Reflection means a form of thoughtful and comparative thinking. Different types of reflection can be distinguished.
On the one hand, there is self-reflection, i.e. thinking about oneself or one's own behavior. The corresponding verb is reflect and stands for to ponder, think through or contemplate.
In philosophy, there have also been subject-specific uses of the concept since the 17th century, which are based on this concept and emphasize different aspects. For example, reflection on social relations or the use of language.
The central concern is the distinction between perception aimed at external objects and the kind of mental activity that reflects on the acts of thinking and representation themselves (abstraction).
A âÂÂknowledge of knowledgeâ (á¼ÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂîü÷àá¼ÂÃÂùÃÂÃÂîü÷, Episteme) is already mentioned by Plato (Charmides 171c), Aristotle calls it the âÂÂthinking of thinkingâ in the context of a discussion of Eudaimonia, which for him arises from intellectual activity in general:
Finally, the return of the spirit to itself, epistrophé in Greek, becomes a central concept in Neoplatonism, especially in Proclus. In the Middle Ages, epistrophé was initially translated as reditio, return, or conversio, conversion. However, Thomas Aquinas also used reflexio.
Following Descartes' mirror metaphors, numerous controversial theories of reflection emerged. Nevertheless, 'the definition of Leibniz â La réflexion n'est autre chose qu'une attention àce qui est en nous<nowiki/>' (âÂÂReflection is nothing but attention to what is within usâÂÂ) would likely have been accepted as a common view within the Cartesian tradition up to Husserl. These foundations gave rise to distinctions that increasingly differentiated âÂÂreflectionâ from the prevailing psychological notion of introspection.
After reflection in English and réflexion in French had become established as colloquial terms in the 17th century, John Locke's treatment of reflection in his An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690) became decisive for further philosophical debates on the subject. Locke distinguishes between the perception of external objects and the perception of processes in our own souls such as âÂÂperceiving, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willingâÂÂ, including the associated feelings of âÂÂsatisfaction or dissatisfactionâÂÂ:
It remains unclear whether reflection should be seen as dependent on external perception or as an independent source of knowledge, since Locke â drawing on Descartes, who, admittedly, did not yet use the term 'reflection' â also asserts that reflection is an independent source of knowledge.
For Immanuel Kant and his transcendental philosophy, reflection was an essential means of cognition and knowledge, emphasizing the role of the associated concepts and their necessary distinction, cf. â critical philosophy. By tracing these activities back to the thinker's own ego, he also named them with his own âÂÂconcepts of reflectionâ (Reflexionsbegriffen), namely unity and difference, attunement and conflict, the inner and the outer, matter and form (CPR B 316 ff.). Reference should also be made here to the (CPR B 326).
The idea that reflection means a loss of immediacy is first found in François Fénelon and was propagated above all by Jean-Jacques Rousseau: âÂÂThe state of reflection is a state against Nature.â A well-known literary treatment of this theme is Heinrich von Kleist's ÃÂber das Marionettentheater, which states:
Johann Gottfried Herder pointed out that reflection is dependent on language: only language makes it possible to capture individual moments in an âÂÂocean of sensationsâ on which the mind can reflect. As people drew on what they had already achieved in the past, which they expanded and improved, Herder ultimately saw spiritual history (Geistesgeschichte) as a âÂÂsupra-individual context of reflectionâÂÂ.
Immanuel Kant deals with the concepts of reflection of his predecessors in an appendix to the transcendental analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason. Here he speaks of amphiboly, i.e. the ambiguity of these concepts of reflection, since they either âÂÂabstract from all conditions of contemplation (...) so, of course, nothing remains for us in the mere concept but the interior in generalâ (B 339, 341); or the concepts of understanding are completely âÂÂsensibilizedâÂÂ, so that one can only determine their difference and their contradiction. The former was Leibniz's mistake, the latter Locke's (B 327). He therefore calls for a transcendental reflection, through which it must first be determined whether concepts âÂÂare compared with one another as belonging to pure understanding or to sensory perceptionâ (B 317) - he calls it transcendental, because it âÂÂidentifies the subjective conditions under which we can arrive at conceptsâ and âÂÂdoes not have to do with the objects themselvesâ from which the concepts are to be obtained (B 316).
In his Wissenschaftslehre of 1794, Johann Gottlieb Fichte distinguishes between âÂÂreflectionâ and âÂÂstrivingâ as the two fundamental activities of the âÂÂabsolute IâÂÂ. At a first stage, they bring about the âÂÂI-nessâ as an âÂÂactivity that goes back into itself and determines itselfâÂÂ. Through further âÂÂfree reflectionâÂÂ, what is initially still connected is separated and âÂÂabsorbed into a new form, the form of knowledge or consciousnessâ whereby reflection becomes the âÂÂbeing for itself of knowledgeâÂÂ, which, however, can never fully realize its ground, namely its freedom and unity. The âÂÂessential basic law of reflectionâ is that knowledge always retains the form of âÂÂthat and thatâÂÂ, which leads to the fact that âÂÂreflection on reflectionâ always makes âÂÂthe world appear in a new formâÂÂ. The connection between reflection and immediacy is accessible in love, which for Fichte is defined as the âÂÂreflection that purely destroys itself in GodâÂÂ.
For Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, the âÂÂsphere of reflection and separationâ is characteristic of man, but at the same time signifies âÂÂa spiritual illnessâÂÂ. However, since this determines modern consciousness primarily through Christianity as a âÂÂseparation of the infinite and the finiteâÂÂ, it must be dealt with. Schelling undertakes this in the System of Transcendental Idealism (1800), in which âÂÂfree reflectionâ is given the task of bringing the ego to an awareness of itself as standing opposite the mere organism. Reflection is âÂÂanalyticalâÂÂ, but refers to a prior âÂÂsynthetic intuitionâ in which the contemplating and the contemplated are identical.
Schelling criticizes Fichte for never escaping "the circle of consciousness" with his positing of the I through the I, thus failing to reach the independently given objects of nature. However, it is difficult to spare Schelling himself from this same reproach.
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel defines modern philosophy in an essay from 1802 as the "philosophy of reflection of subjectivity," but criticizes that in the works of his predecessors, the separation between finite consciousness and an empty Absolute always remains. He developed his own conception of reflection in the Science of Logic (1812âÂÂ1816) and in the Encyclopedia of the Philosophical Sciences (from 1816).
Hegel distinguishes between âÂÂbeingâ as pure immediacy and âÂÂessenceâÂÂ, whose âÂÂown determinationâ is reflection. Reflection âÂÂpositsâ the identity of essence, thereby presupposing being on the one hand, but at the same time âÂÂpositingâ it itself. The âÂÂpositing reflectionâ is therefore accompanied by an âÂÂexternalâ reflection that negates the posited being, precisely because it is posited by the reflection, whereby it is âÂÂthe abolition of this positing of itâ and âÂÂin negating it negates this negating of itâÂÂ. Finally, the âÂÂdetermining reflectionâ shows that posited and external reflection are one, because the latter is nothing but the âÂÂimmanent reflection of immediacy itselfâÂÂ. This results in identity, difference and contradiction as âÂÂreflection determinationsâÂÂ, whereby reflection âÂÂperishesâ in the latter, in the double sense of the expression. The âÂÂinfinite reflectionâ leads from âÂÂessenceâÂÂ, which has the character of a âÂÂsubstanceâÂÂ, to the purely subjective âÂÂconceptâ as the third stage of development of Hegel's logic. In the sphere of the concept, reflection, which until then had only constituted the âÂÂmovementâ from being to essence, âÂÂarticulatesâ itself as judgment and resolution.
From this âÂÂreflection in generalâÂÂ, Hegel distinguishes the âÂÂreflection of consciousnessâÂÂ, which he developed in the Phenomenology of Spirit (1806), and the âÂÂmore specific reflection of the understandingâÂÂ, which discusses the conditions of perception from various points of view. Within the overall process of his philosophy, which describes the coming of the Absolute, he also identifies the being and consciousness of the individual human being as a âÂÂstage of reflectionâÂÂ.
According to Hegel, Jakob Friedrich Fries traced reflection back to âÂÂdirect knowledge of reasonâ on the one hand, while on the other he defined it empirically as a faculty of âÂÂinner self-observationâÂÂ. As a result, the tendency towards a âÂÂpsychologisticâ approach, in which reflection itself was treated as an empirical object, intensified. In contrast, Franz Brentano emphasized that âÂÂinner perception ... can never become inner observationâÂÂ, but merely accompanies the observations. Edmund Husserl's phenomenology was based on this insight:
Husserl sees reflection as the âÂÂmethod of consciousness for the knowledge of consciousness in generalâÂÂ. Since for him only the contents of consciousness can be the subject of a strictly scientific philosophy, it thus has a âÂÂuniversal methodological functionâÂÂ. He formulates a gradual order of reflections, because the âÂÂreflections are again experiences and as such can become substrates of new reflections, and so in infinitumâÂÂ, whereby the previously experienced facts are recorded in the âÂÂretentionâÂÂ. Finally, the âÂÂpure Iâ is thus visualized. Husserl's phenomenological and existentialist successors criticized this âÂÂreduction to pure subjectivityâÂÂ. Merleau-Ponty pointed out that, on the one hand, with this approach the world becomes so transparent to the ego that it is incomprehensible why Husserl took the detour via it at all; on the other hand, reflection always encounters a pre-reflective âÂÂimpenetrabilityâ (opacité) of the world. Reflection must examine and develop its possibilities in the face of this impenetrability:
From this it follows: âÂÂReflection is never able to elevate itself above all situations ... it is always given to itself experientially (erfahrungsmäÃÂig)- in a Kantian sense of the word experience: it arises without itself knowing where from, it gives itself to me as given by nature.âÂÂ
In Being and Nothingness, Jean-Paul Sartre describes the failure of reflection in its âÂÂdouble simultaneous effort to objectify and internalizeâÂÂ.
But âÂÂthe turning back of being to itself can only make a distance appear between that which turns back and that to which the turning back takes placeâ - a split that âÂÂonly makes the nothingness that separates consciousness from itself even deeper and more insurmountableâÂÂ.
Sartre distinguishes between a total of three âÂÂprocesses of non-senseâÂÂ: firstly, the non-sense of the âÂÂfor-itselfâÂÂ, which loses itself âÂÂoutsideâÂÂ, âÂÂwith the to-itself and in the three temporal ecstasiesâ past, present and future; Secondly, the attempt to regain oneself, as just described; thirdly and finally, the nullification through âÂÂbeing-for-othersâÂÂ, which Sartre calls âÂÂimpureâ or âÂÂcomplicit reflectionâÂÂ, because it pursues the impossible goal of âÂÂsimultaneously being other and remaining itselfâÂÂ.
Karl Jaspers, referring to Kierkegaard, calls âÂÂexistential self-reflectionâ âÂÂa medium that never closes to meâÂÂ. On the one hand, âÂÂI search for myselfâ in it âÂÂas emerging from my judgment of myselfâÂÂ, a process that cannot be concluded in principle; on the other hand, although I am constantly uncovering new possibilities, I run the risk of destroying âÂÂevery beginning of my actualityâÂÂ. âÂÂExistence can only come to itself in the constant danger of the endlessness of its reflectionâÂÂ, in which it âÂÂdares to be boundlessly open.âÂÂ
Martin Heidegger deals with the concept of reflection in Kant's Thesis about Being (1962). Kant's transcendental reflection is âÂÂreflection on the network of places in the place of beingâÂÂ, whereby thinking is in play âÂÂonce as reflection and then as reflection of reflectionâÂÂ. The former provides âÂÂthe horizonâ in which âÂÂsuch things as positedness, oppositeness can be seenâÂÂ, the latter âÂÂthe procedure by which ... the being seen in the horizon of positedness is interpretedâÂÂ. According to Heidegger, this is a dichotomy that is fundamental to âÂÂthe entire history of Western thoughtâÂÂ.
Paul Ricà Âur refers to Fichte and his reception in French philosophy when he describes reflection as the âÂÂreappropriation of our striving for existenceâÂÂ. What distinguishes the philosophy of reflection from the Cartesian philosophy of consciousness is that in it the ego is âÂÂneither given in a psychological evidence nor in an intellectual intuitionâÂÂ:
In the 20th century, the questions of reflection and reflexivity were raised anew through the formative influence of philosophy of science and philosophy of language, linguistics and structuralism. They are particularly pronounced in post-analytic philosophy (in its attempt to reintegrate empiricism and the semantics of reflection) as well as in communication theories, especially discourse and systems theories. In this communication paradigm, the new thematization is also reflected in the influence of Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) and Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900-2002). In Herbert Schnädelbach's analysis, reflection is traditionally the thinking of thinking, which is generally useful and systematizable as philosophy and today, more precisely, as methodological-rational philosophy. The methodological systematization of âÂÂreflectionâ makes it possible to transform the pre-analytical, mentalistic understanding of reflection in the discourse theories following Jürgen Habermas and Karl-Otto Apel as well as in the linguistic and post-analytical philosophies and to critically differentiate it there. The idea of mirroring is abandoned. Schnädelbach formulates the relationship between reflection and method at the beginning of his main work Reflexion und Diskurs (1977):
Here, reflection as justification - in the sense of reasons for validity of practical philosophy - goes beyond reflection as self-observation (this represents a demarcation from empiricist and system-theoretical theories). A third distinction to be made in Schnädelbach's theory of reflection is reflection as a clarification of concepts (analogous to his analytical separation of normative, descriptive and explicative discourses). With regard to reflection as the justification of actions, Jürgen Habermas emphasizes the communicative anchoring of reflection in the lecture series The Philosophical Discourse of Modernity (1983/84):
In Niklas Luhmann's systems theory, reflection refers to a certain form of self-reference of social systems, namely that in which the system bases its operations on the difference between system and umwelt. Self-reference serves autopoietic reproduction, i.e. the reproduction of the system from within itself; the orientation towards the difference between system and umwelt allows the system to choose conditioning by the environment itself, which can become relevant if the system as such is called into question. Luhmann formulated, also with regard to mental systems (with reference to Jurgen Ruesch/Gregory Bateson for undisputed standards of psychiatric theories):
Theories of reflection work in different ways and approaches with the paradox of a blind spot in every observation, Kant's refraining from himself, Martin Heidegger's insinuation, Hans-Georg Gadamer's already being-in-language or Jacques Derrida's deconstruction theorem; not least in order to grasp that which cannot be described, at least as âÂÂindeterminateâÂÂ. Following Hegel, Theodor Adorno who continued to work most extensively on this issue, was prompted to develop a negative dialectic. In this theoretical position, reflection is the mental reference back to what thinking can and cannot think in thinking (or to what conversations and other communications can and cannot communicate in communication).
<small>Chronological</small>