The RAF Advanced Air Striking Force (AASF) comprised the light bombers of 1 Group RAF Bomber Command, which took part in the Battle of France during the Second World War. Before hostilities began, it had been agreed between the United Kingdom and France that in case of war, the short-range aircraft of Bomber Command would move to French airfields to operate against targets in Nazi Germany. The AASF was formed on 24 August 1939 from the ten squadrons of Fairey Battle light bombers of 1 Group under the command of Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair and was dispatched to airfields in the Rheims area on 2 September 1939.
The AASF was answerable to the Air Ministry and independent of the British Expeditionary Force. For unity of command, the AASF and the Air Component of the BEF (Air Vice-Marshal Charles Blount), came under the command of British Air Forces in France (Air Vice-Marshal Arthur Barratt) on 15 January 1940. Using the bombers for attacks on strategic targets in Germany was set aside, due to Anglo-French reluctance to provoke German retaliation; attacks on German military forces and their communications were substituted.
The Battle of France began with the German invasion of the Low Countries on 10 May 1940. The Battle squadrons suffered 40 per cent losses on 10 May, 100 per cent on 11 May and 63 per cent on 12 May. In 48 hours the number of operational AASF bombers fell from 135 to 72. On 14 May the AASF made a maximum effort, 63 Battles and eight Bristol Blenheims attacked targets near Sedan. More than half the bombers were lost, bringing AASF losses to 75 per cent. The remaining bombers began to operate at night and periodically by day, sometimes with fighter escorts.
From 10 May to the end of the month, the AASF lost 119 Battle crews killed and 100 aircraft. Experience, better tactics and periods of bad weather from 15 May to 5 June led to losses of 0.5 per cent, albeit with a similar reduction in effectiveness. On 14 June, the remaining Battles returned to Britain; the Hurricane squadrons returned on 18 June and rejoined Fighter Command. The AASF was dissolved on 26 June, the Battles returning to 1 Group, Bomber Command, to prepare for operations against a German invasion, along with the rest of the Royal Air Force.
Once British rearmament began, the air policy of the British government was to have air defences sufficient to defeat an attack and an offensive force equal to that of the . With no land border to defend, British resources had been concentrated on radar stations, anti-aircraft guns and increasing the number of the most modern fighter aircraft. If Germany attacked, the British intended to take the war to the Germans by attacking strategically important targets with its heavy bombers, types unsuitable for operations in direct support of land forces. Implementation of the policy required a considerable number of first-class fighter aircraft to defeat an attacker and bombers to destroy ground targets.
In 1938 the RAF expansion programme was intended to provide means for the air defence of Britain and for counter-offensive operations against Germany. Army co-operation received few resources and no plans were made for RAF participation in mass land operations or the dispatch abroad of large expeditionary air forces. The Western Plan was devised by the Air Ministry for mobilisation and the deployment of squadrons to their wartime airfields. Provision was made for the immediate dispatch of an Advanced Air Striking Force of ten squadrons to France, followed by a second echelon of ten more. Refuelling facilities were also planned for other squadrons, the arrangements for transport and servicing being co-ordinated with the army; thought was also given to basing squadrons in Belgium if it was invaded by Germany.
In February 1939, the British Cabinet had authorised joint planning with the French and preferably with Belgium and the Netherlands in case of war with Germany, Italy and Japan. Two weeks before the first meeting, Germany occupied the rump of Czechoslovakia; war preparations took on a new urgency and staff conversations began on 29 March 1939. Agreement was reached with France to base the AASF on French airfields but only to bring them closer to their intended targets in Germany, until longer-range types became available. French strategy emphasised the defence of the national territory and Allied efforts were expected to give equal emphasis but the British refused to stake everything on the success of a defensive campaign against the Germans in France. The different circumstances of the two countries led the French to rely on a mass land army, with air defence a secondary concern, the was hampered in the late 1930s by the slow progress of its re-equipment, lacking anti-aircraft guns, sufficient fighter aircraft and the means to detect and track enemy aircraft. Observation services relied on civilian telephones and in October 1939, the had only which were considered (obsolete).
Lack of aircraft led the French to advocate a bombing policy of tactical co-operation with the armies, attacking German forces and communications in the front line, rather than the strategic bombing of Germany, for fear of retaliation. From the spring of 1939, arrangements were made for the reception of the AASF, the defence of British bases in France, bombing policy in support of ground forces confronting a German attack in the Benelux countries, and operations against the . A supply of British bombs was dumped near Reims, disguised as a sale to the . Discussion of strategic air operations against the German war economy was delayed because the British did not expect to begin such operations as soon as war was declared and because the French had no bombers capable of them. In the last days of peace, the Cabinet limited air bombardment strictly to military objectives which were narrowly defined and a joint declaration was issued concerning the policy of following of the rules of war pertaining to poison gas, submarine warfare and air attacks on merchant ships to avoid provoking the Germans while the Anglo-French air forces were being built up.
On 24 August 1939, the British government gave orders for the armed forces partially to mobilise and on 2 September No. 1 Group RAF (Air Vice-Marshal Patrick Playfair) sent its ten Fairey Battle day-bomber squadrons to France according to plans made by the British and French earlier in the year. The group was the first echelon of the AASF and flew from RAF Abingdon, RAF Harwell, RAF Benson, RAF Boscombe Down and RAF Bicester. Group headquarters became the AASF when the order to move to France was received and the home station HQs became 71, 72 and 74âÂÂ76 Wings. The Bristol Blenheims of No. 2 Group RAF were to become the second echelon as 70, 79 and 81âÂÂ83 Wings, flying from RAF Upper Heyford, RAF Wattisham, RAF Watton, RAF West Raynham and RAF Wyton; 70 Wing with 18 and 57 squadrons was converting from Battles to Blenheims and intended for the Air Component once the re-equipment was complete. On 3 September, as the British government declared war on Germany; the AASF Battle squadrons were getting used to their French airfields, which were somewhat rudimentary compared to their well-developed Bomber Command stations, some having to wait for the French to deliver aviation fuel.
Strategic bombing operations did not take place as the and Allied strategic bombers observed a tacit truce. The French tried to divert German resources from their Invasion of Poland with the Saar Offensive (7âÂÂ16 September), in which the Battle squadrons were to participate. The main bases were too far inside Germany but airstrips, supply dumps and reserves would be well within the range of the Battles. The British and French governments feared that they had more to lose by courting German retaliation but this deprived the Battle squadrons of a chance to test their equipment and tactics. The preparations did establish that Battles would attack targets within of the front line, including fleeting opportunities, much against the wishes of Group Captain John Slessor, a former director of plans at the Air Ministry, who stressed that the Battle crews were not trained for close support. Other officers thought that "...it is about as far as the Battle will be able to get with a return ticket". Playfair had the fuselage fuel tank removed from AASF Battles and the bomb bays were to be modified to carry anti-personnel bombs, once the equipment arrived in November.
Neither the French nor the British wanted the AASF to sit idle and the Battles began to conduct "high-altitude", formation, photographic reconnaissance sorties, to map the German front line but the Battle had a service ceiling of only and needed to be much lower for formation flying. Battle sorties began on the morning of 10 September, three aircraft of 150 Squadron flying inside Allied lines and photographing obliquely. On 19 September the Battles began to fly beyond the front line, at first, then . Playfair, mindful of the risk, tried to time sorties to coincide with French fighter operations in the vicinity and wanted close escorts if German fighters were around. Three Battles from 103 Squadron and three from 218 Squadron reconnoitred on 17 September, the Battles encountering intermittent anti-aircraft fire (). Bad weather led to a two-day lull, then on 20 September, three Battles from 88 Squadron west of Saarbrücken were attacked by three Messerschmitt Bf 109Ds, which shot down two of the Battles, whose defensive fire was ineffective. One Battle pilot crash-landed and his aircraft caught fire, killing the observer and gunner; the other Battle crashed the same way and the third Battle was hit in its fuel tanks and incinerated the crew.
Playfair concluded that Battles should receive an escort anywhere near the front line but the Air Ministry rejected the claim that more fighters were necessary and he had to ask the French instead. The Chief of Staff of the French Air Force (), Joseph Vuillemin, was short of fighters but promised to help, provided the British helped themselves. At a meeting on 28 September, the British representative repeated the claim that tight formation-flying and collective firepower obviated the need for escorts and Vuillemin cancelled French co-operation. Two days later, five Battles from 150 Squadron on reconnaissance near Saarbrücken and Merzig, were attacked by eight Bf 109Es. The Battles closed up but four were shot down, most in flames. The surviving Battle pilot ran for home and crashed on landing but saved his crew. The squadron immediately fitted its aircraft with an extra rear-facing gun in the bomb-aiming position against attacks from below and behind; in England the Air Ministry blamed the Battle, rather than faulty tactics and equipment and declared it obsolete. For protection against fighter attack, of armour for each aircraft was rushed to France and 15 and 40 squadrons returned to Britain to convert to Blenheims, being replaced by 114 and 139 squadrons which were already flying the type.
In England, discussions for a second-generation Battle took place and the AASF was ordered to train Battle crews for low-level tactical operations to avoid the Bf 109s. The crews practised attacks on road vehicles from as low as and some rehearsals had fighter escorts, a new task given to the AASF Hurricane squadrons. Air Chief Marshal Robert Brooke-Popham, having been dug out of retirement, inspected the RAF in France and organised a meeting with Fairey, the Air Ministry and crews from 150 Squadron, to discuss protection against ground fire. Fairey considered that the Battle was already at its maximum weight and that self-sealing fuel tanks and armour could be added only by reducing the bomb load or range. No one in Britain knew that the Battles in France had already had their fuselage fuel tanks removed, which had saved . Fairey suggested a ventral machine-gun [], crew armour [], safer fuel tanks [], armour around the rear gunner [] and another of ventral (underside) armour. Only the armour plate for the rear gunner needed to be manufactured and the extra armour was ordered to France as soon as possible.
Battle fuel tanks were to be given the French coating, which easily plugged holes from rifle-calibre bullets and also gave some protection from cannon fire. would use up the allotted for fuel tank protection and was still under test but of armour plates were added to the rear of the tanks against hits from behind. On 18 December, twenty-two Vickers Wellington medium bombers were sent to attack German ships in the Battle of the Heligoland Bight and eighteen were lost, many shot down in flames; some of those not shot down ran out of fuel from punctured fuel tanks. The fitting of self-sealing tanks became a crisis measure for Bomber Command and took precedence over the Battle modification, especially as their existing tanks had been armoured against hits from behind and the conversion was put back to March 1940. The extra armour decided on in September was apparently sent to France but never fitted to the Battles.
Operational instructions issued by BAFF included a warning that
The RAF had tried to improve the performance of its aircraft; streamlining the Blenheim had added to its speed. To remedy the vulnerability of Battles to attacks from below, a rear-facing machine-gun was fitted to the bomb-aimer's position but "...it needed a contortionist to fire it....",
Fairey designed a well in the floor of the bomb aiming position for the gunner to lie prone facing the rear but the change would need three months for development and testing. With in storage, the modifications could be done at Fairey and the aircraft swapped with those in France without interfering with AASF operations but the idea was shelved.
To speed production of new aircraft, a review was held to strip existing machines of superfluous equipment and the committee suggested that for tactical bombing, the Battle autopilot [], night flying gear [], bomb sight [] and the navigatorâÂÂbomb-aimer [] could be dispensed with, saving , which would allow the fitting of more forward-firing guns with no net increase in weight. The Air Ministry prevaricated and the equipment was not removed, the Ministry even deprecating the use of the existing forward-firing gun, which was supposed to be reserved for engagements with German fighters, not for strafing unless circumstances were exceptional.
On 11 October, Dornier Do 17 bombers begin to cross the lines at high altitude and one flew at over the 1 Squadron AASF fighter base at Vassincourt Airfield, only to be shot down near Vausigny. The two Hawker Hurricane fighter squadrons (67 Wing) were part of the AASF to provide fighter protection for their bases, with another squadron of Hurricanes in England made available as a reinforcement. The second echelon squadrons of 2 Group, with seven Blenheim squadrons and two Armstrong Whitworth Whitley medium bomber squadrons, stood ready to move to France if the Germans attacked. At on 8 November, 73 Squadron shot down a Do 17, its first victory of the war. To counter the high-flying Dorniers, seven fighter sectors were established on 21 November in (ZOAN, "Air Zone North") and (ZOAE, "Air Zone East") and on 22 November, 1 Squadron shot down two Do 17s in the morning, a Hurricane force-landing after being hit in the engine; early in the afternoon, three Hurricanes over Metz shared a Heinkel He 111 with the , one Hurricane being damaged in a collision with a French fighter; 73 Squadron claimed two Dorniers shot down and one damaged, shared with French fighters. For most of December, flying was washed out by bad weather but on 21 December, two Hurricanes shot down a French Potez 637 over Villers-sur-Meuse, with only one survivor. The next day, five Bf 109s bounced three 73 Squadron Hurricanes and shot two down.
On the declaration of war, the Air Component had come under the command of Lord Gort the Commander-in-Chief of the BEF and the AASF remained under Bomber Command control but based with the . Thought had been given to liaison and Air Missions had been installed in the main Allied headquarters but training exercises showed that communication was inadequate. In January 1940, command of the AASF and the Air Component was unified under Air Marshal Arthur Barratt as Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief British Air Forces in France (BAFF), the Air Component being detached from the BEF while remaining under its operational control and Bomber Command losing the AASF, since the Battle would not be used for strategic bombing. Barratt was charged with giving "full assurance" to the BEF of air support and to provide the BEF with
Since the British held only a small part of the Western Front, Barratt was expected to operate in the context of the immediate needs of the Allies. In France the new arrangement worked well but the War Office and the Air Ministry never agreed on what support should be given to the Field Force of the BEF. When Air Marshal Charles Portal replaced Edgar Ludlow-Hewitt as AOC-in-C Bomber Command on 3 April, he prevented the second echelon of the AASF from going to France, with the agreement of Cyril Newall, the Chief of the Air Staff. Portal took the view that fifty Blenheims attempting to attack an advancing army, using out of date information, could not achieve results commensurate with the expected losses. On 8 May he wrote,
The airfields occupied by the first echelon were still being equipped for operations and would become dangerously congested if the second echelon arrived. Barratt questioned the wisdom of an assumption that because the AASF was behind the Maginot Line, mobility was less important than that of the Air Component and approval was eventually given to make the AASF semi-mobile. Motorisation came too late and the AASF had to beg, steal or borrow French vehicles when squadrons changed base; by late April, the AASF strength had risen to
More flying was possible in January but the air forces spent most of February on the ground, with many of the aircrews on leave. The weather became much better for flying and on 2 March a Dornier was shot down by two 1 Squadron Hurricanes, one of the British pilots being killed while attempting a forced landing after being hit in the engine by return fire; next day, British fighters shot down a He 111. On 3 March, two 73 Squadron pilots escorting a Potez 63 at spotted seven He 111s higher and gave chase, only to be attacked by six Bf 109s. A Bf 109 overshot one of the Hurricanes, which fired on it as it drew ahead. The Bf 109 fell, leaving a trail of black smoke, the eleventh victory for the squadron. The Hurricane was hit by the third Bf 109 and the pilot only just managed to reach a French airfield and make an emergency landing. On the morning of 4 March, a 1 Squadron Hurricane shot down a Bf 109 over Germany and later, three other Hurricanes of the squadron attacked nine Messerschmitt Bf 110s north of Metz and shot one down. On 29 March, three Hurricanes of 1 Squadron were attacked by Bf 109s and Bf 110s over Bouzonville, a Bf 109 being shot down at Apach and a Bf 110 north-west of Bitche; a Hurricane pilot was killed trying to land at Brienne-le-Château.
In April the usual reconnaissance flights were flown by the and larger formations of fighters patrolled the front line with formations of up to three squadrons () flew at high altitude as far as Nancy and Metz. Reconnaissance aircraft began to cross the front line in squadron strength to benefit from greater firepower on the most dangerous part of the journey, before dispersing towards their objectives. Hurricanes shot down a Bf 109 on 7 April at Ham-sous-Varsberg and on 9 April, when the Germans began Operation Weserübung, the invasion of Denmark and Norway, Bomber Command aircraft were diverted to operations in Scandinavia.
The Battle squadrons took over leaflet raids over Germany by night and suffered no losses. The situation was unchanged until the night of 9/10 May, when the heavy guns of the German and French armies began to bombard the Maginot and Siegfried lines. In early May, the AASF had bombers, serviceable bombers being Battles. The had less than a hundred bombers, cent of which were obsolescent. The in the west had aircraft, including about and bombers.
As dawn broke, German bombers made a coordinated, hour-long attack on 72 airfields in the Netherlands, Belgium and France, inflicting severe losses on the Belgian Air Component (/) and the Royal Netherlands Air Force (). The bombers flew in formations of three to thirty or but had least effect on the British and French airfields, over which British and French fighters intercepted the German raiders. Nine British-occupied bases were attacked to little effect. Hurricanes of 1 Squadron at Vassincourt patrolled the Maginot Line from and shot down a for one Hurricane damaged. At A Flight shot down a Do 17 near Dun-sur-Meuse for one Hurricane crash-landed.
At Rouvres, two 73 Squadron Hurricanes attacked three bombers over the airfield, damaging one for a Hurricane forced down damaged. At four Hurricanes attacked eleven Do 17s near the airfield, one Hurricane landing in flames with a badly burned pilot and one Hurricane returning damaged. More Hurricanes were scrambled and shot down two Do 17s; a He 111 was shot down soon afterwards. Orders to 73 Squadron led to it moving back from its forward airfield to its base in the AASF area around Reims. From England, 501 Squadron with Hurricanes, landed at Bétheniville to join the AASF and went into action within the hour against forty He 111 bombers. A transport aircraft ferrying pilots and ground crews of the squadron crashed on landing; three pilots were killed and six injured.
The AASF bomber squadrons remained on the ground waiting for orders but the bombing policy established by (GQG, French supreme headquarters) did not require the British to obtain permission. At Chauny, Barratt and d'Astier discussed reconnaissance reports and Barratt ordered the AASF into action. A German column had been reported in Luxembourg by a French reconnaissance aircraft several hours earlier. The French bomber squadrons received orders and counter-orders; some were sent to make low-level demonstrations to reassure French troops and were intercepted by German fighters. The AASF squadrons had been on stand-by since one flight in each squadron at thirty minutes' readiness and the other at two hours' notice. Barratt called General Alphonse Georges, commander of the (North-eastern Theatre of Operations) to tell him that the AASF would commence operations but it took until to give the order to attack. Thirty-two Battles from 12, 103, 105, 142, 150, 218 and 226 squadrons flew at low altitude, in groups of two to four bombers, to attack German columns.
The first wave of eight Battles had support from five 1 Squadron and three 73 Squadron Hurricanes, sent to patrol over Luxembourg City and clear away German fighters. The two fighter formations were not co-ordinated and had only vague orders; the three 73 Squadron Hurricanes attacked a force of unescorted German bombers and were bounced by German fighters before they made contact with the Battles. At least one Hurricane was shot down; the 1 Squadron pilots saw what was happening but were too low to help. The Battles hedge-hopped towards the target and evaded the German fighters but were well inside the range of German ground fire. Two Battles of 12 Squadron attacked at and one was shot down as it approached the target. The second aircraft strafed the column with its forward firing machine-gun and bombed; neither side could miss and the Battle crash-landed in a field. Another twelve Battles were shot down and most of the rest were damaged.
In the afternoon, a second raid by 32 Battles flying at was intercepted by Bf 109s and ten were shot down by fighters and ground fire. During the day, AASF and Air Component Hurricanes claimed sixty aircraft shot down, sixteen probables and twenty-two damaged. The AASF Hurricanes had flown 47 sorties and been provisionally credited with shooting down six bombers for five Hurricanes shot down or force-landed in a 1999 analysis by Cull et al. No aircraft From Bomber Command in England appeared because the British state was preoccupied with a change in government. Barratt requested support and during the night, Bomber Command sent 36 Wellington bombers to attack Waalhaven and eight Whitleys from 77 and 102 squadrons bombed transport bottlenecks into the southern Netherlands at Geldern, Goch and Aldekirk; Rees and Wesel over the German border also being raided.
As Blenheim crews of 114 Squadron at Vraux were preparing to take off to attack German tank columns in the Ardennes, nine Dornier 17s appeared at treetop height and bombed them, destroying several Blenheims, damaging others and causing casualties. From 9:30 to 10:00 a.m., eight Battles in two flights of two sections each from 88 and 218 squadrons took off to raid German troop concentrations near Prüm over the border in the Rhineland, where two panzer divisions had begun their westwards advance the day before and were already past Chabrehez, inside Belgium. From Reims, the Battles had to make a flight diagonally across the front. The raid was the first by 88 Squadron whose two sections flew apart to give the Germans no time to react. The Battles received constant small-arms fire at the vicinity of Neufchâteau, from Prüm and for the rest of the approach.
An aircraft from the second flight force-landed near Bastogne, two more were lost near St Vith and the surviving aircraft had fuel sloshing around the cockpit. The pilot turned back and attacked a column in a narrow valley at Udler, short of Prüm but the bomb-release gear had been damaged and they did not drop; the Battle managed to return and land at Vassincourt, the four Battles from 218 Squadron disappeared. An attack planned for the afternoon was cancelled because of the dusk and because Barratt wanted to conserve his aircraft. The Belgian government appealed to the Allies to destroy the Albert Canal bridges around Maastricht but the Germans had already installed many anti-aircraft guns there. Six Belgian Battles out of nine from Aeltre were shot down around noon along with two of the six fighter escorts, the three survivors causing no damage.
Six Blenheims from 21 Squadron and six from 110 Squadron in Britain attacked next from . As the bombers approached they met massed anti-aircraft fire and broke formation to attack from different directions, only to spot Bf 109s and form up again. Four Blenheims were shot down, the rest were damaged and no bomb hit the target. Ten modern French LeO 451s from GB I/12 and II/12, escorted by Morane-Saulnier M.S.406 fighters, attempted the first French bombing raid of the battle and set fire to some German vehicles but failed to hit the bridges. The Morane pilots attacked the German fighters and claimed five Bf 109s for four Moranes; one LeO 451 was shot down and the rest so badly damaged that they were out of action for several days. During the night of Barratt called on Bomber Command to attack transport targets around München-Gladbach; Whitleys from 51, 58, 77 and 102 squadrons, with Hampdens from 44, 49, 50, 61 and 144 squadrons sent but five Hampdens returned early and only half the remainder claimed to have bombed the target. A Whitley and two Hampdens were shot down, the two Hampden crews, minus a pilot, making their way back to Allied lines. AASF, Air Component and 11 Group Hurricane pilots claimed 55 German aircraft and French fighter pilots in the RAF area claimed another 15; analysis by Cull et al. in 1999 attributed 34 aircraft destroyed or damaged to Hurricane pilots.
At nine Blenheims of 139 Squadron flew from Plivot to attack a German column near Tongeren but were intercepted by fifty Bf 109s and lost seven aircraft, two of the crews returning on foot after crash-landing. At Amifontaine, 12 Squadron was briefed for an attack on the bridges near Maastricht with six Battles. After the fate of the Belgian Battles the day before, the commander asked for volunteers and every pilot stepped forward; the six crews on standby were chosen. Two Blenheim squadrons were supposed to attack Maastricht at the same time as a diversion and twelve Hurricane squadrons were flying in support but half of these were operating to the north-west and the others were only flying in the vicinity, except for 1 Squadron, which was to sweep ahead to clear away German fighters.
Three Battles of B Flight were to attack the bridge at Veldwezelt and three from A Flight the bridge at Vroenhoven. Two Battles of A Flight took off at and climbed to ; short of Maastricht, the aircraft received anti-aircraft fire, surprising the crews with the extent of the German advance. The Hurricane pilots saw about fighters above them and attacked; three Bf 109s and six Hurricanes were shot down. During the diversion, A Flight dived over the MaastrichtâÂÂTongeren road towards the Vroenhoven bridge covered by three Hurricanes; a Bf 109 closed on the leading aircraft, then veered off towards the second Battle, which hid in a cloud. The Battles dived from and bombed at , both being hit in the engine, one Battle came down in a field, the crew being captured. The second Battle crew, having shaken off the Bf 109, saw bombs from the first Battle explode on the bridge and hit the water and the side of the canal. The second Battle pilot turned away, amidst a web of tracer from ground fire and was then damaged by a Bf 109 fighter, which was hit by the rear gunner. The port fuel tank caught fire and the pilot ordered the crew to parachute, then he noticed that the fire had gone out. The pilot nursed the bomber home but ran out of fuel a few miles short and landed in a field; the observer got back to Amifontaine but the gunner was taken prisoner.
Five minutes later, B Flight attacked the bridge at Veldwezelt, having flown over Belgium in line astern at . One Battle was hit and caught fire before the target, bombed and crashed near the canal; the pilot, despite severe burns, saving the crew who were taken prisoner. A second Battle was hit, zoomed while on fire, dived into the ground and exploded, killing the crew. The third Battle made a steep turn near the bridge then dived into it, destroying the west end. German engineers began immediately to build a pontoon bridge and as they worked, from 2 Group in England attacked the bridges at Maastricht; ten were shot down. At 18 Breguet 693s from with Morane 406 fighter escorts, attacked German tank columns in the area of Hasselt, St Trond, Liège and Maastricht, losing eight bombers. Twelve attacked columns around Tongeren, St Trond and Waremme at and survived, despite most being damaged. Late in the afternoon, fifteen Battles flew against German troops near Bouillon and six were shot down. During the night, forty Blenheims of 2 Group flew in relays against the Maastricht bridges with few losses.
At daybreak, the AASF intervened against the German advance towards Sedan for the first time, three Battles of 103 Squadron attacking a bridge over the Semois, the last river east of the Meuse. The Battles flew very low and all returned. At about three more Battles of 103 Squadron attacked the bridge from and were intercepted by Bf 110s. The Battles dived and hedge hopped to evade the fighters, bombing a pontoon bridge next to the ruins of the original one from and escaped. At about three Battles of 150 Squadron bombed German columns around Neufchâteau and Bertrix, east of Bouillon. One Battle was hit and crashed in flames but the other two bombed from and got away. At three 103 Squadron Battles and three from 218 Squadron attacked in the vicinity of Bouillon, the Battles from 103 Squadron flew individually at low altitude and those of 218 Squadron flew in formation at . General cover was provided by the Hurricanes of 73 Squadron but they claimed only a Henschel Hs 126 reconnaissance aircraft. Two 218 Squadron Battles were shot down and the low-level attack by 103 Squadron cost two more, the squadron having decided to dispense with the navigator for tactical operations by day.
The surviving crew of 103 Squadron had also protected themselves by attacking a German tank column west of the target and running for home, according to the original AASF intention of attacking the first German troops encountered. Barratt had decided that the Battles should attack from a higher altitude to reduce losses from ground fire but Playfair took the view that the new policy would not put the Battles out of range of German anti-aircraft guns. The results of the operations on 12 May gave no conclusive evidence that low attacks were more dangerous. In the sixty sorties since 10 May the Battle squadrons had lost thirty aircraft and in the evening Barratt was ordered to conserve his force until the climax of the battle. In emergencies, the AASF was supposed to maintain a tempo of two-hourly attacks but this proved impossible; Playfair was ordered to rest the Battle squadrons on 13 May. By the end of the day, the AASF had been reduced to bombers. AASF and Air Component Hurricanes were confronted by more Bf 109s over the front line, which shot down at least six of the twelve Hurricanes lost. The two Hurricane forces claimed 60 aircraft shot down, probables or damaged, 27 being attributed to them in a 1999 analysis.
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