Advaita VedÃÂnta and MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism share significant similarities. Those similarities have attracted attention both by Indian and Western scholars of Eastern philosophy and Oriental studies, and have also been criticised by concurring schools. The similarities have been interpreted as Buddhist influences on Advaita VedÃÂnta, though some deny such influences, or see them as expressions of the same eternal truth.
Advaita VedÃÂnta (; literally, not-two) is the oldest extant sub-school of VedÃÂnta, an orthodox (ÃÂstika) school of Hindu philosophy and religious practice. Advaita darà Âana (philosophy, worldview, teaching) is one of the classic Indian paths to spiritual realization and liberation. It first took shape systematically with the writings of the medieval Indian philosopher Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda in the 6th century CE.
Mahayana Buddhism refers to a broad group of Buddhist traditions, texts, philosophies, and practices developed in ancient India (c.âÂÂ1st century BCE onwards). The earliest evidence of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism comes from sà «tras ("discourses", scriptures) originating around the beginning of the common era.
Buddhism as a whole saw a major decline in the Indian subcontinent during the Middle Ages after the rise of new forms of Hinduism, especially the Advaita tradition.
Scholarly views regarding the influence of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism on Advaita VedÃÂnta have historically and in modern times ranged from "Advaita and Buddhism are very different", to "Advaita and Buddhism absolutely coincide in their main tenets", to "after purifying Buddhism and Advaita of accidental or historically conditioned accretions, both systems can be safely regarded as an expression of one and the same eternal absolute truth."
Advaita VedÃÂnta and other schools of Hindu philosophy share numerous terminology, doctrines, and dialectical techniques with Buddhism. According to a 1918 paper by the Buddhist scholar O. Rozenberg, "a precise differentiation between Brahmanism and Buddhism is impossible to draw." T. R. V. Murti notices that "the ultimate goal" of VedÃÂnta, SÃÂá¹Âkhya, and MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism is "remarkably similar"; while Advaita VedÃÂnta postulates a "foundational self", according to Murti "MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism implicitly affirms the existence of a deep underlying reality behind all empirical manifestations in its conception of à Âà «nyatà(the indeterminate, the void), or vijñapti-mÃÂtra (consciousness only), or tathÃÂtà(thatness), or dhÃÂrmata (noumenal reality)."
Both traditions hold that "the empirical world is transitory, a show of appearances", and both admit "degrees of truth or existence". Both traditions emphasize the human need for spiritual liberation (moksha, nirvana, kaivalya), however with different assumptions. According to Frank Whaling, the similarities between Advaita VedÃÂnta and Buddhism are not limited to the terminology and some doctrines, but also includes practice. The monastic rules and cenobitic tradition in Advaitin monasticism are similar to those found in Buddhist monasticism.
The influence of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism on Advaita VedÃÂnta has been significant. Sharma points out that the early commentators on the Brahma Sà «tras were all realists, or pantheist realists. He states that they were influenced by Buddhism, particularly during the 5thâÂÂ6th centuries CE with the development of the YogÃÂcÃÂra school of Buddhist philosophy. Von Glasenapp states that there was a mutual influence between VedÃÂnta and Buddhism. S. N. Dasgupta and Mohanta suggest that Buddhism and Advaita VedÃÂnta represent "different phases of development of the same non-dualistic metaphysics from the Upanishadic period to the time of à Âaá¹ kara." Eliot Deutsch and Rohit Dalvi state:
The influence of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism on other Indian religions and philosophies was not limited to the VedÃÂnta tradition alone. Kalupahana notes that Buddhaghoá¹£a's Visuddhimagga (5th century CE), a comprehensive summary of older Sinhala commentaries on the scriptural canon of TheravÃÂda Buddhism, contains "some metaphysical speculations, such as those of the SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins, the SautrÃÂntikas, and even the YogÃÂcÃÂrins".
According to Sarma, "to mistake him [Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda] to be a hidden or open Buddhist is absurd". The doctrines of Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda and Gautama Buddha are totally opposed, states Murti:
Advaitins have traditionally challenged the Buddhist influence thesis. The influence of Buddhist doctrines on Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda has been a vexed question. Modern scholarship generally accepts that Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda was influenced by Buddhism, at least in terms of using Buddhist terminology to explain his ideas, but adds that Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda was a Vedantin and not a Buddhist. Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda adopted some Buddhist terminology and borrowed its doctrines to his Vedantic goals, much like early Buddhism adopted Upanishadic terminology and borrowed its doctrines to Buddhist goals; both used pre-existing concepts and ideas to convey new meanings. While there is shared terminology, the Advaita doctrines of Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda and Gautama Buddha also show differences.
The influence of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism on Advaita VedÃÂnta, states Deutsch, goes back at least to Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, where he "clearly draws from Buddhist philosophical sources for many of his arguments and distinctions and even for the forms and imagery in which these arguments are cast, much like how Buddhists had borrowed Vedic terminology." According to Plott, the influence of Buddhism on Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda is undeniable and to be expected. Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, in his KÃÂrikàtexts, uses the leading concepts and wording of MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhism but, states John Plott, he reformulated them to the Upanishadic themes. Yet, according to Plott, this influence is to be expected:
According to Mahadevan, Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda adopted Buddhist terminology and borrowed its doctrines to his Vedantic goals, much like early Buddhism adopted Upanishadic terminology and borrowed its doctrines to Buddhist goals; both used pre-existing concepts and ideas to convey new meanings. Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda took over the Buddhist doctrines that ultimate reality is pure consciousness (vijñapti-mÃÂtra) and "that the nature of the world is the four-cornered negation, which is the structure of MÃÂyÃÂ". Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda also took over the Buddhist concept of ajÃÂta from NÃÂgÃÂrjuna's MÃÂdhyamaka philosophy, which uses the term anutpÃÂda.
Michael Comans states Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, an early Vedantin, utilised some arguments and reasoning from MÃÂdhyamaka Buddhist texts by quoting them almost verbatim. However, Comans adds there is a fundamental difference between Buddhist thought and that of Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, in that Buddhism has as its philosophical basis the doctrine of dependent origination (pratëtya-samutpÃÂda), according to which "everything is without an essential nature (nissvabhava), and everything is empty of essential nature (svabhava-sunya)", while Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda does not rely upon this central teaching of Buddhism at all, and therefore should not be considered a Buddhist. Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda's AjÃÂtivÃÂda (doctrine of no-origination or non -creation) is an outcome of reasoning applied to an unchanging nondual reality according to which "there exists a Reality (sat) that is unborn (aja)" that has essential nature (svabhava) and this is the "eternal, undecaying Self, Brahman (Atman)". Thus, Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda differs from Buddhist scholars such as the Indian Buddhist monk and philosopher NÃÂgÃÂrjuna (3rd century CE), states Comans, by accepting the premises and relying on the fundamental teaching of the Upanishads.
Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, states Raju, "wove Buddhist doctrines into a philosophy of the MÃÂá¹Âá¸Âukya Upanisad, which was further developed by Shankara". Of particular interest is Chapter Four of Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda's text Karika, in which according to Bhattacharya, two karikas refer to Gautama Buddha and the term Asparà Âayoga is borrowed from Buddhism. According to Murti, "the conclusion is irresistible that Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda, a VedÃÂnta philosopher, is attempting an Advaitic interpretation of VedÃÂnta in the light of the MÃÂdhyamika and YogÃÂcÃÂra doctrines. He even freely quotes and appeals to them." However, adds Murti, the doctrines are unlike Buddhism. Chapter One, Two, and Three are entirely Vedantin and founded on the Upanishads, with little Buddhist flavor. Further, state both Murti and King, no VedÃÂnta scholars who followed Gauá¸ÂapÃÂda ever quoted from Chapter Four, they only quote from the first three.
Given the principal role attributed to ÃÂdi à Âaá¹ kara in the Advaita tradition, his works have been examined by scholars for similarities with Buddhism. Buddhism supporters have targeted à Âaá¹ kara, states Biderman, while his Hindu supporters state that "accusations" concerning explicit or implicit Buddhist influence are not relevant. à Âaá¹ kara, states Natalia Isaeva, incorporated "into his own system a Buddhist notion of mÃÂyàwhich had not been minutely elaborated in the Upanishads". According to Mudgal, à Âaá¹ kara's Advaita view and NÃÂgÃÂrjuna's MÃÂdhyamaka view of ultimate reality are compatible because they are both transcendental, indescribable, non-dual and only arrived at through a via negativa or neti neti. Mudgal concludes therefore that "the difference between à Âà «nyavÃÂda philosophy of Buddhism and Advaita philosophy of Hinduism may be a matter of emphasis, not of kind".
Similarly, there are many points of contact between the Buddhist YogÃÂcÃÂra school and à Âaá¹ kara's Advaita tradition. According to S. N. Dasgupta,
Daniel Ingalls writes, "If we are to adopt a metaphysical and static view of philosophy there is little difference between Shankara and Vijnanavada Buddhism, so little, in fact that the whole discussion is fairly pointless. But if we try to think our way back into minds of philosophers whose works we read, there is a very real difference between the antagonists". Mudgal additionally states that the Upanishadic and Buddhist currents of thought "developed separately and independently, opposed to one another, as the orthodox and heterodox, the thesis and antithesis, and a synthesis was attempted by the Advaitin Shankara". According to Ingalls, the Japanese Buddhist scholarship has argued that ÃÂdi à Âaá¹ kara did not understand Buddhism.
Some Hindu scholars have criticized Advaita VedÃÂnta for its notion of mÃÂyÃÂ and non-theistic doctrinal similarities with Buddhism, sometimes referring to the Advaita tradition as MÃÂyÃÂvÃÂda.
BhÃÂskara, a Hindu philosopher of the Bhedabheda VedÃÂnta school (9th century CE), accused à Âaá¹ kara's Advaita tradition as "this despicable broken down MÃÂyÃÂvÃÂda that has been chanted by the MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhists", characterizing it as a school that is undermining the ritual duties set in Vedic orthodoxy.
RÃÂmÃÂá¹Âuja, a Hindu saint and founder of the Vishishtadvaita VedÃÂnta school (12th century CE), similarly accused ÃÂdi à Âaá¹ kara of being a Prachanna Bauddha, that is, a "crypto-Buddhist", and someone who was undermining the theistic Bhakti-oriented devotionalism.
The Advaita VedÃÂnta tradition has historically rejected accusations of crypto-Buddhism highlighting their respective views on ÃÂtman, AnattÃÂ, and Brahman. Some early Buddhist texts (1st millennium CE), such as the MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhist scriptures TathÃÂgatagarbha Sà «tras suggest "self-like" concepts, variously called TathÃÂgatagarbha or "Buddha nature". However, in modern era studies, scholars such as Wayman state that these Buddhist "self-like" concepts are neither self nor sentient being, nor individual soul, nor personality. Some scholars posit that the TathÃÂgatagarbha Sà «tras were written to promote Buddhism to non-Buddhists. In contrast, the earliest use of the word ÃÂtman in Indian texts is found in the Rig Veda (RV X.97.11). YÃÂska, the ancient Indian grammarian, commenting on this Rigvedic verse, accepts the following meanings of ÃÂtman: the pervading principle, the organism in which other elements are united and the ultimate sentient principle. ÃÂtman is a central topic in all of the Upanishads, and "know your ÃÂtman (Self)" is one of their thematic foci. The Mahavakyas, as documented in the Upanishads and tracing back to the Vedas, provide the theological Vedantic basis for Advaita philosophy.
The epistemological foundations of Buddhism and Advaita VedÃÂnta are different. Buddhism accepts two valid means to reliable and correct knowledgeâÂÂperception and inference, while Advaita VedÃÂnta accepts six (described elsewhere in this article). However, some Buddhists in history, have argued that Buddhist scriptures are a reliable source of spiritual knowledge, corresponding to Advaita's à Âabda pramana, however Buddhists have treated their scriptures as a form of inference method.
Advaita VedÃÂnta posits a substance ontology, an ontology which holds that underlying the change and impermanence of empirical reality is an unchanging and permanent absolute reality, like an eternal substance it calls ÃÂtman-Brahman. In its substance ontology, as like other philosophies, there exist a universal, particulars, and specific properties, and it is the interaction of particulars that create events and processes. In contrast, Buddhism posits a process ontology, also called as "event ontology". According to Buddhist philosophy, particularly after the rise of ancient MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhist scholarship, the concept of impermanence (anicca) is understood as one of the three marks of existence (trilaká¹£aá¹Âa): there is neither empirical nor absolute permanent reality, because all phenomena are characterized by their lack of a solid and independent existence (svabhÃÂva), and ontology can be explained as a process.
In Buddhist ontology, there is a system of dependent origination and interdependent phenomena (pratëtya-samutpÃÂda) but no stable persistent identities, neither eternal universals nor particulars. In Buddhism, thoughts and memories are mental constructions and fluid processes (skandhÃÂ) without a real observer, personal agent, or cognizer (anattÃÂ). By contrast, in Advaita VedÃÂnta and the other orthodox schools of Hinduism, the eternal, unchanging ultimate self (ÃÂtman) identical with Brahman is understood as the real observer, personal agent, and cognizer. However, the historical Buddha considered this Brahmanical belief to be one of the six wrong views about the self; in fact, Buddha held that attachment to the appearance of a permanent self in this world of change is the cause of suffering (duḥkha), and the main obstacle to the attainment of spiritual liberation (moká¹£a).
Advaita VedÃÂnta holds the premise, "Soul exists, and Soul (self, or ÃÂtman) is a self evident truth". Buddhism, in contrast, holds the premise, "Atman does not exist, and An-atman (non-self, or anÃÂtman) is self evident". Chakravarthi Ram-Prasad gives a more nuanced view, stating that the Advaitins "assert a stable subjectivity, or a unity of consciousness through all the specific states of indivuated consciousness, but not an individual subject of consciousness [...] the Advaitins split from 'mineness'." The Upanishadic inquiry fails to find an empirical correlate of the assumed ÃÂtman, but nevertheless assumes its existence, and Advaitins "reify consciousness as an eternal self." In contrast, the Buddhist inquiry "is satisfied with the empirical investigation which shows that no such Atman exists because there is no evidence", states Jayatilleke.
The Abhidhamma Piá¹Âaka, which is the third division of the scriptural canon of TheravÃÂda Buddhism, considered all existence as dhamma, and left the ontological questions about reality and the nature of dhamma unexplained. According to Renard, Advaita's theory of three levels of reality is built on the two levels of reality found in NÃÂgÃÂrjuna's MÃÂdhyamaka philosophy.
A central concern for ÃÂdi à Âaá¹ kara, in his objections against Buddhism, is what he perceives as the underlying existential nihilism of the Buddhist doctrine. à Âaá¹ kara states that there "must be something beyond cognition, namely a cognizer," which he asserts is the self-evident soul (ÃÂtman) or Witness-consciousness (SÃÂkṣë). Buddhism, according to à Âaá¹ kara, denies the existence of a cognizer entirely. He also considers the notion of Brahman as pure knowledge and "the quintessence of positive reality." The teachings of the oldest Principal Upanishads and Brahma Sà «tras, according to à Âaá¹ kara, differ from both the Buddhist realists (SarvÃÂstivÃÂdins) and the Buddhist idealists (YogÃÂcÃÂrins). à Âaá¹ kara elaborates on these arguments against various schools of Buddhism, partly presenting refutations which were already standard in his time, and partly offering his own objections.
à Âaá¹ kara's original contribution in explaining the difference between Advaita and Buddhism was his "argument for identity" and the "argument for the witness". In his opinion, the Buddhists are internally inconsistent in their theories, because "the reservoir-consciousness that [they] set up, being momentary, is no better than ordinary consciousness. Or, if [they] allow the reservoir-consciousness to be lasting, [they] destroy [their] theory of momentariness." In response to the idealists, he notes that their alaya-vijnana, or store-house consciousness, runs counter to the Buddhist theory of momentariness. With regard to the à Âà «nyavÃÂda doctrine of the MÃÂdhyamaka school, à Âaá¹ kara states that "being contradictory to all valid means of knowledge, we have not thought worth while to refute" and "common sense (loka-vyavahÃÂra) cannot be denied without the discovery of some other truth".
A few Buddhist philosophers made the opposite criticism in the medieval era toward their Buddhist opponents. In the 6th century CE, for example, the MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhist scholar BhÃÂviveka redefined Vedantic concepts to show how they fit into MÃÂdhyamaka philosophy, and "equate[d] the Buddha's Dharma body with Brahman, the ultimate reality of the Upanishads." In his Madhyamakahá¹ÂdayakÃÂrikaḥ, BhÃÂviveka stages a HënayÃÂna (TheravÃÂda Buddhist) scholar as his interlocutor, who accuses MahÃÂyÃÂna Buddhists of being "crypto-Vedantins". Medieval-era Tibetan Gelugpa scholars accused the Jonang school of being "crypto-Vedantist." Contemporary scholar David Kalupahana called the 7th-century Buddhist scholar Chandrakirti a "crypto-Vedantist", a view rejected by scholars of MÃÂdhyamaka philosophy.