State ultranationalism (趠åÂÂ家主義 or 趠å½家主義, Chà Âkokkashugi; lit. "ultra-statism") or simply ultranationalism (ã¦ã«ãÂÂã©ãÂÂã·ã§ãÂÂãªãºã , Urutoranashonarizumu), refers mainly to the radical statist movement of the Shà Âwa period, but it can also refer to extreme Japanese nationalism before and after the Shà Âwa era.
State ultranationalists use the authority of the state/nation (å½家) through Tennà  as the focus of public loyalty. Other Ikki Kita's "state socialism" or "national socialism" (å½家社ä¼Â主義) is a representative idea referred to as 趠å½家主義 in Japan.
Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan's political practice had been dominated by statism/nationalism. In the early 20th century, the middle and lower classes, led by Ikki Kita, who were dissatisfied with the control of national resources by the elder, important ministers, old and new Kazoku, warlords, zaibatsu, and political parties heads since the Meiji Restoration, sought radical reforms. They advocated that the representatives of the traditional statism/nationalism be indiscriminately categorized as the culprits of the evils, and that they should be killed one by one to show a break with the traditional statism since the Meiji Restoration. This was a break with the traditional statism/nationalism of the Meiji period. This rupture was most fully manifested when the Tennà  began to be viewed not as a symbol of tradition, but as a symbol of change, and the failed mutiny by ultra-nationalist junior officers in 1936 ultimately led to Japan's full-scale entry into the era of Japanese nationalist military government four years later.
According to some scholars, Japan, which has a tradition of obedience, cooperation, and solidarity, already had at least a proto-fascist and proto-totalitarian spirit, so unlike Italy and Germany, it was able to adopt a totalitarian attitude without radical change in the late 1930s. Japanese liberal scholars, including Masao Maruyama, saw Japanese state ultranationalism as fascism and referred to it as .
American historian Robert O. Paxton argues that with the absence of a mass revolutionary party and a rupture from the incumbent regime, Imperial Japan was merely "an expansionist military dictatorship with a high degree of state-sponsored mobilization [rather] than as a fascist regime". British historian Roger Griffin, called Putin's Russia and World War II-era Japan "emulated fascism in many ways, but was not fascist".
Masao Maruyama, assessed that the Japanese statist/nationalist (å½家主義) government model was similar to [European] fascism, but not directly related to state/national-socialism (å½家社ä¼Â主義). However, he claimed that ultra-nationalism (趠å½家主義) as Japanese statism was clearly influenced by national-socialism. According to him, the proposal of [Japanese] ultra-nationalism is based on ideal socialism and combines the ideologies of some national-socialism.
According to the methodology of political practice, state/national-socialism is the socialism that the government promotes from top to bottom. Ultra-nationalists, on the one hand, wants the Tennà  to accept their radical national-socialist ideology, but on the other hand, it causes problems at a low level and puts pressure on the government to reform. Eventually, Japan entered Japanese nationalism, which is similar to fascism, not a national-socialist state, but 40 years of ultra-nationalism have been a great success.
Japan has been in a state of statism/nationalism (å½家主義) and militarism (è»Âå½主義) since the Meiji Restoration, but it was this "ultra-" (趠) that led Japan to the military path of Japanese nationalism. And this "ultra-" is the Japanese practice of national-socialist ideology.
The Liberal Democratic Party (1955âÂÂpresent), Japanese largest right-wing party, has an ultranationalist faction.