The phi-hiding assumption or æ-hiding assumption is an assumption about the difficulty of finding small factors of ÃÂ(m) where m is a number whose factorization is unknown, and àis Euler's totient function. The security of many modern cryptosystems comes from the perceived difficulty of certain problems. Since P vs. NP problem is still unresolved, cryptographers cannot be sure computationally intractable problems exist. Cryptographers thus make assumptions as to which problems are hard. It is commonly believed that if m is the product of two large primes, then calculating ÃÂ(m) is currently computationally infeasible; this assumption is required for the security of the RSA cryptosystem. The æ-hiding assumption is a stronger assumption, namely that if p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub> are small primes exactly one of which divides ÃÂ(m), there is no polynomial-time algorithm which can distinguish which of the primes p<sub>1</sub> and p<sub>2</sub> divides ÃÂ(m) with probability significantly greater than one-half.
This assumption was first stated in the 1999 paper titled Computationally Private Information Retrieval with Polylogarithmic Communication, where it was used in a private information retrieval scheme.
The phi-hiding assumption has found applications in the construction of a few cryptographic primitives. Some of the constructions include: