The First SinoâÂÂKazakh War (; ), also known as the First QingâÂÂKazakh War, or in Kazakhstan as the Qing [Chinese] invasion of Kazakh Khanate, was the first of a series of conflicts and frontier disputes between the Kazakh Khanate and Qing China during the middle of the 18th century, following the collapse of the Dzungar Khanate.
The encounters included raids, skirmishes, and frontier clashes rather than simply just large-scale, formally declared wars. They were often intertwined with broader regional dynamics, including the movement of nomadic Kazakh tribes, Qing frontier garrisons, and the Qing efforts to secure trade routes, impose tribute, and in some occasions, open colonisation, from steppe polities.
While the conflicts did not result in a permanent Qing annexation of Kazakh lands, they significantly affected the political and military strategies of both sides. For the Kazakh Khanate, the encounters demonstrated the growing influence of the Qing in Central Asia and reinforced the need for diplomacy and strategic accommodation. For the Qing Empire, these engagements were part of a broader effort to consolidate its western frontier following the conquest of the Dzungars, to decimate the presence of nomadic resistances, and to stabilize trade and tribute relations across Central Asia, mainly with the sedentary Uzbek khanates. These engagements marked a turning point in KazakhâÂÂQing relations, shifting the balance of power in favor of the Qing, influencing Kazakh migration and political alignment in the eastern steppe, and the establishment of Chinese presence near Kazakh border.
The conflicts also had long-term implications for steppe geopolitics, contributing to eventual Russian involvement in the northern Kazakh territories and setting the stage for later treaties and border arrangements in the 19th century between Tsarist Russia and Qing China.
After the Dzungar Khanate fell with the final conquest of Dzungars and the onset of the upcoming Dzungar genocide, it led to a power vacuum in the eastern steppe which had previously served as a buffer between the Kazakh Khanate and Qing-controlled territories. At the same time, with the Kazakh Khanate already weakened after the Russian protectorate control of Little Jüz two decades ago, Kazakh leaders in the Middle and Senior Jüz now faced increased pressure from Qing Chinese forces seeking to consolidate control over the region formerly dominated by the Dzungars. To make it even more complicated, despite the long rivalry between Kazakhs and Dzungars, the two steppe rivals were still very linked via the Eurasian nomadic heritage and common steppe cultures, and intermarriages between them were not uncommon; in fact, the Dzungarian leader, Amursana, was himself also a member of Ablai Khan of the Kazakh Khanate via marriage with Ablai's daughter; whilst at the same time, Ablai Khan also had a Dzungar wife that was believed to be the older sister of Amursana. By contrast, the Qing Empire was a very much foreign regime in the eyes of both Kazakhs and Dzungars, as Qing China was a sedentary empire with grand ambitions.
This mixture of complicated networks meant disputes over pasturelands, caravan routes, tribute obligations, Manchu-Chinese imperialist ideology, and familial ties between Kazakhs and Dzungars, increasingly strained the relations. Qing Chinese officials demanded submission and tribute from Kazakh leaders or facing a war of conquest, while Kazakh tribes resisted encroachments on their traditional territories. RaidingâÂÂboth defensive and retaliatoryâÂÂfurther inflamed tensions. These escalating disputes ultimately set the stage for the outbreak of the First KazakhâÂÂQing War, as both sides sought to assert control over the steppe and its valuable resources.
When the Dzungar Khanate was destroyed in 1755, Qing China appointed four different Khans to control the remnants of the Oirat-based Khanate, hoping to divide them. However, Amursana, the Dzungar Khong Tayiji, managed to escape and later led a popular liberation movement against Qing rule; however, not all Oirat feudal lords recognized his supreme authority, which led to internal conflicts.
Abandoned by his allies with only 200 warriors, Amursana went into hiding in the steppes under Ablai Khan. At the Qing court, the question arose of how to deal with the Kazakh khanates and how to prevent Kazakh rulers from participating in the liberation movement of the Turkic and Mongol peoples of Central Asia. Political contacts were established between the Middle Zhuz and the Qing. Still, as Amursana was married to a daughter of Ablai Khan and one of Ablai Khan's wife was already from the Dzungar lineage, Amursana was able to use this link to flee to Kazakh territory when the Qing Army returned in March 1756, from which the Dzungars continued to conduct guerrilla warfare from the Kazakh steppe.
Before the grand preparations for war, Qing China closely monitored the claimants to the throne of the Dzungar Khanate. Agents and Oirat defectors were well informed about the role of the Kazakh rulers, primarily Ablai Khan, who had also invaded Dzungaria throughout the winter and spring of 1755. Because of this, Qing Chinese officials began to suspect the Kazakhs were complicit. This issue became more urgent after DawachiâÂÂs defeat and flight to Eastern Turkestan, and the elimination of the Dzungar Khanate as a state entity, Qianlong Emperor instructed the command on two possible solutions to the âÂÂKazakh questionâÂÂ:
On summer, the embassy sent to the camps of Ablai carrying a manifesto demanding the withdrawal of Kazakh troops in the demanded region. In response, in order to establish diplomatic contacts, Ablai sent an embassy to the Qing court, which in Beijing was interpreted as an expression of the Kazakhsâ willingness to recognize dependence on the Qing dynasty. However, when AmursanaâÂÂs location became known to the Qing command, another embassy was sent to the camps of Ablai Khan demanding the surrender of the deposed Dzungar Khong Tayiji again; this time, the Chinese received a categorical refusal to hand over the Oirat refugees by Ablai Khan himself.
Once the Kazakh leadership refused to respond, Qianlong Emperor ordered troops to invade the Kazakh territory, including arresting Ablai Khan, by late May 1756. In response, Ablai assembled a militia of warriors from the Middle and Senior Zhuz, along with Dzungar supporters of Amursana, and moved to confront the Qing forces. Later, Kazakhs from the Junior Zhuz under Sultan Yeraly came to reinforce them, setting the stage for war to come.
To achieve this, Qing responded to Kazakh resistance and refusal to hand over Amursana with a string of organized campaigns. Troops stationed in former Dzungar lands and modern-day Eastern Kazakhstan were reinforced with artillery and infantry units capable of sieging fortified Kazakh nomadic settlements. The Qing implemented a strategy of targeted punitive expeditions: raiding tribes that refused tribute, destroying supplies, and capturing livestock to weaken Kazakh resistance. At the same time, the Kazakhs conducted counter-raids on Qing supply lines and outposts, attempting to disrupt the Qing advance.
In May 1756, the Qing Chinese army, under the command of Dardan and Khadakh, started to march forward the Lake Zaysan territory, where they fought a small skirmish against the small detachment of 500 men of Bayan Batyr for several days in the Chagan-Odo region, before the Kazakh troops made tactical retreat to avoid further casualties against the more numerous Qing force.
The first real clash between Kazakh and Qing Chinese troops occurred in the Emil River when Qing troops, led by Dardan, fought a battle against the joint KazakhâÂÂDzungar detachment under the command of Kojaibergen Batyr. The result was disastrous for the KazakhâÂÂDzungar coalition, as the force lost over 600 troops against the heavily armed and organised Qing troops, forcing the Kazakh and Dzungar troops to retreat. This defeat forced Ablai Khan to change his tactics, avoiding open field battle and to lure the Qing Chinese to trap.
As the memory of the Barefooted Flight remained very fresh to many Kazakhs at the time, Ablai Khan opted to organise a cautious tactical retreat to preserve the core troops and morale. As such, the Kazakhs conceded control of Tarbagatai Mountains, as well as Chuy Valley, Talas, Syr Darya, Mount Ku and Sary-Jaz valley, to the Qing force, hoping to lure more and more Qing troops to trap.
On August 18, Qing troops merged with each other and met at the Ishim River, and advanced to Kokshetau (north of Astana today), where Ablai Khan and Amursana were taking refuge. The result was a major clash between Qing and KazakhâÂÂDzungar forces, which the coalition force was again defeated and lost 200 men; the Kazakhs and Dzungars were forced to retreat once more, but Qing troops still failed to capture Ablai Khan and Amursana alive.
The Chinese, having pushed beyond limit, found themselves isolated in the vastness of the steppe, and suffered from a huge logistical strain as their supply route was too far, causing problems to the Qing Chinese, majority were unfamiliar with the conditions. At the same time, Chingünjav, the Khalkha Prince, decided to revolt against the Qing Chinese rule, forcing Qianlong to withdraw some portion of troops from the Kazakh steppe to crush the Khalkha rebellion. As for the result, Dardan and Khadakh had been forced to withdraw.
Capitalising from the Chinese withdrawal, the Kazakhs and Dzungars started to unleash their persistent guerrilla tactics, undermining Chinese morale. It's within this frame, the Battle of Shiderty River took place in September 1756 in the headwaters of the Shiderty River, near Bayan-ðul. The Kazakhs, led by batyrs Kabanbay, Kojaibergen, and Bogenbay, alongside remnants of Amursana's troops, defeated the forces led by Generals Dardan and Khadakh. The site of this battle has retained the name "èïÃÂÃÂÃÂàÃÂÃÂÃÂÃÂðý" (Shurshit kyrilghan, "place of the defeat of the Chinese pursuits"), for only 3,000 out of 20,000 Chinese soldiers remained alive. Significant losses, food shortages, and the onset of harsh winter forced the Chinese authorities to recall the remnants of their troops. The victory of the Kazakhs was costly but nonetheless significant. Because of this defeat, Qianlong personally demoted both Dardan and Khadakh for their failure to capture the Kazakh and Dzungar lords alive.
By late 1756, Qing China decided to resume their invasion of Kazakh Khanate, but Amursana's return to Dzungaria had ignited another wave of anti-Chinese rebellion, diverting much of the Chinese troops to deal with them. However, Qing China was far more powerful and it managed to crush the Dzungars by June 1757, which the Chinese then turned to Kazakh Khanate once more; under the leadership of Fude and Zhaohui, the Chinese marched back to Kazakh Khanate, aiming to fulfil what Dardan and Khadakh failed.
On July the same year, Fude and Zhaohui's troops, numbered over 10,000, quickly moved to confront the 2,000 Kazakh troops, led by Naiman Sultan Abulpeiz, in Ayagoz. The battle ended with the Kazakh troops crushed to defeat, and Abulpeiz was captured alive. The defeat in Ayagoz pushed the Kazakh Khanate to near brink of collapse as it opened China's passage to Turkestan; begging for mercy, Abulpeiz told that Amursana was no longer in Kazakh territory, and, already exhausted by war, Ablai Khan asked for peace settlement.
Following the defeat in Ayagoz, Ablai Khan agreed to settle account by negotiating for two months with the Chinese, which Qing China demanded him to pledge the Khanate as a vassal of Qing China, and the extradition of Amursana to China for trial. However, Amursana managed to flee to Russia just on time, rendering Chinese efforts worthless. After two months, the Kazakh Khan and his warriors agreed to go to Beijing, and pledged tributary relations with Qing China every three year, ending the war between Qing China and Kazakh Khanate.
Official Chinese sources, based on reports from Qing commanders, claimed successful campaigns and sought to portray military operations favorably. However, according to Russian accounts, the campaign of 1756âÂÂ57 was met with mixed success. Reports from the Siberian governor V. A. Myatlev to the Collegium of Foreign Affairs indicated that a Kazakh force of about 10,000 inflicted several heavy defeats on Qing troops at Kalmyk Tologa and along the Ayaguz River. Despite this, the war still marked for the first-time since the Tang dynasty, a Chinese imperial power once again marched west in order to conquer Central Asia, this time under the guise of the Qing, a Sinicised Manchu dynasty. This war also proved to be one of Qianlong's highest points in his powerful imperial reign, as China extended their territory to apex because of this conflict. However, Qianlong, worried about the possibility of the Kazakh insurrection and migration, decided to trigger the Dzungar genocide, which Kazakhs were also massacred as they were sometimes mistaken as Dzungars due to shared nomadic origins, before resettling the region with Han and Hui peoples.
For the Kazakh Khanate, despite preserving independence and statehood, the cost was high as it was a Pyrrhic victory in nature, due to the high amount of casualties of the Kazakh force against the better-equipped and more modernised Chinese force. This war also proved fatal, as Kazakh Khanate became even more weakened due to persistent Chinese pressures. However, following the brutal Dzungar genocide, the Kazakhs became more weary and distrustful of China's intentions due to the atrocities inflicted on fellow nomads; in addition, growing Kazakh migration to the territory around Lake Balkhash, Jetisu, Irtysh river and Ili, as well as in Dzungaria region, meant the war between Kazakh and Chinese powers once again became inevitable, resulted in the Second Sino-Kazakh War a decade later.
Nonetheless, Soviet historians R. B. Suleimenov and V. A. Moiseev emphasized the role of Ablai, who proved to be an energetic and capable commander, displaying courage and valor. Under his leadership, the small Kazakh troops delivered sudden strikes from the rear and flanks and then disappeared instantly, preventing the Qing command from delivering a decisive blow or forcing the enemy to surrender. Kazakh historian K. K. Abuev notes that the series of Qing invasions of Kazakhstan in 1756âÂÂ1757 effectively ended in failure, as the Kazakh Khanate's core leadership remained intact.
In long term, although Kazakh Khanate survived Chinese conquest attempts, its weakened state meant it was directly targeted by the Russian conquerors in the north. In 1782, the Kazakh Khanate's two final juzes were annexed by the Russians, with 75% of the Khanate's territory went to Russian hand, and 25% remaining territory, mainly in area spanned from Lake Balkhash, Jetisu to Dzungaria's Ili and Chuy Valley, fell to China. This meant Kazakh land was divided to two until 1864, when the Treaty of Tarbagatai meant the portion that consisted of modern-day Eastern Kazakhstan was later annexed by the Russians from the Chinese, which later formed the Semirechye Oblast of the Tsarist Empire, forming the modern border of Kazakhstan and China.