buddhist or Hindu.</blockquote>BhÃÂviveka held that even though Nagarjuna himself had only relied on prÃÂsaá¹Âgika style reductios which do not put forth any positive thesis (and only refutes the arguments of the opponent), it was the responsibility of the commentator to make explicit the implications and logical consequences of Nagarjuna's text. This was to be done by making use of pramÃÂá¹Âa reasoning in order to establish logical arguments that proved the truth of mÃÂdhyamaka in a positive sense. That is to say, Bhavya sought to prove madhyamaka by arguing for the truth of independent theses (pratijñÃÂ) which did not rely on refuting the theses of others.
Because of this, he criticized Buddhapalita, an earlier commentator on Nagarjuna, for failing to properly draw out these implications and construct proper syllogistic arguments to prove the truth of Madhyamaka. As Richard Hayes notes, Bhavya took pains to show that "MÃÂdhyamikas do have a conviction that they are prepared to state and defend, namely, that all phenomena are devoid of an inherent nature, that is, a nature that they have independently." Hence, Bhavya held that mÃÂdhyamaka philosophers needed to provide proper arguments in favor of the basic mÃÂdhyamaka theory which states that all phenomena (dharmas) are empty (à Âà «nya).
Eckel illustrates the differences in method between Bhavya and Buddhapalita as follows:<blockquote>The first substantive verse of Nagarjuna's MMK says: "Nothing arises from itself, from something else, from both, or from no cause at all." Buddhapalita explains the first part of this verse as follows: "Nothing arises from itself, because its arising would be useless, and because it would lead to an absurd conclusion. There would be no point for things that already exist in their own right to arise again, and, if something arises after it already exists, it would never cease to arise." Bhaviveka reformulates this argument as a positive assertion: "The internal sense media ultimately do not arise from themselves, because they already exist, like consciousness." By making this logical transformation, Bhaviveka takes an argument that reduces the opponent's assertion to an absurd conclusion (prasaá¹Âga) and substitutes an independent (svatantra) inference, with a proper thesis (pratijñÃÂ), reason (hetu), and example (dá¹Âá¹£á¹ÂÃÂnta).</blockquote>Regarding the fact that Nagarjuna himself states that he does not defend any thesis in his The Avoidance of Refutations (VigrahavyÃÂvartanë), Bhavya makes use of the doctrine of two truths to defend his method. Though he agrees that ultimately there can be no thesis, it is still possible to use words in a conventional manner to convince others through reasoning as a "skillful means" (upÃÂya). Eckel notes that his defense of positive syllogisms may have been motivated by its importance in the sixth century Indian circles of formal debate. In these circles, the practice of merely attacking the views of one's opponent without defending a thesis of one's own (which was called vitaá¹Âá¸ÂÃÂ) was seen as bad form and not well respected.
Regarding the importance and use of reason on the Buddhist path, BhÃÂviveka agrees with some of his Buddhist opponents that reasoning cannot know true reality. However, according to BhÃÂviveka, reason (tarka) does have a role in the Buddhist path and that is the removal of wrong and confused views about reality which block one's spiritual progress. BhÃÂviveka affirms that "Buddhas use faultless inference in a way that is consistent with tradition to completely reject many different concepts of imagined things" and "inference rules out the opposite of knowledge." For BhÃÂviveka, it is after reasoned inference has cleared away all the confusing wrong views (kudá¹Âá¹£á¹Âi) and conflicting doctrines (vÃÂda) that a person is able to "see all objects of knowledge just as they are, with non-conceptual knowledge and with minds like space."
Furthermore, inference allows one to examine all the differences which are found among the various spiritual traditions and philosophies (darà Âana), and then to be able to determine which is true in a rational manner. This is because "if tradition has the status of tradition because it has an unbroken transmission, then everything is tradition, and it is necessary to determine which is true."
Thus Bhavya sees reasoning about spiritual and philosophical matters as an key preliminary step which prepares the mind to develop a pure and non-conceptual type of wisdom (prajñÃÂ) that sees ultimate truth. In chapter three of the Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way, Bhavya states:<blockquote>
Because wisdom requires the clearing away of wrong views, there is a need to understand these views and thus an important part of BhÃÂviveka's philosophical project was a schematic theory of erroneous views. BhÃÂviveka does this in various ways, one of which is based on the early Buddhist BrahmajÃÂla Sà «tra which outlines 62 types of wrong views and he also provides another even longer list of 363 wrong views which is found in the TarkajvÃÂlÃÂ.
Bhavya also explored the various Indian philosophical schools (darà Âanas) in depth. Bhavya is notable in the Indian tradition for his work on comparative philosophy and doxography. According to Malcolm D. Eckel, "no Indian Mahayana thinker played a more crucial role in mapping the landscape of Indian philosophy and defining the relationships of its different traditions. At a time when major branches of Indian philosophy were still in the process of formation, Bhaviveka provided a model of textual classification (the philosophical compendium or doxography) that became the classic vehicle for the study of Indian philosophy." Bhavya's work discusses most of the major schools of Indian philosophy (Vaià Âeá¹£ika, SÃÂá¹Âkhya, VedÃÂnta, Mëá¹ÂÃÂá¹Âsàas well as Jainism).
Bhaviveka also engages with the doctrines of à ÂrÃÂvakayÃÂna (non-Mahayana) Buddhists and addresses their various criticisms against Mahayana.
According to Qvarnström, Bhavya's MadhyamakahrdayakÃÂrikàand its TarkajvÃÂlàcommentary is one of the earliest sources on early (pre-Shankara) Vedanta (aside from the Brahmasà «tra, the VÃÂkyapadëya and the GaudapÃÂdëyakÃÂrikÃÂ). Regarding Bhavya's view of Vedanta, Qvarnström writes:<blockquote>the VedÃÂntatattvavinià Âcaya of the MadhyamakahrdayakÃÂrikàand TarkajvÃÂlàis interesting because it is the first Buddhist text to distinguish Madhyamaka philosophy from purely Vedanta notions. In VTV, Bhavya maintains that the notion of a "Self'- or in his terminology, an "intrinsic nature" - actually was borrowed from the Madhyamaka school. Bhavya consequently considers it his duty not only to refute the Vedanta interpretation of this notion, but also to outline his own view on this matter at great length. The question of "intrinsic nature" or "Self' constitutes, therefore, the main object of the polemics between the VedÃÂntavÃÂdins and the MÃÂdhyamikas in VTV. Bhavya may thus be said to have initiated on a systematical basis the main issue of the prolonged controversies between Buddhist and Brahmanical philosophy which were to continue well beyond his time.</blockquote>
BhÃÂviveka wrote an independent work on the Madhyamaka entitled the MadhyamakahrdayakÃÂrikÃÂ (MHK, Verses on the Heart of the Middle Way) which Bhavya in turn wrote an autocommentary upon entitled the TarkajvÃÂlÃÂ (Blaze of Reasoning). BhÃÂviveka's MadhyamakahrdayakÃÂrikÃÂ and his commentary TarkajvÃÂlÃÂ therein, states (Malcolm) David Eckel, provide a "unique and authoritative account of the intellectual differences that stirred the Buddhist community in this creative period". However, the Blaze of Reasoning also contains different layers, and it seems like at least parts of it where also authored by a later figure, possibly BhÃÂvaviveka II.
The text survives in an incomplete Sanskrit manuscript as well in Tibetan translation by Atià Âa and Lotsawa Jayaà Âëla (which has allowed for a reconstruction of the full Sanskrit).
According to Qvarnström, this text outlines the main views found in the Buddhist à ÂrÃÂvakayÃÂna and YogÃÂcÃÂra schools as well as the Brahmanical Vaià Âeá¹£ika, SÃÂá¹Âkhya, VedÃÂnta and Mëá¹ÂÃÂá¹ÂsÃÂàschools. All these schools are presented as the pà «rvapaksa (opponent's view). Their views are critiqued and the Madhymaka view is then outlined as the uttarapaká¹£a (superior view).
The MadhyamakahrdayakÃÂrikÃÂ is divided into the following chapters:
The first three chapters present Bhavya's own Madhyamaka philosophy and understanding of Buddhism, the rest discuss and refute other views.
The PrajñÃÂpradëpa (Wylie: shes rab sgron ma; or shes rab sgron me) is BhÃÂviveka's commentary upon Nagarjuna's Mà «lamadhyamakakÃÂrikÃÂ. The Sanskrit is no longer extant (except for a few embedded quotations in the PrasannapadÃÂ, Candrakërti's commentary of the Mà «lamadhyamakakÃÂrikàand critique of the PrajñÃÂpradëpa) but according to Ames (1993: p. 211) is available in both an excellent Tibetan translation, rendered by JñÃÂnagarbha and Cog ro Klu'i rgyal mtshan (Wylie) in the early 9th century. Ames (1993: p. 211) also conveyed that the Chinese translation is poor, where the inference of inferiority was drawn from the work of Kajiyama (1963: p. 39). The Sanskrit name has been reconstructed as either *PrajñÃÂpradëpa or *JanÃÂndeepa (where JanÃÂndeepa may or may not be a Prakrit corruption or a poor inverse-translation, for example).
There is also later figure by the same name, sometimes called BhÃÂvaviveka II or Bhavya. According to Ruegg, this second BhÃÂvaviveka may have been the same person as the tantric Bhavyakërti (c. 1000) and is the author of the MadhyamakÃÂrthasaá¹Âgraha (Compendium of Meanings of the Middle) and the Madhyamakaratnapradëpa (Jewel Lamp of the Middle).
BhÃÂviveka is retrospectively considered by the Tibetan Buddhist tradition to be the founder of the svÃÂtantrika madhyamaka tradition within Buddhism. Tibetan doxographers divided the madhyamaka philosophy of NÃÂgÃÂrjuna into svÃÂtantrika (those who make use of svatantra: autonomous syllogisms) and prÃÂsaá¹ gika, which refers to those madhyamikas who only use prasaá¹ ga (consequential, reductio ad absurdum) arguments, mainly Buddhapalita (470âÂÂ550 CE) and Candrakirti (600âÂÂ650 CE). This manner of division has been retroactively applied in Tibetan monasteries, and commonly found in modern secondary literature on madhyamaka.
However, according to Dreyfus and McClintock, such a classification is problematic and was not used in India, where instead the "svÃÂtantrika and prasangika" schools were camped together then contrasted with Santaraksita and Kamalasila" (Yogacara-Madhyamaka) schools. The former accepted "external objects exist", while the latter camp accepted "external objects do not exist". The svÃÂtantrika versus prÃÂsaá¹ gika sub-schools may have been an 11thâÂÂ12th century innovation of the Tibetan translator Patsab Nyima Drakpa while he was translating a Sanskrit text by Candrakirti into Tibetan.
In the lineage of the Panchen Lamas of Tibet there were four Indian and three Tibetan mindstream tulku of AmitÃÂbha before Khedrup Gelek Pelzang, 1st Panchen Lama. The lineage starts with Subhuti, one of the original disciples of Gautama Buddha. BhÃÂviveka is considered to be the third Indian tulku in this line.