The Thrasher incident was a political and diplomatic incident in 1915, when the United States was still neutral in World War I. The cause for it was the sinking of the British steamer by a German submarine, where one of the around 100 victims was a passenger from the US, Leon Chester Thrasher. On 28 March 1915 the U-boat chased and halted Falaba, whose crew sighted the submarine at a distance of 3 miles astern. At first the steamer tried to escape, but after 12 minutes, the Germans ordered her to stop with flag signals, which were obeyed. After 20 minutes, the Germans came into hailing distance, and gave the crew and passengers 10 minutes to evacuate. Poor handling of the life boats â three of them merely surf boats â caused some of the boats to fall into the cold water with many people. The majority of them, around 100, drowned or died because of hypothermia.
Witnessing the difficulties the British had with launching Falabas boats, Kapitänleutnant Georg-Günther von Forstner, the captain of the German submarine, decided to wait another 10 minutes, and seeing there were still some on board the ship, kept waiting further. Receiving reports of approaching smoke on the horizon, thinking they were from Allied destroyers, after waiting 23 minutes for the evacuation, and the launched life boats already hundreds of yards away from Falaba, at 12:53 GMT he gave order to fire one torpedo. The ship sunk within 8-10 minutes after the hit. Between 20 to 30 people were still on board, and one group was busy with belatedly preparing the lowering of the last boat, placed on the poop deck. Forstner claimed he noticed this activity only after he gave the order to launch the torpedo. Survivors of Falaba claimed that this surf boat was full of people, and many died in the explosion. The men remained on board, saved themselves by jumping in the water, some of them, including captain Frederick Davies, died. A drifter tracking the u-boat and just arriving at the scene rescued most of the survivors, around 120 people from the water and from the life boats.
Following the sinking, the British press published stories from survivors which claimed the Germans misused the White Ensign, gave only an inadequate time of five minutes to evacuate and laughed at people struggling for their lives in the water. Inquiries on 30 March in Milford Haven, and in May in London led by Lord Mersey concluded, that after a chase of about 20 minutes and after waiting only 5 minutes, the submarine torpedoed Falaba. The sinking led to a diplomatic incident between the American and German governments, and contributed to the deterioration of American-German relations which ultimately led the United States to join World War I on the Allied side in 1917.
The Thrasher-incident â or Falaba-incident â was one occasion of a row in which German naval activities harmed US interests. On 28 January 1915 a German merchant raider captured and scuttled the US sailing ship . On 4 February Germany declared a war zone around the British Isles, in which the Imperial German Navy's approximately 20 submarines would seek to starve out Britain by sinking merchant shipping. The United Kingdom responded by tightening its naval blockade of Germany.
Under customary international law, attacks on civilian vessels are governed by cruiser rules. A warship may stop and search an unresisting vessel, and capture or sink her only while assuring the safety of the crew and passengers. The Allied blockade adhered to these rules, but violated the rules for a blockade by putting it up far away from German shores and diverting neutral shipping on the high seas. In response Germany's declaration signalled an official abandonment of such restrictions, though in practice submarine commanders would adhere to some version of the rules in most attacks until 1917.
The Wilson administration, led by President Woodrow Wilson and Secretary of State William Jennings Bryan, protested to the German government on 10 February. Wilson and Bryan called the German intention "an act so unprecedented in naval warfare" and that the US would hold the Germans to "a strict accountability for such acts of their naval authorities." Germany responded by issuing orders to avoid targeting neutral ships, but a number of such vessels were attacked anyway, and German naval mines in the North Sea sank American steamships on 21 and 22 February.
The British Admiralty gave instructions to merchant ships on dealing with U-boats, including advice to attempt to make an escape. Doing so has been argued to potentially qualify as "resistance" as far as cruiser rules are concerned.
Leon Chester Thrasher (sometimes falsely spelled Thresher) was from Massachusetts. He was born in Hardwick in 1884, and trained in Springfield as a machinist and master mechanic. He was described as a "mechanical engineer" or "mining engineer". He had worked for the Panama Canal Railway, and was traveling from London to Sekondi to work for a British firm, the Broomassie Mining Company, in Gold Coast (now Ghana). Thrasher was issued a US passport in June 1911, but it had expired in June 1912. At first this raised a question of whether he had retained his US citizenship.
On 27 March 1915 Elder Dempster Lines' Falaba left Liverpool for West Africa. She had a crew of 95 and 151 passengers. The passengers included about 40 British Army troops, 10 of them officers on their way to serve in the Kamerun campaign, 70 Colonial Service officers, and 3 foreign nationals, a Dane, a Greek and Thrasher. Her cargo included 13 tons of cartridges and gunpowder. According to the inquiry this was a normal peacetime cargo for the ship. However, in wartime it counted as contraband according to international law, and if caught, the German Navy could legally sink the ship.
The Falaba was equipped with eight boats. Four of them (No. 1-4.) were real life boats for 49 people each (except No. 2 certificated for 50), three were so called surf boats, designed for transporting baggage the to shore on the West African coast, where most ports were open, without natural protection from waves. Two of them (No. 6 and 7) had a capacity of 28, while No. 5 was qualified for 29. There was also a captain's gig, not included as a life boat, could carry 25 The certificated boats could carry all together 282 people, just the number with full capacity of passengers and crew. With the gig included there was accommodation for 307 persons.
On the main boat deck there were six of these boats, counted from stern towards the bow, numbered 2, 4 and 6 on the port (left side), and 1, 3 and 5 on the starboard (right side). Hence, the forward ones No. 6 and 5 were both surf boats. On the poop was the gig alongside with the third surf boat. On the day of the incident, the gig was on the left, and the surf boat on the right. The numbering of these two boats caused some confusion during the legal process in May. Some referred to the gig as No. 7 and the surf boat as No. 8, for others they were the other way. The examination of the seven certified boats in December 1914 concluded, that all of them were in good condition and well equipped.
According to his chief engineer two out of the 12 fires under the 4 boilers were kept clean, and instead of the maximal 13,5 knots, the ship was sailing with a speed of about 12,5-12,75 knots, and following the Admiralty instructions kept well away from the usual route. The weather conditions were very moderate, with a little choppy sea. There was a light north-eastern breeze and a swell from the south-west.
As usual for ocean liners, the clocks of the Falaba were changed in every 24 hours. According to chief officer Walter Baxter, on 28 March the clocks were altered "something like 35 minutes" between 08:00 and 10:00 a.m. by the third officer. The clocks were changed on the bridge and in the saloons, but not in the engine room, where the clock used to be changed after a "Full speed ahead" order through the telegraph at 12:00 new deck time. On the 28 March for undisclosed reasons the clock in the engine room had a time between Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) and the newly established deck time, with 16 minutes ahead of the deck time, and 19 behind GMT.
The clock of the quartermaster in the wheel house must have differed also from both GMT and deck time, since quartermaster Robert Harrison remembered seeing a time â 12:22 â on it after evacuation ordered, but many minutes before the torpedo was fired. If GMT, it would be in the middle of the chase, if deck time, the Falaba would have been torpedoed already at that time even according to the German log book (12:18), which contained a true timeline. The clock in the "Marconi house" started with GMT, and this was not changed, since radio operators do not alter it at all when working to a British call station in the British Isles.
In the log book of U-28 the times were given in 1 hour after GMT, that means radio operator Edwin Taylor and captain Forstner had just that difference, the easiest data to match. 12:00 GMT had the radio operator and some passengers (with unaltered watches) in mind, for captain Forstner it was 11:00, for Falaba deck time 11:25, and for the engine room it must be about 11:41. The wheel house is uncertain, maybe had the same time as the engine room (possibly from the previous journey?).
The submarine under the command of Kapitänleutnant Georg-Günther von Forstner started her mission on March 16 from the estuary of the river Ems with the aim of cruising in the Irish sea. The next day she sighted the British steamer Leeuwarden, which after firing three warning shots stopped. After evacuation of the crew, the steamer was sunk with gunfire. Forstner towed the life boat to the Maas light ship in the mouth of the river Rhine. On March 18, the Germans boarded two Dutch steamers transporting foodstuff to Britain. Prize crews took both to Zeebrugge in German-occupied Belgium, where also the submarine anchored. One of the steamers, the Batavier V was let free, while some of the cargo of the Zaanstrom was given back. The ship itself was seized by the German authorities.
U-28 left harbour to continue her mission on March 24. Passing the Strait of Dover, water leaked into her main periscope, making it unoperable. With the minor periscope underwater attacks were only possible under very calm conditions, but Forstner decided to continue and operate according to the prize law. Next day U-28 halted the Dutch steamer Medea. Since she was transporting food to London and her papers could not ascertain, that not for military reasons, she was sunk with gunfire. Afterwards the submarine towed the life boats into the vicinity of the nearby patrolling British patrol boats. After dusk Forstner launched a torpedo on a darkened steamer, but missed her.
On March 26 sailing west in heavy waves Forstner launched a torpedo aiming at a steamer without any signs, but missed again. At the Lizard Peninsula Forstner sighted many British steamers, but heavy seas made torpedo launching impossible.
On March 27 U-28 sighted a steamer without any markings in the Bristol Channel and tried to stop her, but she began to flee. The submarine opened fire, but due to the frontal waves had only a slight speed advantage. U-28 achieved four hits on the steamer but abandoned the chase after one and a half hour in order to spare munition. During the chase the steamer hoisted the British flag. Forstner remarked to the occasion:
This steamer was the Vosges, which indeed sank before reaching a harbour. One crew member was killed.
Later that day the steamer South Point was halted, and torpedoed after her crew left. The sinking was accelerated with gunshots on the waterline. In the meantime a steamer neared to the scene, and tried to run away after the submarine signalled her to heave to. What thereafter happened to the Aguila is controversial. British sources claim that after a warning shot before the bow she stopped, and started to evacuate. One of her life boats capsized, and two women drowned. The Germans opened fire afterwards, causing farther death casualties. U-28 fired 20 rounds in total before torpedoing her. Forstner ordered the nearby fishing vessel Ottilie to take the survivors on board. She has found three of the life boats, the fourth was found by another vessel next day. In contrast to the British version, Forstner claimed that he was firing on the Aguila only while she was fleeing, and only after she was hit, decided to stop.
The submarine spent the night to March 28 on the bottom of the sea in a depth of 25 metres, south of St George's Channel. In the morning a ship under Spanish flag was halted, inspected and let free. Next a bigger one was sighted. This was the Falaba.
According to the submarine's log book there was a North-Eastern wind with heavy seas, but the weather was clear at that time. Forstner went under to take an attacking position undetected. Cause of the bigger waves with the smaller periscope the ship was again to be detected when she was in a distance of about 5 miles. Underwater attack impossible, Forstner ordered to surface and take up the chase with full speed (16 knots) at 11:10 (12:10 GMT).
In the vicinity the Germans have sighted many fishing vessels, and their fear was, that anyone of them could have been armed. Out of the many the drifter Eileen Emma departed from Milford Haven three days before, on March 25 to the fishing grounds. After detecting the submarine, her captain, Horatio Wright decided to separate from the other vessels and gave an hour long "chase" to the submarine. Then he sighted the Falaba, and realized that "it was no good chasing", cause the submarine went after that steamer and proved much faster. He followed the Germans with the new aim of save the people from the ship.
At this point the Falaba was about 50âÂÂ60 miles to the west from St. Anne's Head steering 216ð (south-southwest) with a speed of about 12.5âÂÂ12.75 knots. The surfacing submarine was quickly sighted by passengers on board the Falaba. One of the passengers thought that the submarine was flying the White Ensign, and a debate aroused among the spectators on that matter. After a few minutes, third officer Harry Pengilly became aware of the commotion, and was informed by the passengers of their observation. He at once went to the bridge and at 11:40 deck time (GMT 12:15, just 5 minutes after U-28 surfaced to begin the chase) reported the sighting to first officer Walter Baxter, describing it as a submarine at a distance of 3 miles, 3 points to the right, and adding that the submarine might fly the British flag. Behind the submarine "at some distance" a small fishing vessel, the drifter Eileen Emma was also observed. Some said, the drifter was just behind the submarine, another estimation located the submarine just between Falaba and the drifter, hence 6 miles would have been between Falaba and the drifter.
Baxter informed captain Frederick Davies, who was in the chart room, and he came out immediately to see the submarine. Observing the submarine with glasses, he soon made out that she was indeed flying a German flag, and gave an order to accelerate to full speed, and alter the course by 2 points to make the submarine right astern. More speed could not be obtained since the ship was sailing with her maximal available speed, about 12.5 knots at that time, due to not all possible fires being then lit under each boiler. According to fourth engineer Hugh Brown the clock in the engine room was at 11:56 when the "full speed" telegraph order was received, and thinking it was the signal to midday, the clock hand was set forward at 12:00.
After giving these orders, captain Davies sent first officer Baxter to the radio room to send this message to Land's End station:
According to Edwin Taylor, this message was sent at 12:25 GMT (11:50 deck time), 10 minutes after the submarine was reported. He attached a request to the message, that it is to be relayed to a "battleship". He received an answer to his message, and also that it was relayed. Coming back from the radio room, Baxter received a telescope from a passenger, and with that he realized, that the submarine was actually flying a German flag.
While Falaba sailed with about 12.5 knots, the U-28 was coming with her maximum 16 knots. With that speed difference, the chase was about to last nearly a whole hour. But 12 minutes after the submarine was reported to the chief officer, at 11:52 (12:27 GMT), the submarine signalled "stop immediately" with flags, and about half a minute later "stop or I will fire". In order to threaten the vessel, captain Forstner had sent two gunners to the deck gun, who had to tie themselves to their weapon for not to be washed away from board.
According to quartermaster Harrison, seeing both these signals the chief officer and the captain discussed the matter, and Baxter advised the captain not to risk a hit on the deck now already full of spectators, and they better stop before the Germans open fire. The captain agreed, and the engines were stopped even before the third German message "abandon ship immediately" was signalled. The fourth engineer stated, that in the engine room the order "stop" was received at 12:12 on the telegraph, 12 minutes after "full speed".
Forstner also fired a red lighted signal rocket to warn the steamer not to flee, and the steamer should have replied with signaling that she is obeying to the order. According to Forstner he signalled next "abandon ship immediately". According to the estimate of the Admiralty, the Falaba needed 5 to 6 minutes to stop completely, that means, she must have stopped already at around 11:57âÂÂ11:58 deck time (12:32âÂÂ12:33 GMT). Some survivors also mentioned, that at the late stage of the chase the submarine was approaching very fast. Captain Forstner, who was in the hull of the submarine watching the events through the periscope observed "wild disorder" ("wilde Unordnung") ensuing just after the flag sign "abandon ship immediately" was hoisted.
Some minutes after this signal the submarine arrived next to the steamer, and out of precaution held itself out of range of hand weapons, and observed, whether there were board weapons on the steamer, and after finding there were none, at 11:30 on his clock (11:55 Falaba deck time, 12:30 GMT) he hailed through a megaphone, that he is granting 10 minutes to evacuate. Captain Davies replied "Alright, we are taking to the boats now."
Hearing this short conversation Edwin Taylor sent another wireless message on his own initiative at 12:35 GMT with this content:
The radio operator later explained this message with his expectation of being torpedoed in a short time. This second wireless message was sent 10 minutes after the first one, and evidently 5 minutes after the megaphoned time limit. According to Taylor himself, he remained 6âÂÂ7 minutes in the radio room after sending that message, when coming along first officer Baxter informed him that they are overhauled by the submarine, and he has nothing to do anymore in the radio room. So Taylor left for the boats.
About that time some passengers estimated the distance to be around 100 yards to the submarine, and someone even suggested to fetch the rifles from beneath, and open fire on the German sailors, who seemed to represent easy targets. Having the submarine already that near was the decision on the bridge made to swing out the boats No. 5 and 6 on the main deck. Earlier only No. 1, 2, 3, 4 and the gig were swung out. Even this time the surf boat on the poop was not involved. The chief steward, the second steward and a further steward was ordered by the first officer to bring all the passengers on deck and provide them with life belts. Chief bedroom steward John Ellams stated, that they had to tell the passengers, that they were given 10 minutes to evacuate. Learning from the lessons of the Titanic and avoid panic instead of the order "into the boats" the order "to the boats" was given. Passengers who came up without their own life belts were provided out of the two big boxes on the upper deck.
According to some passengers some kind of excitement was arising after the megaphoned order, but there was no real panic. Some reported that there was a big rush for boat No. 3 and a commotion ensued. Others stated, that every passenger waited patiently for lowering the boats, some were even singing the song "It's a Long Way to Tipperary".
Forstner witnessed as the crew of Falaba struggled hard with preparing and lowering the boats, and more of them were hastily dropped on the water. He decided therefore to wait longer, so that all of them could be lowered and they can draw off to a safe distance from the ship. In the meantime, he slowly got around the ship, and positioned himself on her starboard side, and elapsing already 20 minutes after megaphoning the evacuation time, he ordered one of the torpedoes in the bow to be prepared for launching.
By this time the British lowered their boats, some of them capsized, or began to sink because of missing plugs. The survivors unanimously reported, that the Falaba was stationary at the time when the boats were lowered. One survivor even stated that the ship was already motionless at the time the megaphoned message was given. The first lowered (and dropped) boats were drifting slowly towards the stern, while the tide, the stream and the wind turned the ship.
U-28 took up a position on the starboard of Falaba with her stern to the ship. According Forstner he thought that after 20 minutes all the boats were lowered, but decided to wait a bit, cause he saw some people still moving around. Farther 3 minutes elapsed, when fast nearing smokes were reported from the conning tower. Forstner now â at 11:53 (12:53 GMT, Falaba deck time 12:18) â gave the order to fire. The torpedo shot launched out of a distance of 240 metres hit the ship under the davits of boat No. 1. In his log book Forstner explained, that he has noticed only after the order that there was one last boat on the poop being prepared for lowering. The explosion caused this surf boat to fell in the water. (On the German photograph there is a bigger white spot under the poop, maybe the splash or perhaps the retouched impact). The detonation could be heard even 16 miles away on board the fishing vessel George Baker, which was one of the drifters coming to rescue the survivors. The Falaba suddenly leaned to starboard, but stopped for a while, than started to sink slowly by the stern. She completely sank within 10 minutes. According to chief officer Baxter it happened in 8 minutes.
There were still 16-18 people on board as Baxter stated. The first officer ordered them to stay until he gives order to jump. That happened after a few minutes, and those people tried to reach one of the boats or catch something floatable.
After the torpedo hit captain Davies went to the bridge, and gave signals with the steam pipe, obviously to call for immediate help from the drifter Eileen Emma, just arriving at the scene. This action of the British captain mentions praising even Kapitänleutnant Forstner in his log book. The Germans did not participate in the rescuing, since Forstner has observed the radio station installed on the ship and feared, that the reported "fast approaching" smokes on the horizon came from alarmed warships. Upon this he decided to leave the scene quickly. Radio operator Edwin Lough Taylor â who was lowered with boat No. 1, and after its capsizing swam for No. 2 â remembered the fate of the passengers of a third boat (No. 6) as follows: <blockquote>We saw about this time one of the boats containing about 30 of our companions capsized by the heavy seas without a chance of our doing anything to save them. So trying were the circumstances under which we were placed that one of the black firemen with us jumped overboard to end his agonies, whilst we found ourselves obliged to restrain another from cutting his throat⦠We ourselves were continually passing fellow creatures in the last throes of drowning, and I shall never forget the agony of listening to their final and awful cries, and watching the heartrending look of horror as they sank from sight...</blockquote> 104 were lost of the 242 on board. Thrasher was among the people killed in the incident. He was the first US citizen to be killed by the action of a German submarine.
Same time as the Falaba started the liner her journey from Liverpool to America, and she was one of the ships receiving the distress signal. She was only 15 miles from Falaba, but according tot he orders of the Admiralty it was forbidden to her to risk her own safety by helping other ships under attack of submarines. According to the Cymric the first wireless message of the Falaba was "Submarine alongside. Am putting off passengers in boats." A few minutes later the radio operator of Cymric heared British warships answering the distress call.
The Falaba was just between Queenstown (Ireland) and Pembroke (Wales), and both towns naval base received the distress call. There was no naval ship, but Pembroke has sent out the destroyer Liffey, which dropped her anchor there the day before.
First officer Baxter was responsible or the lowering of the boats, and after stopping the engines captain Davies sent him to the starboard boats immediately to supervise the arrangements there. Since the stop order was not given after 12:00, but already around 11:52 (instead of 12:35 it was 12:27 GMT), he might have gone there later. Baxter ordered three stewards (among them the chief and second stewards) to bring all their men up on the upper board, and ensure, that all of them receives a life belt. For the lowering of the boats on the port side was second office H. C. Hawkins responsible, and the help of the third officer.
The boats were lowered on both sides following their numbering, that means starting on the main boat deck from behind towards the bow. The two on the poop deck followed, but the surf boat on the starboard side was not swinged out before all the others had got to the water, and it could not be lowered before the torpedo struck the Falaba. Buckmaster in his opening speech in the May assessed, that the sequence was No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and the gig as lowered into the water, while No. 5. and 7. surf boats' fate was uncertain. He thought that No. 1 had 50 people, No. 4 around 40, No. 6 twenty, and the gig 30 people. During the process it became obvious, that No. 5 boat was lowered even before the gig, but the solicitor general strived to make the false impression, that besides No. 7 there was another boat not lowered in time, or could not row away before the torpedo hit, and in his view this boat must have been No. 5 or 6. This was forced even despite almost all the witnesses stated, that there was only one left behind, and all the others were 100-400 yards away from the ship at the time of the torpedo hit. Also there is no boat to be seen in the vicinity of the ship on the German photograph. Lieutenant Parker lowered in No. 6 testified, that No. 4 reached water before them, hence a possibly order might be: 2âÂÂ1âÂÂ3âÂÂ5âÂÂ7âÂÂ4âÂÂ6âÂÂ8 , where No. 7 is the gig. According to chief engineer William Guy he was enlisted to boat No. 6, but as he got up on the deck, this was already lowered, so he took the boat No. 4. If this is true, than the sequence should be 2-1-3-5-7 (gig)-6-4-8.
The lowering of the boats on the starboard side happened under the supervision of chief officer Walter Baxter as follows:
For the boats on the port side was second officer H. C. Hawkins responsible, and he was aided by third officer Pengilly, who was new on the ship and had no station on former boat lists. The second officer died in the incident.
At the time of the torpedo hit the sea was quite calm, but soon after the Falaba sank the sea got very choppy, and this deteriorated the chances of survival. The oil spoiling out of the cargo liner moderated somewhat these waves. The drifters coming to rescue the shipwrecked were all fishing on the North Sea before the war, but because of the naval mines and presence of enemy ships they had to change fishing area, and so they changed to the seemingly still peaceful Irish Sea. According to her captain, Horatio Wright, the drifter Eileen Emma following the submarine arrived on the scene while the Germans waited the Falaba to be evacuated, and launched her dinghi for pulling out survivors from the water even before the torpedo was fired. At the time of the torpedo hit she was about 300 yards from the Falaba and 1 or 2 minutes later she had pulled out the first shipwrecked persons. This ship has rescued the majority of the people, 122 in number. Captain Wright stated, that 40 of them were pulled out of the water. 6 of the rescued on Eileen Emma died soon afterwards because of hypothermia. Her captain, Horatio Wright explained, that he has been âÂÂchasingâ the submarine for an hour, and was only 300 yards (270 m) from the starboard bow of the Falaba when the torpedo was fired. In the inquiry led by Lord Mersey in May he stated, that her first life boat was already being lowered when the explosion occurred, and one or two minutes later the first persons were already pulled out of the water, after No. 4 boat rejected his offer to save them, arguing, he should care about the people drifting in the water first.
Forstner does not hurt the drifter â after Langensiepen & NottelmannâÂÂs presumption on humanitarian grounds havenâÂÂt sunk her, to let her rescue the shipwrecked. Beyond the 122 rescued by the Eileen Emma, further 14 were rescued by the Orient II (with the 12 survivors on No. 2 boat), 5 by the George Baker, 8 by the Wenlock and 3 by The Emulate, latter 3 were taken on board from the dinghi of the Eileen Emma.
The survivors were taken to Milford Haven. The Eileen Emma met with HMS Liffey on her way there, and the destroyer has taken on board most of the survivors. Reaching the port, she handed them over to the tug boat Atlanta, which landed them at around 23:00. The last survivors arrived at 02:30. Eight bodies were landed, among them Captain Davies and two soldiers (lieutenant Blakeney and sergeant Ernest Wallace).
According to the Naval Staff Monographs 46 of the 95 crew members and 57 of the 147 passengers lost their lives, altogether 103. In the Proceedings 48 crew members and 93 passengers are mentioned as rescued, and 47 crew members and 54 passengers as deceased, 101 victims in all. It is uncleared how many lost their lives due to the torpedo-explosion, or whether there were any. During the process in May there were some suggestions in that way, but the causes of death were always treated as drowning., and also The Naval Staf Monographs calls the causes generally as drownings, although mentions some died in the explosion.
According to the British report it was unknown how many victims on which class travelled, but Elder Dempster published a partial list two days after the tragedy mentioning, that out of the survivors 52 were first class, 34 second class passengers, while 49 crew members stayed alive, 3 suffered shrapnel wounds.
A passenger, Lieutenant Charles Lacon of the Warwickshire Regiment has made several photos on board the Falaba after U-28 appeared, which survived even after spending one hour in the water. The pictures were published already after three days, on 31 March by the Daily Mirror. The journal paid Lacon 200 pounds for them, and remarked that everyone should be prepared and hold a camera by himself for such occasions, because the editorial office would pay good money for the photographs. There is a German photograph from the moment of the torpedo hit too, which contradict several of the claims made by Falabas survivors.
The majority of the survivors, 83 men were housed in the Bethel of the town, while the six women were allocated in different houses. The local Red Cross helped to care about them, blankets were sent down from Fort Hubberston. On Monday the survivors were moving freely in the town, and many told their accounts of what happened to them. Chief officer Walter Baxter was allocated in the George and the Dragon Hotel, and he refused to meet with the reporters.
Many reports of the survivors were published by the British press. Based on these accounts The Western Telegraph reported, that the overhauling submarine ordered the cargo liner with three whistles to stop and evacuate, but before all the boats could be lowered, a torpedo was fired at 13:15. The first boat went up, and according some accounts a second torpedo smashed the second and third boats, although the fourth was able to get away safely. Some survivors stated, that the Germans were laughing at the shipwrecked. The captain of the Eileen Emma said, that he took notice of the submarine at 12:15 (GMT), and realising he was up to mischief, he chased her in hope of running her down. An hour later he sighted the liner, and he tried to get near to the submarine and finish her off. Seeing his intentions, the Germans fired a torpedo on the steamer out of a range of 200âÂÂ300 yards. At this time the Eileen Emma was only 200 yards from the submarine. According to the report âÂÂthe piratesâ waited for a while to see whether the ship will sink, and than left the scene. The drifter began to rescue the shipwrecked.
The Elder Dempster paid the costs of the survivors to reach their destinations, because most of them didnâÂÂt have the time to take their money with them. The majority of them left Milford Haven with train.
Falaba was the second British passenger ship that U-28 had sunk in as many days. On 27 March it had sunk Yeoward Brothers' steamship Aguila, also with considerable loss of life. U-28 was reported to have fired its deck gun at Aguila, inflicting casualties, including as her passengers and crew were abandoning ship.
Wilson thought U-28 had violated international law, the key point being the short amount of time given to evacuate the ship, but Bryan questioned "whether an American citizen can, by putting his business above his regard for his country, assume for his own advantage unnecessary risks and thus involve his country in international complications."
Wilson had Counselor Robert Lansing draft a diplomatic complaint to the Germans:
Bryan advised Wilson to not send a note in such bellicose terms, and had Lansing redraft the note. It was noted that only one American was killed, thus grounds for a legal protest was weak. The decision was made to leave off a formal protest for the time being, as Thrasher may be simply an isolated incident.
Two attacks followed: one, an air attack on the Cushing, and then a submarine attack on an American tanker, the Gulflight. On 7 May a U-boat sank RMS Lusitania. The incident was a great deal more severe, as the U-boat had this time attacked with no warning at all. Many people, including over a hundred US citizens, died in the shipwreck. The US sent a diplomatic note to Germany asking for an apology and reparations for both ships. The note included a warning that the US would take "any necessary act in sustaining the rights of its citizens or in safeguarding the sacred duties of international law."
The Lusitania sinking brought up the Thrasher case again. The Germans claimed that they had given the ship ample time to evacuate (10 minutes, extended to 23), and that they had been forced to sink the ship due to the approach of "suspicious vessels". This point was brought up by Bryan in his discussions with Wilson. The German government also contended that if a merchant ship tries to escape capture and seek assistance, that alters the duty of the commander of the attacking vessel to try to ensure the safety of non-combatants aboard the merchant ship, even after the ship subsequently stops and ceased resistance. The US government rejected this contention.
Thrasher's body washed ashore on the coast of Ireland on 11 July 1915, after it had been in the sea for 106 days. At first, authorities mistook him for a Lusitania victim and designated him Body No. 248. During the subsequent British inquiry led by Lord Mersey, which ended in July, one of the passengers claimed they were angry at the "bungled" evacuation, alleging that had the crew been well organized and the passengers well led, all of those on the ship could have been safely evacuated before the torpedo was fired. The passenger thus blamed Elder, Dempster, their Marine Superintendent and his brother-in-law Fred Davies for the loss of life. Mersey ultimately found that the ship only had five minutes to evacuate, thus placing all of the blame on the U-boat captain. Many later authors suspect the true amount of time given to evacuate was likely around 10 minutes, in between the British and German claims. Journalist and Lusitania conspiracy theorist Colin Simpson claims the torpedo may have detonated the Falabas cargo, but the inquiry at the time did not believe this was an issue.