(fl. c. 800) was an Indian philosopher known for his radical skepticism who most likely flourished between 800-840 probably in southern India. He was the author of one of the most extraordinary philosophical works in Indian history, the Tattvopaplavasiá¹Âha (tattva-upa.plava-siá¹Âha "The Lion that uproots all Philosophies"/"The Lion upsetting all Principles") in which he professed radical skepticism, which posits the impossibility of knowledge. In his work, he attempts to show the contradictions of various philosophical positions as well as the counter positions. He is loosely affiliated to the materialist CÃÂrvÃÂka/LokÃÂyata school of philosophy but his affiliation with charvaka is disputed among scholars. He has been differently classified as a sceptic, agnostic or materialist atheist.
His main claim is that it is not possible to arrive at true knowledge with standard means recognized by the traditionally adopted model of cognitive procedures (pramÃÂá¹Âa) in Indian epistemology, because one should first properly define basic criteria of validity for valid cognitive procedures, which is not possible without a prior true knowledge of reality against which we could test the procedures for validity etc. As it is traditionally argued, our knowledge of reality and of objects depends on valid cognitive procedures. However, as JayarÃÂà Âi points out, all valid cognitive procedures are either fundamentally flawed and ultimately unreliable or they require further valid cognitive procedures, and these stand in the same need etc. Therefore, within the traditional epistemological model, we can neither formulate proper definitions of valid cognitive procedures nor define what reality is and what basic categories are.
The text was discovered in a single manuscript in the 20th century. Its original 1940 edition attributed it to the materialist Charvaka school, but scholarly opinion on this point remains divided. Some consider JyarÃÂà Âi's philosophy as a heterodox philosophy in Indian materialist tradition or the Charvaka/Lokayata tradition as his radical skepticism makes him & his philosophy different from typical Charvaka/Lokayata materialist tradition. His work Tattvopaplavasiá¹Âh remains the only authentic, albeit not 'orthodox' treatise of the charvaka/Lokayata tradition. The work is primarily epistemological in nature, reminiscent of the sceptical philosophy of David Hume.
The manuscript of Tattvopaplavasimha was discovered in 1926 and published in 1940 by Saá¹Âghavë and PÃÂrëkh. The book examines epistemology, where JayarÃÂà Âi considers the pramÃÂna (sources of knowledge) accepted in establishing conclusions (perception, inference, and testimony), and proves that none of them are sufficient for establishing knowledge. Inference relies on inductive reasoning, which cannot be shown to be universal premises. Testimony requires the reliability of the witness, which must be established by another of the pramÃÂna. Even direct perception cannot establish truth, because it requires that the perception not be erroneous or illusory, which also cannot be established. Therefore, JayarÃÂsi argues that none of the sources of knowledge are valid, and nothing can be known for certain.
JayarÃÂsi challenged the ÃÂstika establishment's belief in supernatural beings by attacking their epistemology. Since none of the sources of knowledge are valid, how can anything be said about these beings? Therefore, he argued for the reasonability of atheism, and that happiness in one's life is the most reasonable goal. Jayarasi represented a philosophy of extreme skepticism, claiming no school of philosophy can claim its view of reality as knowledge, including the CÃÂrvÃÂka itself; however, because CÃÂrvÃÂka philosophy represents common sense, it could be used as a guide.
Tattvopaplavasimha is regarded by some authors as belonging to the CÃÂrvÃÂka (LokÃÂyata) school. Sukhlal Sanghvi and Rasiklal Parikh, D.R. Shastri, Eli Franco, Karin Presidendanz, and Piotr Barcelowicz are examples. Franco (1994), for instance, says "Tattvopaplavasimha is the only Lokayata text which has been discovered so far".
This view is opposed by scholars including Karel Werner, Walter Ruben, K.K Dixit, Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, M. K. Gangopadhyaya, A H Salunkhe, and Ramkrishna Bhattacharya. Werner (1995), for instance, is sceptical of the claim that Tattvopaplavasimha is a CÃÂrvÃÂka text. He however accepts that the text is an important secondary source for CÃÂrvÃÂka.
There has been some controversy concerning whether JayarÃÂà Âi could at all be ranked among the representatives of the Indian materialist school, i.e., among the CÃÂrvÃÂkas / LokÃÂyatas. Until the publication of the Tattvôpaplava-siá¹Âha, JayarÃÂà Âi was considered a typical representative of the materialist school. It all changed when the publication of the work in 1940 made the text available to scholars. The publication revealed that JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs view are far from what one considered âÂÂstandardâ or âÂÂorthodoxâ materialism and hardly compatible with what we so far knew about the schools of the CÃÂrvÃÂkas / LokÃÂyatas. As a result, a wide range of conflicting interpretations abound as to how to classify JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs philosophy.
SukhlÃÂljë Saá¹Âghavë and RasiklÃÂl C. PÃÂrëkh (1940: xi-xii) take the text as âÂÂa work of the LokÃÂyata or CÃÂrvÃÂka school, or to be more precise â of a particular division of that schoolâÂÂ, emphasising that JayarÃÂà Âi âÂÂis developing the doctrine of the orthodox LokÃÂyataâ with a âÂÂcritical methodâ (p. xii). The tradition of ascribing the view to Saá¹Âghavë and PÃÂrëkh that the Tattvôpaplava-siá¹Âha is âÂÂa genuine CÃÂrvÃÂka workâ relies rather on the misreading of what both the authors say: they are well aware that JayarÃÂà Âi develops an original and independent school within what he himself considered a materialist tradition. This view, adopted also by Ruben (1958), is somewhat modified by Franco (1987: 4âÂÂ8), who speaks of a âÂÂradical change from a rather primitive materialism to a highly sophisticated form of scepticismâÂÂ, and also recently by Ethan Mills (2018), who claims that JayarÃÂà Âi developed âÂÂmaterialist strainsâ and represented âÂÂskepticism about philosophyâÂÂ, or âÂÂskepticism about epistemologyâ (Mills (2015), (2018)).
Thus, a group of other researchers (e.g., Koller (1977), Matilal (1985: 482), Matilal (1986: 27), Solomon (2010: xvi), Jha (2013: vii), Gokhale (2015: 156âÂÂ157), Mills (2018)) classify JayarÃÂà Âi as a sceptic, either loosely affiliated to the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata tradition or not at all, even as an anti-religious sceptic (Matilal (1985: 482)), a radical sceptic (Franco (1987: 3âÂÂ8)), âÂÂthe full-fledged form of Indian Skepticismâ (Solomon (2010: xvi)), an extreme sceptic who represents âÂÂa kind of anarchism in the realm of valuesâ (Gokhale (2015: 180, 155)), sometimes also as an agnostic (Ruben (1958); Matilal (1985: 483, n. 10)), or a combination of both, being an author of âÂÂa work in defence of scepticism, or at best, agnosticismâ (Debiprasad ChattopadhyayaâÂÂs âÂÂEditorâÂÂs Noteâ to ChattopadhyayaâÂÂGangopadhyaya (1990: xiv)). A rather unusual stance on JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs affiliation is represented by K.K. Dixit (1962: 103) / (1990: 529), who claims that he was both a materialist and⦠âÂÂa worshipper of illogicâÂÂ.
Still another line of researchers disagree that JayarÃÂà Âi belonged to the materialist tradition at all, typical proponents of this opinion being Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya (1959), (1989) and Karel Werner (1995). Chattopadhyaya (1989) argues that since JayarÃÂà Âi criticises all philosophical views and schools, he cannot be reckoned as an adherent of the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata tradition, because one can either be a materialist or sceptic; and clearly JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs philosophical views do not fit into the typical materialist framework. Karel Werner (1995) seems to support such an approach, although with some reservations. Recently, also Ramkrishna Bhattacharya (2009: 51, 76 n. 43) follows this line of interpretations and argues that âÂÂJayarÃÂà Âi was not a CÃÂrvÃÂka/LokÃÂyataâÂÂ, suggesting that he was not a sceptic but represented âÂÂa fundamental idealist (solipsist) positionâÂÂ. To this group belong also both A.K. Warder (1956: 52), who accepts that he was neither a materialist nor sceptic but a positivist instead, and K.N. Jayatilleke (1963: 82), who interprets him as âÂÂnot a sceptic but an absolute nihilist in his metaphysicsâ and âÂÂa pragmatic materialistâ and âÂÂa logical scepticâ (p. 91).
There could hardly be a better source of information on the true affiliation of JayarÃÂà Âi than the author himself. He nowhere states in his work that he is a CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata, in which he does not differ from all other Indian authors who nowhere mention their philosophical affiliations in the form: âÂÂThe author of the present work is Buddhistâ or âÂÂI am a follower of the NyÃÂya schoolâÂÂ. In most cases, such affiliations are communicated through the opening sections, e.g. in the introductory verses (maá¹ galâcaraá¹Âa), or in the colophons, but usually an indirect manner, e.g. by paying homage to the Awakened One (buddha) or to a guru or Mahêà Âvara, or through some other hint, but it is hardly ever done directly, in an unequivocal manner. Unfortunately, the preserved text of Tattvôpaplava-siá¹Âha does not contain any introductory verses (probably there were none). The only concealed information in the opening section of the work could be found the first verse that occurs in the very beginning which says: âÂÂThe worldly path (laukiko mÃÂrgaḥ) should be followedâ¦/ With respect to everyday practice of the world (loka-vyavahÃÂra), the fool and the wise are similarâ (TUS, p.1.9âÂÂ10 = Franco (1987: 68âÂÂ6âÂÂ7) = Solomon (2010: 1âÂÂ2) = Jha (2013: 2)), quoted from some other source, taken as authoritative by JayarÃÂà Âi. The expression âÂÂthe worldly pathâ (laukiko mÃÂrgaḥ) often occurs as a reference to the LokÃÂyata (âÂÂthe followers of the worldly [practice]âÂÂ), e.g. by Haribhadra in his à ÂVS1.64. Most importantly, however, JayarÃÂà Âi on several occasions quotes verses of Bá¹Âhaspati in order to either support his own opinion or to show that there is no disagreement between the Tattvôpaplava-siá¹Âha and the tradition of Bá¹Âhaspati (cf. Franco (1987: 5)). Further, he explicitly mentions the materialist teacher by name and refers to him with reverence âÂÂHonourable Bá¹Âhaspatiâ (bhagavÃÂn bá¹Âhaspatiḥ, TUS, p.45.10âÂÂ11 = Franco (1987: 228.10) à= Solomon (2010: 229) = Jha (2013: 187)),[1] the reverential term occurring only once in the whole work. This is rather unique, for JayarÃÂà Âi does not seem to follow any authorities or to quote passages and opinions which he unreservedly views in favourable light. There can hardly be any doubt, that JayarÃÂà Âi placed himself within that tradition and apparently acknowledged that he was originally trained within it.
In the colophon of the treatise (TUP, p. 125.13âÂÂ18 = Franco (1987: 7) = Solomon (2010: 98) = Jha (2013: 463âÂÂ464)), JayarÃÂà Âi explicitly pays homage to Bá¹Âhaspati, here referred to by his traditional epithet âÂÂpreceptor of godsâ (sura-guru; cf. Bhattacharya (2009: 25, 51, 76)), and so does the author refers to himself as âÂÂpreceptor of deities (gods)â (deva-guru):<blockquote>âÂÂEven [all] such unshakeable reductio arguments (vikalpa) that escaped the attention of theàpreceptor of gods (i.e. Bá¹Âhaspati) find their way into this lucid [treatise] that crushes the conceit of charlatans. This [lucid treatise], titled âÂÂThe Lion [Destroying] the Delusion of CategoriesâÂÂ, which contributes to great advantage and will gain excellent reputation, has been composed by [me], the preceptor of deities (gods) [known as] Bhaá¹Âá¹Âa à Ârë JayarÃÂà Âi.[2] [These] reductio arguments of JayarÃÂà Âi [found] in this [treatise] are efficacious in annihilating the charlatans, are elaborated by [JayarÃÂà Âi who is] the ocean of knowledge, [and are meant to] vanquish disputants.âÂÂ</blockquote>The idea which JayarÃÂà Âi here expresses is clear: he follows the footsteps of his own preceptor, Bá¹Âhaspati (both âÂÂpreceptor of godsâÂÂ), developing the latterâÂÂs arguments and augmenting them with his own, more sophisticated.
JayarÃÂà Âi criticises basically all philosophical schools with two exceptions: the Advaita VedÃÂnta of à Âaá¹ kara and the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata school. The reason for being silent on the tradition of à Âaá¹ kara was that the latter was either contemporaneous or posterior to JayarÃÂà Âi, but there would have been no reason not to formulate any criticism against the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata school, if that had not been JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs own tradition. Further, even though JayarÃÂà Âi is generally very cautious not to express his own positive views and theories, there are several exceptions, which clearly reveal his materialistic outlook.
There is also some external evidence corroborating to a certain degree the thesis about CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata affiliation of JayarÃÂà Âi. VidyÃÂnanda who first mentions JayarÃÂà Âi brings some interesting details to light (alluded to above). In his Aá¹£á¹Âa-à Âatë (Aá¹£S 29.20âÂÂ36.7), he explicitly indicates a category of nihilistic thinkers who reject a number of vital principles and claim that âÂÂThere is no [reliable] omniscient authority (tërtha-kÃÂra), there is no [reliable] cognitive criterion (pramÃÂá¹Âa), there is no [reliable] authoritative doctrine (samaya) or [reliable] Vedas, or any kind of [reliable] reasoning (tarka), because they contradict each other,â and he quotes a popular verse: âÂÂReasoning is not established, testimonies differ, there is no sage whose words are a cognitive criterion (i.e., authoritative), the essence of the moral law (dharma) is concealed in a secret place (i.e., is not available). The [proper] path is that taken by the majority of peopleâÂÂ[3]. Whether the verse comes from an unidentified LokÃÂyata source, which is not impossible, or not, it is echoed by JayarÃÂà Âi in the above mentioned verse at the beginning of his work and the expression âÂÂthe worldly pathâ (laukiko mÃÂrgaḥ). Interestingly, the verse has an obvious sceptical underpinning. The category of such âÂÂnihilistsâ includes (1) the followers of the LokÃÂyata school (laukÃÂyatika, Aá¹£S 29.26), also known as the CÃÂrvÃÂka (Aá¹£S 30.25), who are associated with the view that there is just one cognitive criterion, i.e. perception, and (2) the category of âÂÂthose who propound the dissolution of [all] categoriesâ (tattvôpaplava-vÃÂdin, Aá¹£S 31.2). VidyÃÂnanda (Aá¹£S 31.2 ff.) explains who the latter are: âÂÂSome who are those who propound the dissolution of [all] categories take (1) all the categories of cognitive criteria such as perception etc. and (2) all the categories of the cognoscibles as dissolved (i.e., not established)âÂÂ. Throughout his text, VidyÃÂnanda keeps these two traditions â the LokÃÂyata and the Tattvôpaplava â separate, although he does acknowledge that they are genetically related, the main difference between them being whether one recognises at least one cognitive criterion (CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata) or none (JayarÃÂà Âi). Further on, VidyÃÂnanda begins the exposition of materialism (Aá¹£S, p. 35.22 ff.) which is designated with a generic term âÂÂcognitive criteria-free assumptionâ (apramÃÂá¹Âikà⦠iá¹£á¹Âi), among which the first variety represents standard materialists who accept perception as the only cognitive criterion (Aá¹£S, p. 35.19âÂÂ37.9), and the second variety concerns âÂÂthose who propound the dissolution of [all] categoriesâ (tattvôpaplava-vÃÂdin) who do not accept any cognitive criteria (pramÃÂá¹Âa) (Aá¹£S, p. 37.10 ff.). Also Anantavërya explicitly classifies JayarÃÂà Âi as a materialist by making a pun on the word cÃÂrvÃÂka: âÂÂThe author of âÂÂ[The Lion Destroying] the Delusion of CategoriesâÂÂâ says what is charmingly chastised by the CÃÂrvÃÂkasâ (SViṬ, p. 277.19: tattvôpaplava-ká¹Âd ÃÂha â cÃÂrvÃÂkaià  cÃÂru carcitamâ¦).
A typical charge against JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs affiliation to materialists (CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata), known for two main claims â that there is only one cognitive criterion (pramÃÂá¹Âa), namely perception, and the four elements compose all the universe, including consciousness â would the apparent paradox: JayarÃÂà Âi seems to acknowledge neither. This led Bhattacharya (2017: 353âÂÂ354) to dispute, on philologically implausible grounds, that JayarÃÂà Âi refers to Bá¹Âhaspati and the Bá¹Âhaspati-sà «tra as his own tradition.
According to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, "JayarÃÂà Âi, who claims to be intellectually superior to Bá¹Âhaspati, could ... hardly be a follower of Bá¹Âhaspati himself, i.e., could hardly be the leader of any imaginary offshoot of the CÃÂrvÃÂka or BÃÂrhaspatya system". In support of his view that Tattvopaplavasimha is not a CÃÂrvÃÂka/LokÃÂyata text, Chattopadhyaya says "it is moreover necessary to remember that JayarÃÂà Âi claims as his final achievement the annihilation of the vanity of the PÃÂá¹£aá¹Âá¸Âin [pÃÂkhaá¹Âá¸Âin]-s (Tattvopaplavasiá¹Âha Baroda edition p.125). Now whatever might have been the exact meaning of the word pÃÂá¹£aá¹Âá¸Âin, it could by no stretch of imagination have excluded the LokÃÂyatikas and CÃÂrvÃÂkas."
Salunkhe also holds that Jayarasi Bhatta did not belong to the CÃÂrvÃÂka school of philosophy as he denies even Pratyakà Âa pramana and four MahÃÂbhà «tas that CÃÂrvÃÂka had accepted. He notes Jayarsi as an agnostic and anti-philosophic person rather than a materialistic LokÃÂyatika.
Ramkrishna Bhattacharya adduces an argument from within the text itself to refute the claim that Tattvopaplava-siá¹Âha is a CÃÂrvÃÂka text. He says, "there is indeed a CÃÂrvÃÂka at the very beginning of the Tattvopaplava-siá¹Âha. But he is not JayarÃÂà Âi, but another person who is presented as a CÃÂrvÃÂka out to challenge JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs doctrine of upsetting tattva as such. This objector has to be a CÃÂrvÃÂka, for who but a CÃÂrvÃÂka would refer to the basic premises of materialism and stand upon them? The presence of this objector and the way JayarÃÂà Âi gets into controversy with him clearly indicate that JayarÃÂà Âi himself was not a CÃÂrvÃÂka or did not even belong to âÂÂa section of the CÃÂrvÃÂkaâ (cÃÂrvÃÂkaikadeà Âya)".
However, the earliest external recipients of JayarÃÂà ÂiâÂÂs ideas, the Jaina thinkers VidyÃÂnanda and Anantavërya, importantly ascribe to JayarÃÂà Âi or to his immediate materialist tradition a saying that âÂÂBá¹ÂhaspatiâÂÂs aphorisms are primarily meant to refute the opponents with respect to all [issues].â This serves as an external evidence that JayarÃÂà Âi did acknowledge the authority ofàBá¹Âhaspati and his aphorisms but interpreted them in the spirit of his own methodological scepticism.
That there must have been some strain among the materialists prior to JayarÃÂà Âi which both admitted that the world is composed of the four elements and at the same time apparently doubted that there is any cognitive criterion (pramÃÂá¹Âa) is reflected by Akalaá¹ ka, who points to the following paradox such a materialist would have to face: âÂÂAs a result of the absence of cognitive criteria (pramÃÂá¹Âa) [the materialist] cannot ascertain that perception, and nothing else, is the only one [cognitive criterion], or [ascertain] the essence of cognoscible objects. Since, when other cognitive criteria are negated, a [proper] definition of perception becomes inexplicable, what [cognoscible objects] by what [cognitive criteria] could be established or negated, on account of which [one could maintain that] the world is composed of the four elements?â (SVi 4.12, p. 272.3âÂÂ5).
Of significance is that VidyÃÂnanda puts JayarÃÂà Âi on par with the Buddhist doctrine of Emptiness (à Âà «nya-vÃÂda), as represented by NÃÂgÃÂrjuna, and with VedÃÂntic idealists (brahma-vÃÂda), as three kinds of self-refuting theories (Tà ÂVA 80.22âÂÂ81.14; 195.14âÂÂ16). This might theoretically be taken as evidence that all three represented scepticism. However, since there is no hint that VedÃÂntic idealists were sceptics at all at that time, and we have strong evidence that JayarÃÂà Âi was not a sceptic, what Mills (2018) takes to be the three pillars of skepticism in classical India, namely NÃÂgÃÂrjuna, JayarÃÂà Âi and à Ârihará¹£a, represented here by a forerunner, cannot be classified as sceptics, despite their commonalities, as noticed by VidyÃÂnanda.
JayarÃÂà Âi can be therefore taken as a genuine representative of an offshoot of the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata tradition, primarily because he himself thought he was a follower of Bá¹ÂhaspatiâÂÂs materialist tradition, and probably because he had originally been trained in the materialist system. It also seems very likely that the representatives of the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata system occasionally had sceptical inclinations prior to JayarÃÂà Âi, which helped him to abandon typically materialist claims and undertake his sceptical project. However, neither he nor his work can be taken as typical representatives of the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata school or a first-hand source of information about that tradition. Despite this, the work remains the only authentic, albeit not âÂÂorthodoxâ treatise of the CÃÂrvÃÂka / LokÃÂyata tradition that has come down to us.