Lieutenant General Dðáng VÃÂn ÃÂức (; 1927âÂÂ2000) was a Vietnamese army officer. He is best known for leading a coup attempt against General Nguyá» n Khánh on 14 September 1964. He was a supporter of the ÃÂại Viá»Ât Quá»Âc Dân ÃÂảng (DVQDD, Nationalist Party of Greater Vietnam), a Roman Catholic political movement.
ÃÂức joined the French-backed Vietnamese National Army, which became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) after the Republic of Vietnam (South Vietnam) was established. After becoming a major general in 1956 and commanding the Airborne Brigade, ÃÂức served for a year as ambassador to South Korea. Later, he had problems with President Ngô ÃÂình Diá»Âm and went into exile in France, before returning after the arrest and assassination of Diá»Âm after a November 1963 coup.
Duc was an assistant to Lê VÃÂn Kim, one of generals in the ruling junta, but was recruited into a coup plot by Generals Khánh, Trần Thiá»Ân Khiêm and ÃÂá» MáºÂu. At the time, France was advocating for South Vietnam to become neutral, and the withdrawal of the United States. ÃÂức used his experience of France to draft fake documents purporting to show the junta of Dðáng VÃÂn Minh wanting to go along with the French proposal. These were then presented to the Americans to ensure support, and Khánh toppled Minh in January 1964 without a fight.
ÃÂức was rewarded with command of IV Corps, which oversaw the Mekong Delta region, before being relieved in September, along with the commander of III Corps and Interior Minister Lâm VÃÂn Phát. This prompted the pair to launch a coup against Khánh on 13 September. They initially took over the capital without a fight, but Khánh escaped, and after receiving endorsements from the U.S., defeated the plotters. At the military trial that followed, charges were dropped.
ÃÂức was a member of the Vietnamese National Army of the French-backed State of Vietnam, which fought against the Democratic Republic of Vietnam, which was run by the communist Viet Minh of Há» ChàMinh. In 1955, during the transition period after the partition of Vietnam, ÃÂức was a VNA colonel and fought in operations against the Hòa Hảo warlord Ba Cụt, who was trying to wrest power from Prime Minister Ngô ÃÂình Diá»Âm. After Ba Cụt was driven from the Mekong Delta, he fled to the Thất Sán mountains near the border with Cambodia. There, ÃÂức commanded an operation that attempt to capture Ba Cụt in 1955. He claimed to the media that he would capture Ba Cụt within ten days he was unable to do so. Ba Cụt was finally captured in April 1956 and executed several months later. By the end of that year, Diá»Âm had proclaimed himself the president of the newly formed Republic of Vietnam, and the VNA became the Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
ÃÂức was promoted to major general in 1956 and served as an officer in the Airborne Brigade. He was sent abroad to act as the minister to South Korea from 1956 to 1957. ÃÂức was regarded as an effective but idiosyncratic officer. During the later years of Diá»Âm's rule, ÃÂức was in exile in France. The arrest and assassination of Diá»Âm after a November 1963 coup allowed ÃÂức a chance to return to Vietnam.
He returned from exile in Paris, where he had been working as a waiter, and became an assistant to General Lê VÃÂn Kim, the chief of the junta's general staff. At the time, there was a coup plot against the ruling junta of General Dðáng VÃÂn Minh, and ÃÂức was recruited by a group including Khánh, ÃÂá» MáºÂu and Trần Thiá»Ân Khiêm.
At the time, the French President Charles de Gaulle wanted Vietnam to become a neutralist country, with the Americans out of the region. This was controversial among the anti-communist South Vietnamese and the plotters wanted to milk the furore by implicating their junta enemies. ÃÂức had years of experience in France, which had given him a good feel of what the French might be up to and what their relations with Francophile members of the ARVN were. He used this to concoct some plausible sounding and incriminating documents for MáºÂu. They purported to show that three prominent members of the junta: Generals Minh, Kim and Trần VÃÂn ÃÂôn had been bought by French agents and were on the brink of declaring South Vietnam's neutrality and sign a peace deal to end the war with the North. Some of the documents were leaked to some senior U.S. officials.
On the night of 29 January 1964, MáºÂu and Khiêm alerted their troops to assume their positions around Saigon. At 15:00 the next day, Khánh took over the Joint General Staff Headquarters and seized power in a bloodless coup, having caught the junta off guard. Khánh rewarded ÃÂức by giving him an important command. Duc served as the commander of IV Corps, which oversaw the Mekong Delta region of the country, from 4 March until 15 September 1964, when he was replaced by Major General Nguyá» n VÃÂn Thiá»Âu.
The removal was due to Buddhist lobbying, who accused Khánh of accommodating too many Catholics regarded as Diá»Âm supporters in leadership positions. This come after Khánh made an attempt to augment his power in August by ordering a state of emergency and introducing a new constitution, which resulted in mass unrest and calls for civilian rule, forcing Khánh to make concessions in an attempt to dampen discontent. Meanwhile, General Lâm VÃÂn Phát was dismissed as Interior Minister. Disgruntled, the two launched a coup attempt before dawn on 13 September, using ten army battalions that they had recruited, as well as tanks. The coup was supported by Catholic and ÃÂại Viá»Ât Quá»Âc Dân ÃÂảng elements. Another member of the conspiracy was Colonel Phạm Ngá»Âc Thảo, who, while ostensibly a Catholic, was actually a communist spy trying to maximize infighting whenever possible. General Khiêm, a member of the ruling triumvirate along with Khánh and Minh, but a rival of the dominant Khánh, was also believed to have supported the plot.
They hoped to overthrow Khánh before their scheduled removal from command took effect. Four battalions of rebel troops moved before dawn from the Mekong Delta towards Saigon, with armored personnel carriers and jeeps carrying machine guns. After cowing several police checkpoints on the edge of the capital with threats of machine-gun and artillery fire, the plotters put rebel sentries in their place to seal off the capital from incoming or outgoing traffic. They then captured communication facilities in the capital including the post office to prevent messages from being sent in or out. Appearing on national radio, and claiming to represent "The Council for the Liberation of the Nation", Phát proclaimed the deposal of Khánh's junta, and accused Khánh of promoting conflict within the nation's military and political leadership. He further promised to capture Khánh and pursue a policy of increased anti-communism, stronger government and military. Phat said that he would use the ideology and legacy of Diá»Âm to lay the foundation for his new junta. There was little reaction from most of the military commanders.
According to historian George McTurnan Kahin, Phát's broadcast was "triumphant" and may have prompted senior officers who were neither part of the original conspiracy nor fully loyal to Khánh to conclude that Phát and ÃÂức would not embrace them if they rallied to their side. ÃÂức claimed that the coup attempt was prompted by "the transfer to the capital of some neutralist elements, and by some pro-communists in the government". However, Phát and ÃÂức could not apprehend Khánh, who had escaped the capital and flew to the central highlands resort town of ÃÂàLạt. American officials encouraged Khánh to return to Saigon and reassert his control. The general refused to do so unless the Americans publicly announced their support for him to the nation. They then asked Khánh about his plans for the future, but felt he was directionless. After talking to Phát and ÃÂức, they concluded the same and decided to back the incumbent, publicly releasing a statement through the embassy endorsing Khánh. Khánh also received support from Nguyá» n Cao Kỳ, the head of the Republic of Vietnam Air Force, who flew over the city and threatened to bomb the rebels, while Brigadier General Nguyá» n Chánh Thi of the 1st Division also supported Khánh.
The announcement helped to deter ARVN officers from joining Lam and ÃÂức, who decided to give up. General William Westmoreland, the commander of American forces in Vietnam, had spoken to ÃÂức and reported to Washington that he "in no uncertain terms ... informed him [Duc] that MACV, the U.S. Mission, and the U.S. Government did not support in any way his move, [and] advised that he get his troops moved out of town [Saigon] immediately. He said that he understood and thanked me. He seemed to be a shaky and insecure young man." ÃÂức mistakenly believed Kỳ and his subordinates would be joining the coup, but later realized he was mistaken.
When he learned he had been tricked into thinking that the plotters had great strength, he soon defected. According to an anonymous source, Phát's hardline Diá»Âmist public statements and radio broadcast comments had caused ÃÂức to reconsider his own participation in the coup. After a further meeting between Phát and ÃÂức and Kỳ, the rebels withdrew as Kỳ put on another show of force.
As the coup collapsed, Kỳ and ÃÂức appeared with other senior officers at a news conference where they proclaimed that the South Vietnamese military was united, and announced a resolution by the armed forces, signed by them and seven others claiming a united front against corruption. The officers contended that the events in the capital were misinterpreted by observers, as "there was no coup". Kỳ claimed Khánh was in complete control and that the senior officers involved in the stand-off, including ÃÂức, "agreed to rejoin their units to fight the Communists".
ÃÂức claimed that the leading officers had agreed:
ÃÂức further commented that the fair treatment of citizens was the only way to defeat the communists. When asked if he now supported Khánh, ÃÂức, "looking ill with weariness, if nothing else", simply nodded in agreement. Kỳ claimed that no further action would be taken against those who were involved with ÃÂức and Phát's activities. However, on 16 September, Khánh had ÃÂức and the other plotters arrested and sent to trial. He removed three of the four corps commanders and six of the nine division commanders for failing to move against Phát and ÃÂức.
In mid-October, ÃÂức and Phát were among 20 put on trial in a military court. ÃÂức told the assembled media that the trial was unfair, stating "I believe in the supreme court of conscience". He then pointed to his subordinate officers and called them "national heroes". ÃÂức denied media speculation he had backed down during the coup to avoid being bombed by Kỳ, claiming "I wanted to avoid bloodshed ... I am very proud of my decision". Phát's lawyers started by moving for the charges against the conspirators to be dismissed, claiming the rebels had not been captured "red-handed"; this motion was denied. The accused officers claimed they had only intended to make a show of force, rather than overthrow Khánh. ÃÂức claimed that the objective of his actions was to "emphasize my ideas" and said that his actions did not constitute a coup attempt. ÃÂức claimed that if he was truly intending to overthrow the government, he would have arrested public servants or military officials and denied that he had done so. However, he admitted to being concerned by Khánh's policies. ÃÂức claimed he had decided to end what he regarded as a military protest demonstration when Khánh promised to consider his concerns, and then returned to the IV Corps headquarters in the Mekong Delta. ÃÂức claimed responsibility for the actions of his subordinate and co-accused, Colonel Huỳnh VÃÂn Tôn, who led the 7th Division of IV Corps into Saigon in support of the action. Tá»Ân confirmed that ÃÂức had ordered him to move his troops into the capital. During questioning, ÃÂức made no reference to Phát.
One week later on 24 October, the charges were dropped. Khánh then gave ÃÂức and Phát two months of detention for indiscipline; their subordinates were given shorter periods of detention. According to Kahin, Khánh rigged the military trial so that ÃÂức and Phát were acquitted so they could be used as a Catholic counterweight to the Young Turks faction of Kỳ and Thi, who, in Khánh's eyes, had become increasingly strong and threatening.
After this, ÃÂức left the military. In January 1966, he was arrested along with between 10âÂÂ50 officers, mostly junior officers of the rank of captain, who were suspected of making plans to overthrow Kỳ's junta. Most observers thought the suspicions against the arrested men were not credible, and ÃÂức was released after 24 hours and given an informal warning to avoid political activities. Kỳ made a speech denouncing the alleged coup plot without naming individuals the military was placed on a higher level of alert.