The pro-Beijing camp or pro-PRC camp refers to a group or individual in Taiwan that is friendly to the People's Republic of China (PRC), supports the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), and is oriented toward Chinese unification. The CCP uses both carrots and sticks to strengthen pro-Beijing political forces in Taiwan to form a "united front"; while threatening war with Taiwan, it also provides opportunities for commercial and cultural exchange.
Both pro-Beijing camp and pan-Blue Coalition support "One China"; while the pan-Blue Coalition defines the Republic of China as "One China", but pro-Beijing camp generally recognize the People's Republic of China as "One China". However, some political parties, such as the pro-Beijing New Party, do not deny the Republic of China and support peaceful unification with the People's Republic of China.
In 2022, the Director of Taiwan's National Security Bureau stated that the Chinese Communist Party provides training to local online influencers as part of its "cognitive warfare" for political propaganda. In 2023, the Republic of China's Mainland Affairs Council stated in a report that the CCP was increasing its cross-strait propaganda efforts in Taiwan through cognitive warfare.
According to Sinologist Gerry Groot, the erosion of the "one country, two systems" framework in Hong Kong had a profound impact on Taiwan's political landscape. Following the 2020 enactment of the National Security Law by the Standing Committee of the National People's CongressâÂÂa response to mass demonstrations and dissent in Hong KongâÂÂGroot argues that the "clear and effective end of Hong KongâÂÂs judicial independence" occurred twenty-seven years ahead of schedule. This perceived abrogation of CCP promises was closely observed in Taiwan, where it "made the work of the tiny minority of pro-unification activists even harder and reinforced the skepticism of others regarding the value of CCP promises." Furthermore, Groot notes that these developments in Hong Kong played a crucial role in the 2020 Taiwanese presidential election, aiding the re-election of Tsai Ing-wen while undermining the campaign of the Kuomintang candidate, Han Kuo-yu.
The organized crime groups in Taiwan, driven by financial incentives also support the PRC unification efforts.
In Taiwanese political standards, TaiwaneseâÂÂChinese nationalism has been regarded as right/conservative and Taiwan independence movement as left/progressive; the pro-Beijing camp is also called the "radical pro-unification factions" (æ¥統派) and is considered "far-right" (極å³); because the PRC is a one-party dictatorship and authoritarian nationalist regime but Taiwan is a liberal democracy.
Kuomintang continues to be opposed to communism, as anti-communism is written under Article 2 of Kuomintang's party charter. However, some politicians, including Hung Hsiu-chu, are classified as "pro-Beijing". Although the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) positions itself as a centrist party, its cooperative relationship with the PRC has prompted belief that it aligns more closely with conservatism.