The Battle of the Dalmatian Channels was a three-day confrontation between three tactical groups of Yugoslav Navy ships and coastal artillery, and a detachment of naval commandos of the Croatian Navy fought on 14âÂÂ16 November 1991 during the Croatian War of Independence. On 14 November, the commandos torpedoed the Mirna-class patrol boat PÃÂ-176 Mukos close to the island of Braàin the Split Channel of the Adriatic Sea, prompting a Yugoslav naval bombardment of Braàand à  olta Island the same day. The drifting Mukos was salvaged by Croatian civilian boats and beached at NeÃÂujam bay.
The next day, a group of Yugoslav Navy vessels, organised into the Kaà ¡tela tactical group (TG), deployed to the Split Channel, and bombarded the city of Split in retaliation for the loss of Mukos. In return, Croatian coastal artillery engaged the Kaà ¡tela TG. To draw off some of the artillery fire, the Yugoslav Navy deployed another group of vessels from the island of Vis, organised as the Vis TG, south of à  olta, where it was engaged by more Croatian artillery. The Kaà ¡tela TG retreated east and joined with the PloÃÂe TG, consisting of three minesweepers.
On 16 November, the combined Yugoslav force sailed through the KorÃÂula Channela strait separating the islands of Hvar and KorÃÂulato reach safety at the Yugoslav Navy base at Vis. The warships were then engaged by Croatian coastal artillery deployed on KorÃÂula and the Peljeà ¡ac Peninsula, losing two minesweepers to the artillery fire in the process.
The battle marked the last deployment of the Yugoslav Navy into one of the Dalmatian channels, the loosening of the naval blockade of the Croatian coast imposed in September, and the largest Croatian Navy operation in the war. The Croatian Navy later towed the grounded Mukos to à  ibenik, repaired the vessel and put her into service as OB-62 à  olta. During the battle, 22 Yugoslav Navy crewmen, two Croatian gunners and two civilian sailors in Split were killed. Thirty-three Yugoslav officers were charged in relation to the naval bombardment by Croatian authorities.
In 1990, following the electoral defeat of the government of the Socialist Republic of Croatia, ethnic tensions increased. The Yugoslav People's Army (Jugoslovenska Narodna Armija â JNA) confiscated Croatia's Territorial Defence Forces' (Teritorijalna obrana â TO) weapons to minimize resistance. On 17 August, the tensions escalated into an open revolt by Croatian Serbs, centred on the predominantly Serb-populated areas of the Dalmatian hinterland around Knin, and parts of Lika, Kordun, Banovina, and eastern Croatia. This was followed by two unsuccessful attempts by Serbia, supported by Montenegro and Serbia's provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, to obtain the Yugoslav Presidency's approval for a JNA operation to disarm Croatian security forces in January 1991.
After a bloodless skirmish between Serb insurgents and Croatian special police in March, the JNA, supported by Serbia and its allies, asked the federal presidency to give it wartime authorities and to declare a state of emergency. The request was denied on 15 March and the JNA came under the control of Serbian president, Slobodan Miloà ¡eviÃÂ. Preferring a campaign to expand Serbia rather than to preserve Yugoslavia, Miloà ¡eviàpublicly threatened to replace the JNA with a Serbian army and declared that he no longer recognized the authority of the federal presidency. By the end of March, the conflict had escalated into the Croatian War of Independence. The JNA intervened; they increasingly supported the Croatian Serb insurgents and prevented Croatian police from intervening. In early April, the leaders of the Croatian Serb revolt declared their intention to integrate the area under their control, known as SAO Krajina, with Serbia. The government of Croatia viewed this declaration as an attempt to secede.
In May 1991, the Croatian government responded by forming the Croatian National Guard (Zbor narodne garde â ZNG), but its development was hampered by a United Nations (UN) arms embargo and the Yugoslav Navy's blockade of the Adriatic coast, both of which were introduced in September. Following the Battle of the Barracks, the ZNG acquired a significant stock of weapons and ammunition, including 34 Yugoslav Navy vessels moored in à  ibenik. Croatian forces using naval mines deployed in Kaà ¡tela Bay rendered the Yugoslav Navy base at Lora in Split inaccessible. On 25 September, the Yugoslav landing barge BRM-86 hit one of the mines and sank while taking supplies from Lora; five Yugoslav servicemen were killed. On 8 October, Croatia declared independence from Yugoslavia, and a month later the Croatian National Guard was renamed the Croatian Army (Hrvatska vojska â HV). Late 1991 saw the fiercest fighting of the war; the 1991 Yugoslav campaign in Croatia culminated in the Siege of Dubrovnik and the Battle of Vukovar.
On the night of 10âÂÂ11 October, the Croatian torpedo boat TB-51 Vukovar (former TÃÂ-222, captured at à  ibenik on 22 September), commanded by Frigate Lieutenant Vojko MareliÃÂ, launched an eight-torpedo salvo to the Yugoslav frigate VPBR-31 Split, hiding in the radar shadow of ÃÂiovo island to avoid detection. None of the torpedos hit home.
During the first days of November, the Yugoslav Navy stopped the Libertas convoy twice for inspection between the islands of Braàand KorÃÂula as it enforced the blockade. The convoy of 40 small boats led by the ferry Slavija was on its way to resupply Dubrovnik and retrieve refugees from the besieged city. On 11 November, the Maltese-flagged coaster Euroriver, crewed by Croatian sailors, was sunk by gunfire off à  olta Island.
Despite the capture of the Yugoslav Navy vessels in September, Croatia's coastal defences relied on captured coastal artillery on the mainland and the nearby islands. In central Dalmatia, these included three batteries on the mainland between à  ibenik and Split, guns on à ½irje Island, a battery near ZeÃÂevo and guns on Smokvica Island near Primoà ¡ten. Four coastal artillery batteries on islands off Splitthe 88-millimetre MarinÃÂa Rat on the island of à  olta, the Raà ¾anj battery on the island of BraÃÂ, and the 88-millimetre battery Raà ¾njiàand the 85-millimetre battery Privala on the island of KorÃÂulawere captured. Some of the guns captured on à ½irje and à  olta were removed and used to set up additional coastal artillery batteries at Kaà ¡juni and Duilovo in Split. Additional batteries were set up in Lovià ¡te at the tip of the Peljeà ¡ac Peninsula, and in Blace and ÃÂrna Luka on KorÃÂula on the coast north of Smokvica and Vela Luka. The battery deployed to ÃÂrna Luka contained M1942 (ZiS-3) guns. A naval commando detachment from the Croatian Navy was deployed to the western BraÃÂ. The coastal artillery was subordinated to the Croatian Navy and commanded by Admiral Sveto Letica.
The Yugoslav Navy deployed three tactical groups (TGs) named Kaà ¡tela, Vis and PloÃÂe off the coast of central Dalmatia from its bases on the islands of Vis and Lastovo. The Kaà ¡tela TG was deployed to the sea off Split and north of the islands of à  olta and BraÃÂ. It consisted of Koni-class frigate VPBR-31 Split, KonÃÂar-class fast attack craft RTOP-401 Rade KonÃÂar and RTOP-403 Ramiz Sadiku, Osa-class missile boat RÃÂ-306 Nikola MartinoviÃÂ, Shershen-class torpedo boats TÃÂ-220 Crvena zvezda and TÃÂ-224 Pionir II and two Mirna-class patrol boats, including PÃÂ-176 Mukos. Kaà ¡tela TG may have also included an additional Osa-class missile boat. The PloÃÂe TG, deployed to the sea between the mainland and Braàto the east of the Kaà ¡tela TG, consisted of three minesweepers: ML-143 Ià ¾, ML-144 Olib and ML-153 Blitvenica. The Vis TG was deployed off the western tip of the island of Hvar. It consisted of a Kotor-class frigate VPBR-34 Pula commanded by Captain Ilija BrÃÂiÃÂ, one KonÃÂar-class fast attack craft, two Osa-missile boats and two Mirna-class patrol craft. The Yugoslav Navy fleet was under overall command of Rear Admiral Nikola ErcegoviÃÂ.
On 14 November at 5:34 p.m., the Croatian naval commandos attacked Mukos off Braàusing a torpedo fired from the island. Her crew reported an explosion in the bow of the ship and requested assistance from the Kaà ¡tela TG because she started to sink. The Kaà ¡tela TG dispatched Pionir II, which reached Mukos shortly afterwards and had transferred the crew of the damaged vessel by 6:10 p.m. Mukos was left to drift towards à  olta with her bow fully submerged and containing the bodies of three dead crew members. For nearly the entire night, the Kaà ¡tela TG directed gunfire against the Milna and Stomorska areas of à  olta to draw fire from Croatian coastal artillery. However, the coastal artillery deployed in the targeted areas did not return fire. Additional Yugoslav vessels sortied from Vis but returned to their base before the morning without transiting the Split Entrancethe strait between the islands of Braàand à  olta. By that time, the naval gunfire also died down. The PloÃÂe TG remained in their assigned area of patrol.
On 15 November at 6:42 a.m., the Kaà ¡tela TG commenced a naval bombardment of targets in Split and on the islands of Braàand à  olta. The order was issued aboard VPBR-31 Split and the JNA Maritime Military Sector command and JNA bases in Split were advised of the attack. The JNA based in Split did not join the bombardment. Letica notified the JNA Maritime Military Sector commanding officer Major General Nikola Mladeniàof the attack, but Mladeniàsaid he could not control the situation because his headquarters was denied a supply of electricity. The European Community Monitor Mission (ECMM) was also notified; they promised to make efforts to stop the bombardment. Shortly after, Letica ordered the coastal artillery to commence fire against the Kaà ¡tela TG. Besides several near-misses, the coastal artillery fire scored a direct hit against VPBR-31 Split, that was attributed to the MarinÃÂa Rat-based battery on à  olta. Croatian sources said Mladeniàordered the bombardment in retribution for the loss of Mukos.
In response to the difficult position of the Yugoslav Navy vessels north of à  olta and BraÃÂ, the Vis TG led by Pula sailed north from the island of Vis to draw some of the artillery fire away from the Kaà ¡tela TG. As the ships approached the Split Entrance, they made a radar contact sailing away from Split towards open sea at a high speed. Pula, attempting to enforce the blockade imposed in September, requested the vessel by radio to stop for an inspection. The vessel failed to respond and Pula fired several shots in front of it before BrÃÂiànoticed that it was a hydrofoil carrying an ECMM team and flying the flag of Europe. He abandoned the pursuit and proceeded to à  olta.
The Vis TG came under fire from the coastal artillery when it arrived within of à  olta. In response to the incoming fire, Pula fired her bow-mounted gun against targets on Braàand à  olta. Croatian sources said that approximately 800 rounds were fired indiscriminately, striking civilian targets, while BrÃÂiàsaid the TG under his command acted only against artillery located outside residential areas. Pula also fired four salvos of depth charges using her RBU-6000 rocket launcher while the land was outside its range to draw greater attention from the artillery gunners.
The Kaà ¡tela TG started to withdraw east at approximately 8:00 a.m., fearing the shortest available route to Vis might be mined in the area of Split Entrance. It reached the eastern tip of Braàby 8:30 a.m. At 9:28 a.m., three Yugoslav Air Force J-21 Jastrebs flew low over Braàand à  olta; minutes later, two were reportedly shot down by anti-aircraft artillery. Six Yugoslav jets were sortied against targets on Braàand à  olta. Following the naval action that morning, Croatian civilian boats from à  olta towed the partially submerged Mukos to NeÃÂujam Bay and ran it aground there. In the afternoon, the Kaà ¡tela TG and the PloÃÂe TG linked up east of the island of Hvar.
On 16 November at 11:00 a.m., the Kaà ¡tela and PloÃÂe TGs started to assemble at the eastern end of the KorÃÂula Channel, which separates the islands of Hvar and KorÃÂula just north of Cape Lovià ¡te at the westernmost tip of the Peljeà ¡ac Peninsula. The relatively slow minesweepers Ià ¾ and Olib, which belonged to the PloÃÂe TG, were hit in the bow and the engine room respectively, by the guns at Lovià ¡te. To assist the minesweepers, Split turned around to engage the artillery at Cape Lovià ¡te while the minesweepers sailed north closer to the Hvar shore in increasingly thick fog. The Croatian guns at Lovià ¡te also scored hits on the missile boat RÃÂ-306 and the torpedo boat TÃÂ-224.
At 3:30 p.m., the Kaà ¡tela TG turned around once more to attack Cape Lovià ¡te, but were engaged by nearby coastal artillery located on KorÃÂula. Blitvenica was damaged in the shooting and the entire naval force moved north-west towards à  ÃÂedro Island. Ià ¾ sustained heavy damage and ran aground in Torac Bay off Hvar, and was abandoned. Olib sank between Peljeà ¡ac and Hvar. Her crew were rescued by the remaining vessels in the group. At 7:00 p.m., the fleet sailed south from à  ÃÂedro towards the western part of KorÃÂula, seeking shelter as the Sirocco wind strengthened. As the ships approached KorÃÂula, they were fired upon by coastal artillery at ÃÂrna Luka and Cape Privala, forcing them to turn west towards Vis. The Vis TG did not engage Croatian positions on 16 November. The coastal guns at Privala reported seven hits on Split.
The Yugoslav Navy was defeated and its ships did not sail north of the Split Entrance again. The battle was the largest engagement of the Croatian Navy during the war. Two Croatian anti-aircraft gunners were killed in action on the island of BraÃÂ. According to MladeniÃÂ, the Yugoslav Navy lost 22 seamenincluding three aboard Mukostwo minesweepers and a patrol craft. The Yugoslav Air Force lost two aircraft but the pilots were rescued by a helicopter that sortied from Vis and picked them up from the sea. Croatian Navy divers later raised Mukos and she was towed to à  ibenik by a Brodospas-owned tug. She was repaired and turned over to the Croatian Navy as OB-62 à  olta. Two civilians were killed and nine were wounded in the naval bombardment of Split. The bombardment damaged the Archaeological Museum, Split Municipality Building, Arena Gripe, Public Sanitation Institute, the Technical School, and the ferries Bartol Kaà ¡iàand Vladimir Nazor, which were moored in the Port of Split. The two civilian fatalities were crew members of Vladimir Nazor.
Croatian authorities charged 33 JNA officersincluding BrÃÂiÃÂ who was tried in absentia and convicted to 15 years in prisonfor the bombardment of Split, Ã Â olta and BraÃÂ. BrÃÂiÃÂ, who later became a high-ranking officer of the Montenegrin Navy, was arrested in Naples in late 2007 when he travelled to a NATO function. He was not extradited to Croatia. Most of the other charged officers were also tried in absentia. , fifteen officersincluding BrÃÂiÃÂwere convicted, one was acquitted and seventeen cases were ordered by the Supreme Court of Croatia to be retried because of irregularities during previous trials.
In Croatia, the events of 14 and 15 November 1991 are referred to as the Battle of Split (Bitka za Split) or the Battle of the Split Channel (Boj u Splitskom kanalu), while the events of 16 November are referred to as the Battle of the KorÃÂula Channel (Bitka u KorÃÂulanskom kanalu). The events spanning all three days of the Battle of the Dalmatian Channels are also referred to as the Battle of the Adriatic (Bitka za Jadran).