The term red lines ( or ) has seen use in the Russian invasion of Ukraine since 2022. It is a veiled threat of engagement intended to warn an opponent or observer not to interfere or undertake an action or behavior that would "cross the red line".
On 21 April 2021, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a speech in which he repeatedly warned the West of red lines that Russia would not accept. The warnings were repeated on many occasions up to the date of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. In particular, Russia identified Ukraine's possible admission to NATO as a "red line". During a December 2021 phone call between U.S. President Joe Biden and President Putin, "Putin told Biden that Ukraine's bid to join NATO must be denied in return for assurances that Russian troops would not carry out an attack." NATO's General Secretary Jens Stoltenberg rejected Russia's demand to reverse a 2008 pledge to allow Ukraine to join NATO, stating: "NATO's relationship with Ukraine is going to be decided by the 30 NATO allies and Ukraine, no one else."
There has been a vigorous discussion about what Russia means with its red lines. Some have argued that Russia has reacted, but that Russia's reaction has not been as impressive as it had threatened. Others point out that while Russian high command "is unlikely to try to break through Ukrainian defenses by applying nuclear instruments ... Putin did escalate his nuclear rhetoric in the last weeks of his reelection campaign". Some have said that the threat of nuclear war and the number of red lines that have been crossed reveal the inability of belligerents involved in the war to project power internationally.
The mention of red lines has been in everyday use since the beginning of the renewed full scale invasion in Ukraine to justify the war. In February 2022, President Vladimir Putin of the Russian Federation stated that the United States and its Western partners had crossed a red line concerning Ukraine, which resulted in consequence of Russia having to undertake its "Special Military Operation" against Ukraine due to the threat imposed from Ukraine to the very existence of the Russian Federation.
Crossing a red line to the Russian Federation is often identified as damaging Russian national interests. Such actions may include the imposition of sanctions, the freezing of Russian or affiliated nation funds, and the donation of military goods to its perceived adversaries or others.
While the Russian Federation commonly uses the "red line" phrase in international politics, it has simultaneously used it to shape narratives aimed at domestic audiences.
In June 2023, President Putin said that Russia would keep responding to breaches of its red lines. President Putin has been consistent about the threat of nuclear action being used solely in the event of crossing the red line of an existential threat to the state.
In 2023, Russia made 15 official "red line" statements, compared to 24 in 2022.
Russia has used the phrase "red line" often, and because some of these lines have been crossed without major repercussions, some believe that Russia has devalued the impact of their threats, with the threats appearing more as bluffs.
There may be an actual red line that Russia and the Kremlin have, but it is largely unclear what it consists of.
Some of the red-line threats from Russia may be bluffs solely to slow the supply of resources to Ukraine, making the West consider their options and delaying action.
Others may be used to show that an escalation has occurred once a line is crossed. Red lines are nearly always soft, variable, and adjustable rather than immutable hard-line positions.
Russia and Ukraine have mentioned red lines regarding acceptable peace terms in diplomacy. One such example of a diplomatic Russian red line leaves Russia keeping Crimea, and another Ukrainian red line sees all Russian forces leave the territory that belonged to Ukraine on 31 December 1991. These red lines appear incompatible.
As time has progressed in the war, a set of implicit rules has emerged which fit between current operations and red lines and affect the rule creator.
Examples of such tacit rules include:
Under these stated rules, Russia would cross a red line if they attacked a NATO country, and NATO would cross a self-imposed red line if they sent troops into Ukraine. The above aims to limit an expansion of the war; however, it is not all one-sided, as other tacit rules are:
Red lines come in differing levels of severity. Some of these are bluffs, with parties to the conflict having given many red lines transcended without issue during the last decade. Belligerents and non-belligerents alike have employed several tactics to counter red-line policies. Such counter-measures aim to allow the crossing of red lines with significantly fewer or no consequences.
Red lines set by Russia have affected NATO member-state decisions concerning Ukraine. For example, the United KingdomâÂÂapart from refusing to have British soldiers participateâÂÂhas supplied most pieces of equipment and undertaken training missions that they are in a position to do; however, many other countries have shown timidity and concern over the red lines, resulting in a lack of, or delay in, providing assistance to Ukraine.
Certain chemical weapons being deployed by Russia are pushing the boundaries of Western red lines, as is the treatment of civilians, especially Ukrainian children.
Many countries outside of the direct belligerents active in the Russo-Ukrainian war have interests within it. As a result, foreign parties such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and the People's Republic of China have established their own so-called red lines.
When the international community refers to the crossing of "red lines", it tends to be limited to the use of nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons and the supply of other lethal weapons. Below, a small list of such red lines has been provided.